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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Prescription drugs play an ever-increasing role in health care sectors. 
Expenditures for prescription drugs leaped by nearly 500 percent to $234.1 billion in 
2008, compared to the $40.3 billion observed in 1990 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2010). Portions of this increase can be attributed to price inflation and a blend of 
utilization and mix factors, such as increased drug use, availability of innovative but 
more expensive agents, and preference for brand-name drugs over generic alternatives. 
Although the rate of growth in prescription drug expenditures have displayed a 
downside trend since the early 2000s, even falling to 1.6 percent in 2007 (Aitken, 
Berndt et al. 2009), it is projected to persistently outpace the growth rate for hospital 
care and physician services through 2019 (Truffer, Keehan et al. 2010).  
Meanwhile, prescription drug coverage is becoming more expensive to obtain 
for non-elderly adult population, as a consequence of large changes in drug benefits 
and incremental cost shifting from insurers to policyholders. Given the concern about 
the skyrocketing costs of prescribed medications and the growing population lacked 
adequate insurance coverage, there is continuing academic and policy interest in how 
insurance affects prescription drug expenditures and utilization, especially among 
chronically ill individuals (Blustein 2000; Shea, Terza et al. 2007; Solomon, Goldman 
et al. 2009).  
Unlike the healthy individuals who require simple routine check up and 
scheduled immunizations, those with chronic conditions need much more 
comprehensive health care over time (Bodenheimer and Berry-Millett 2009). Such 
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life-threatening chronic conditions as hypertension and diabetes frequently cause 
higher rates of utilization and expenditures on a range of costly health care services 
including those not related to hypertension and diabetes treatment, when some 
combination of chronic conditions occur (Anderson and Knickman 2001) or 
additional acute conditions are developed due to the uncontrolled chronic conditions 
(Norris, High et al. 2008).  
Because prescription drugs are instrumental to managing chronic conditions, it 
generally accounts for a great portion of total expenditures on health care for 
chronically ill individuals. If health insurance to some degree eliminates financial 
barriers to initiate drug therapy for the treatment of chronic conditions, it has the 
potential to substantially lower individuals’ out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures 
associated with the use of other health care services related to the uncontrolled 
condition, and ultimately, to achieve better health outcomes. However, the task of 
uncovering the role of health insurance on the demand for prescription drugs is 
complicated by the classic adverse selection and moral hazard problems, that is, 
individuals who purchase health insurance do not constitute a random part of the 
population; presumably, individuals, particularly those with chronic conditions, have 
higher willingness to pay than individuals who refrain from buying. As a consequence, 
the insured could be less healthy and end up with more consumption of health care 
services than their counterparts with no insurance.  
Although both selection and moral hazard have been well-documented in 
public and private health insurance settings (Pauly and Zeng 2004; Finkelstein and 
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McGarry 2006; Einav and Finkelstein 2011), most empirical studies achieve restricted 
findings on individuals’ insurance choice and their demand for prescription drugs, 
which only hold for a specific subgroup of the overall population (Krobot, Miller et al. 
2004; Shea, Terza et al. 2007; Huh, Rice et al. 2008).  
Several major causes can led to this disparity in findings. First, there are 
variations in key features such as sample size, benefit design both cross plans and 
over time, identification strategies as well as efforts to control for other factors 
relevant to insurance choice and subsequent prescription use. Second, there might be 
different anticipated behavioral responses that affect individuals’ likelihood to select 
such plans, depending on their current health status as well as financial constraint. 
Further, there might be different ex post behavioral responses to the change in 
medical prices due to insurance effects, depending on the conditions that the medical 
treatments aim at. Therefore, for chronically ill individuals, their responses to health 
insurance, especially to plans with drug coverage, depend on the conditions the 
prescription drugs treat.  
Existing literature indicates that consumer sensitivity to cost sharing varies 
across therapeutic classes (Federman, Adams et al. 2001; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 
2003; Goldman, Joyce et al. 2007) and increased net prices of drugs may decrease the 
use of ‘nonessential’ drugs more than the use of ‘essential’ drugs (Martin and 
McMillan 1996; Mueller, Schur et al. 1997; Piette, Heisler et al. 2006). This makes 
identifying therapeutic classes essential for interpretation of empirical results on 
individuals’ demand for prescription drugs.        
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In recognition of the value of health insurance and critical importance of 
prescription drugs to patients, this study employs a theoretical economic model for the 
utility maximizing behavior of non-elderly adults with chronic conditions. At the 
individual level, both descriptive and multiple regression analyses are employed to 
explore the variation in prescription drug OOP expenditures and utilization by health 
insurance status, by chronic conditions and by socioeconomic factors. Four chronic 
conditions which require pharmaceutical intensive treatment are selected, i.e. 
hypertension, diabetes, depression and asthma. Empirical results are generated using 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data along with the Red Book files 
included in the Medstat Database to investigate the determinants of an individual’s 
insurance choice and update estimates of the association between an individual’s 
insurance choice and prescription drug utilization and expenditures.  
 
1.1 Research Questions 
This study addresses three related research questions: 
1. What factors are associated with a chronically ill individual’s insurance choice, 
out-of-pocket (OOP) prescription drug expenditures and utilization? 
2. How is private health insurance associated with OOP prescription drug 
expenditures and utilization among the chronically ill? 
3. Does the association between private health insurance and prescription drug 
utilization differ by type of chronic condition? 
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1.2 Hypotheses 
Three hypotheses related to the conceptual model and research questions of 
this study will be examined.  
1. Insurance plans, especially those with drug coverage are positively associated 
with utilization of prescription drugs for all non-elderly adults with chronic 
conditions. 
Because health insurance lowers the net price of health care services while 
drug coverage may further ease access to prescription drug treatment, it is expected 
that insurance plans, especially those with drug coverage, will encourage the use of 
prescription drugs.    
2. Drug coverage is negatively associated with OOP expenditures on prescription 
drugs for all non-elderly adults with chronic conditions. 
Drug coverage may trigger moral hazard, which is likely to result in higher 
prescription drug utilization as well as OOP expenditures associated with the use. 
However, empirical evidences indicate that individual with no drug coverage face 
greater financial burdens with higher OOP drug expenditures (Stuart, Shea et al. 2000; 
Poisal and Murray 2001).  
The scope of the moral hazard problem could be less severe than expected. 
First, in theory, most individuals would weigh the benefits of prescription drug with 
both the financial and non-financial costs before purchase. With drug coverage, the 
financial pressure to individuals is low, but still exists. Meanwhile, the non-financial 
costs such as physical uncomfortableness and time costs could be innegligible. 
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Second, recent research have shown effective efforts from health plans and pharmacy 
benefit managers to reduce drug use and steer policyholders to less-expensive 
alternatives (Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; Huskamp, Epstein et al. 2003; Goldman, 
Joyce et al. 2004). Therefore, it is expected that drug coverage is negatively 
associated with OOP expenditures on prescription drugs for policyholders. 
3. The magnitude of the association between private health insurance and 
prescription drug utilization varies across conditions.  
There is only a limited understanding about the specific chronic condition and 
drug characteristics that individuals take into account when deciding whether to forgo 
treatment and the level of conditional use. Existing literature suggests the value of 
drug treatment to an individual depends on its therapeutic importance to health 
outcome (Soumerai, Avorn et al. 1987; Stuart and Grana 1998). This study take note 
of empirical research by Pylypchuk (2010) which estimates the demand for 
prescription drugs to treat a series of chronic conditions. It is relevant to the present 
study because it suggests that the variation in noticeability of conditions’ symptom is 
an alternative measure to ‘poor or fair health’ in capturing an individual’s actual 
health status. Moreover, this measure is likely to reflect an individual’s utilization 
behavior. This study would further investigate the demand for prescription drugs by 
extending the analysis to not only the sub-population with such chronic physical 
conditions as hypertension, diabetes and asthma but also the sub-population with such 
chronic mental conditions as depression.  
The present study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
factors associated with insurance choice and the relationship between health insurance 
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and prescription drug expenditures and utilization, highlighting the limitation of 
previous studies and the value added from the present approach. Section 3 provides a 
brief theoretical framework, based on which the model is specified in the next section. 
Section 4 specifies the empirical model. Section 5 describes the data source, and 
discusses the empirical strategy. Section 6 analyzes the results and section 7 draws 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Moral Hazard 
The conventional wisdom suggests that insurance could lead to the 
paradoxical outcome of inducing risky and overconsumption behavior. Most 
consumers choose health insurance because they prefer a certain loss to an uncertain 
loss of a similar expected magnitude (Nyman 2004). As a result, consumer choice 
occurs in sequential stages, the first a choice of health insurance based on expectation 
of future health condition as well as individual risk preference, and the second a series 
of health care services given the insurance policy and the individual’s budget 
constraint. Therefore, having health insurance, especially with drug benefits, could 
theoretically motivate individuals to consume more prescription drugs, because their 
OOP costs are less than the full prices. This effect of insurance on health care demand 
is termed the moral hazard effect (Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968).  
Numerous studies compared prescription drug use by the poor and by 
vulnerable populations with and without insurance (Grootendorst 1997; Poisal and 
Chulis 2000). Despite employing different methods and different populations, 
researchers consistently found that the presence of insurance is associated with greater 
use of prescription drugs, although only a few used a representative sample (Lillard, 
Rogowski et al. 1999; Shea, Terza et al. 2007; Huh, Rice et al. 2008; Khan, Kaestner 
et al. 2008). However, the estimated value of the correlation between insurance and 
drug use has a wide range. Lillard, Rogowski et al. (1999) documented that insurance 
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was associated with over 12 percent increase in the probability of any drug use. Shea, 
Terza et al. (2007) found that the probability of any prescription drug use increased by 
30 percent and drug fills increased by almost 50 percent if the individual had 
prescription drug insurance whereas Khan, Kaestner et al. (2008) predicted the 
increase of prescription fills associated with drug coverage to be 6 percent to 10 
percent. 
2.2 Adverse and Favorable Self-selection 
The estimated association between insurance and drug use should be 
interpreted with caution. There could have been unobservable aspects of individual’s 
health status affecting both self-selection of health insurance and the subsequent 
choice of health care utilization when ill. A classic argument is that individuals with 
poorer health and higher expected drug use have more incentive to buy health 
insurance with drug coverage. In this case, the individual’s unobserved characteristics, 
which are related to both the explanatory variable of interest (e.g. insurance choice) 
and the dependent variable (e.g. prescription expenditures or use), may upwardly bias 
the estimate of association between insurance and drug use. Such bias is also known 
as “endogeneity” in econometrics terms.  
Meanwhile, profit-maximizing insurance companies may have incentives to 
design plans that attract lower-risk individuals. Under this scenario, favorable 
self-selection arising from insurance plan behavior could downwardly bias the 
estimate of interest. However, evidences on self-section in insurance choice are mixed 
across studies. Focusing on the non-elderly with private insurance, Strumwasser, 
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Paranjpe et al. (1989) documented that Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) 
systematically enrolled favorable risks. Dowd, Feldman et al. (1991) reported that 
selection bias was small and insignificant. Nicholson, Bundorf et al. (2004) found no 
evidence that HMOs attracted low-risk enrollees. Similarly, Schaefer and Reschovsky 
(2002) indicated that HMO enrollees were not healthier and even slightly less healthy 
among the privately insured. More recently, evidence presented in Shin and Moon 
(2007) suggests that there is no difference in mental and physical limitations between 
HMO and non-HMO enrollees, whereas HMO enrollees seem to have fewer 
comorbidities on average than their counterparts. They explain that the age 
distribution of HMO enrollees is younger. Considering this, it is not surprising that 
health conditions among HMO enrollees are slightly better than their counterparts, 
based on the number of comorbidities.  
2.3 Modeling the Relationship between Insurance Choice, Utilization and 
Expenditures 
To avoid selection bias issues, some research uses experimental data which are 
scarce and often out of date (Manning, Newhouse et al. 1987; Ligon 1993). Indeed, 
without a randomized controlled trial (e.g. HMO group vs. fee-for-service counterpart) 
like the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), the relationship between insurance 
and prescription utilization can only be interpreted as correlated and not causal. 
However, the Rand HIE itself did not study people without health insurance, so it 
could not fully determine how the presence or absence of health insurance affects 
health care utilization. Besides, Rand HIE focused on “bundled” comprehensive 
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coverage, implying that the level of coverage of all medical care was changed 
together. There was no experiment in which drug coverage differed, holding the level 
of coverage of all other medical care constant. Further, the Rand HIE was questioned 
for its generalizability of comparisons of health care from HMOs and fee-for-service 
(FFS) sectors given the fact that data on the former were based on a “single, relatively 
small but well-managed” HMO in Seattle (Ginzberg 1992). Nevertheless, the Rand 
HIE is still referenced as a “gold standard” study in research on the effects of health 
insurance and opened the way for increased cost-sharing for health care through the 
1990s.  
Inspired by the Rand HIE, a number of studies on prescription demand have 
focused on the effects of alterations in insurance benefits such as the addition of 
copayment and increased coinsurance rate. However, there remains little systematic 
evidence on how consumers’ prescription use and OOP expenditures vary by the 
levels of insurance. 
Historically, HMOs were known to provide more generous drug coverage than 
other insurers and thus incurred higher drug use (Weiner, Lyles et al. 1991). However, 
with the influx of enrollees into HMOs and the prevalence of chronic disease, HMOs 
and other drug payers alike have introduced cost containment measures - through the 
use of both physician-oriented and demand-oriented instruments - to curtail the use of 
unnecessary drugs and alleviate the financial stress of health plans.  
The literature suggests that physician-oriented instruments such as prescribing 
rules and restrictions, physician education, and financial incentive are effective for 
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cost containment (Robinson 2001; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002), particularly in 
HMOs who bear the risk of medication costs (Wallack, Thomas et al. 2007) and can 
limit their reimbursement to the network of providers. In a qualitative case study of 
managed health plans in California, it was shown that drug control efforts directed at 
physicians contributed to decreasing expenditures by emphasizing generic substitution 
and therapeutic interchange of less expensive drugs (Wallack, Weinberg et al. 2004). 
Using the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, Rice (2011) investigated how 
managed care, HMOs in particular, had an impact on physicians’ prescribing behavior 
of generic substitutes. However, the result suggested that the probability of 
prescribing generic drugs were not significantly different between HMO physicians 
and non-HMO physicians. Further, the variation in generic prescribing rates across 
the two physician sample, as well as within each sample, largely depends on drug 
classes and individual drug characteristics such as generic-brand price differential and 
the length of time a brand-name drug has been on the market relative to its 
alternatives.  
Meanwhile, there are many efficient demand-oriented instruments that intend 
to influence the behavior of the insured via user fees, including copayments (a flat 
rate per prescription), coinsurance (a percentage of the expense paid by the insured), 
deductibles (a fixed amount of expense paid by the insured before the benefits of the 
insurance plan can apply), multi-tiered formularies (differential copayment or 
coinsurance rate to multiple tiers of drugs, based on the type of prescribed 
medications and insurer preference, e.g. generic drugs, preferred brand-name drugs 
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and non-preferred brand-name drugs in a three-tier formulary). 
An early study (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990) found that progressively higher 
copayment levels resulted in decreased drug utilization among the non-elderly insured 
in HMO plans. Several recent studies (Horn, Sharkey et al. 1998; Thomas, Wallack et 
al. 2002; Huskamp, Epstein et al. 2003) also showed that the adoption of multi-tiered 
formularies and the accompanying changes in copayments resulted in lower 
utilization and expenditures on drugs, although most of the savings go to the insurers, 
not to the insured. Furthermore, higher copayments and multi-tiered formulary plans 
reduced the use of clinically important drugs that prevented progression of such 
chronic conditions as hypertension, diabetes and depression (Landsman, Yu et al. 
2005; Lu, Ross-Degnan et al. 2008), although the reduction in “essential” drug use 
due to cost control measures could be less than that in “nonessential” drug use 
(Soumerai, Avorn et al. 1987; Fortess, Soumerai et al. 2001; Tamblyn, Laprise et al. 
2001). Although demand-side interventions help to limit the use of unnecessary and 
expensive drugs, it may also lead to an increase in the use of other types of medical 
care (Soumerai, McLaughlin et al. 1994).  
By comparing health care spending patterns of HMO enrollees with non-HMO 
counterparts among the non-elderly privately insured, Shin and Moon (2007) found 
that having HMO enabled individuals to lower total OOP expenditures as a whole. 
However, it did not alleviate cost sharing for policyholders on prescription drugs in 
particular. One limitation of this study is that it provided little detail on how the HMO 
enrollees differ with their non-HMO counterparts in drug use or expenditures since it 
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did not further differentiate plans by drug benefits. 
Allowing a consumer to choose among four insurance options: no insurance, 
private non-HMO without drug coverage, private non-HMO with drug coverage, and 
private HMO with drug coverage, Pylypchuk (2010) estimated multivariate models of 
the determinants of the probability of any drug use and the conditional level of 
expenditures among the non-elderly chronically ill. The models were run separately 
for individuals with hypertension, diabetes and asthma. His study reveals several 
interesting findings.  
First, individuals with drug coverage have a higher propensity to start drug 
treatment and to spend more on prescription drugs, compared with the uninsured or 
those with insurance but no drug coverage. However, there is mixed evidence of self 
selection into insurance choice. For example, in the hypertension sample, a few health 
risk factors such as diabetes, disability and angina are positively related to health 
coverage. In the asthma sample, however, respondents reporting eye or kidney 
problems caused by diabetes are less likely to choose plans with drug coverage. 
Pylypchuk concluded that the overall tendency of self-selection was adverse for 
health coverage. Future research should shed more light on this issue by further 
investigating different subgroups across more conditions.  
The second major finding in Pylypchuk’s study is that the nature of the 
symptoms associated with a condition affects a patient’s OOP spending on 
prescription drugs. Generally speaking, individuals with health coverage have higher 
probability of any drug use and conditional higher level of utilization relative to the 
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uninsured as mentioned earlier. However, the chronically ill are less responsive to 
insurance status than the overall population. Further, patients with such asymptomatic 
chronic conditions as hypertension are more sensitive to insurance status than those 
with such symptomatic chronic conditions as asthma. However, due to data 
constraints, Pylypchuk failed to control the therapeutic class of drugs, which 
represents a significant indicator of intended effect as well as a potentially important 
factor in determining a patient’s response to health insurance.  
In addition, the variation in the magnitude of insurance impact on drug 
expenditures across different conditions might also occur because insurance plans 
may differ in ways that influence individuals’ prescription utilization pattern and, 
ultimately, their OOP expenditures. There could have been variation in covered drugs 
and cost sharing. Some have encountered increased cost-sharing for brand name drugs 
as insurance plans have adopted wider use of tiered formularies that impose higher 
copayment for more expensive drugs of certain therapeutic classes.  
In summary, the findings of previous studies on the impact of insurance choice 
have been mixed, regardless of whether the outcome was prescription utilization or 
OOP expenditures. These inconclusive findings are the result of variation in research 
designs, difference in investigated populations, and more importantly, limitation in 
analyses. Those analyses were performed at the aggregate rather than the individual 
level; did not control for the medical condition of patients, nor the severity of that 
condition; did not specify the therapeutic class of drugs; did not disaggregate 
prescription drugs into generic and brand-name components to indentify whether 
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there is variation in the magnitude of utilization and OOP expenditures as a result of 
different utilization pattern.  
The present study estimates the association between health insurance choice 
and prescription drug expenditures and utilization. It improves upon previous studies 
with more recent data and controls of prescribed therapeutic classes to ensure 
utilization to be related to the treatment for target conditions. In addition, by 
controlling therapeutic classes, the present study compares individuals’ demand on 
prescription drugs by chronic condition in response to different sources and levels of 
health insurance coverage. Further, by distinguishing brand name drugs from generic 
drugs, the present study examines whether individuals with drug coverage are more 
likely to purchase brand name drugs than those who have to pay for the entire costs; 
whether individuals covered by HMO plans are more likely to purchase generic 
substitutes than their counterparts covered by non-HMO plans with drug coverage.  
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Chapter 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
According to neoclassical economy theory, an individual selects a bundle of 
goods to maximize his utility, subject to a budget constraint. In the context of health 
care, Grossman (1972) constructed a theoretical model of the demand for health. The 
model views health as both a consumption good that produces direct utility and an 
investment good that produces satisfaction to an individual indirectly through greater 
productivity, fewer sick days and higher income. In the standard neoclassical 
framework, health capital is a stock variable defined by an initial level of health that 
depreciates over time and investments in health made through the consumption of 
medical goods such as prescription drugs and other medical services, along with 
random shocks. To determine the optimal investment in health and consumption of 
other goods, the individual maximizes the utility as well as the health capital subject 
to the budget constraint.  
As a result, the demand for prescription drugs is a derived demand from the 
optimal investment in health. It follows that, given an individual’s utility function, all 
other things equal, the demand for prescription drugs is a function of prices of 
prescription drugs and other medical goods and services, the individual’s income and 
other exogenous socio-demographic factors. Because prescription price itself is a 
function of the individual’s insurance status and level of coverage, the theory implies 
that insurance choice will affect a consumer’s demand for prescription drugs.  
Because individuals are forward looking, those who expect to have greater 
demand for health care (e.g. those with chronic conditions or high multimorbidity 
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levels) may have more incentives to obtain health insurance coverage. Therefore, 
individuals face a two-stage decision. The theoretical framework for the present 
analysis follows closely the modeling efforts by Cameron, Trivedi et al. (1988), Mello, 
Stearns et al. (2002) and Koc (2004).  
In the first stage, a risk-averse individual uses the available information to 
form an expectation regarding the distribution of future health status and makes an 
optimal choice of health insurance coverage that yields maximized utility. The 
optimality condition for the insurance decision is derived from the first order 
condition of one’s utility function, where the marginal cost of health insurance equals 
the marginal value of health insurance. The marginal cost of insurance takes the form 
of foregone consumption as the individual ends up with additional health insurance. 
The marginal benefit of insurance can be viewed as the value of extra medical goods 
or services.  
Except for the premium and copayment of a given insurance contract, an 
individual’s insurance choice is theorized to be influenced by both the personal 
characteristics of the decision maker – including actual or perceived health status, 
socio-demographic characteristics and economic factors (Phelps 1992) – and the 
characteristics of the local health plan market such as managed care penetration rate 
(Mello, Stearns et al. 2002; Koc 2004).  
In the second stage, nature determines the individual’s health state. The 
individual then makes optimal health care consumption based on the realized health 
state, health insurance status chosen in the previous stage and other 
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socio-demographics characteristics. Following the same logic, if enough information 
about prescription drugs could be obtained, the individual will weigh the cost and 
benefit of additional drugs relative to other means of producing health before 
consuming a combination of medical goods and services for maximized utility, 
subject to the given preference set and budget constraint. 
In this conceptual model, health status and socio-demographic characteristics 
related to health care consumption affect both an individual’s insurance choice and 
the subsequent utilization. Managed care market penetration is correlated with 
individuals’ health insurance choice but not directly with utilization, given observed 
insurance status.    
As mentioned before, the endogeneity of insurance choice complicates the 
estimation of the relationship between insurance and health care use, when some 
unobserved factors may an individual’s decision to enter an insurance contract or not 
and therefore create a self-selection bias. The recent evidence from Shea, Terza et al. 
(2007) suggests that selection into insurance is predictable based on observable health. 
This finding mitigates concerns about endogeneity for private insurance plans. The 
present model controls for health status and other observable characteristics by using 
a set of variables typically absent from most current data set such as morbidity, 
diagnosed conditions and individuals’ attitude towards risk-taking behavior.  
In addition, the association of insurance choice and prescription drug 
expenditures is identified by employment characteristics variables, including whether 
the individual is self-employed and whether the individual is a union member. 
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Previous literature has shown that self-employment is a valid predictor for health 
insurance coverage (Meer and Rosen 2004). The self-employed normally face a 
higher price for health insurance compared to wage earners, due to adverse selection 
or administrative cost (Holtz-Eakin, Penrod et al. 1996; Hamilton 2000). Therefore, 
the self-employed are less likely to be insured than their counterparts.  
Union membership is another good predictor in a model of insurance choice 
and health care demand. Freeman and Medoff (1984) have highlighted the significant 
impact of labor unions on the provision of employer-based health insurance in the 
United States. Generous health coverage are highly attractive to older and less mobile 
inframarginal workers that have greater demand for health care. Therefore, union 
members have higher propensity to obtain insurance and less restrictive benefits 
(Pauly and Herring 2007; Ahking, Giaccotto et al. 2009).  
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Chapter 4. THE MODEL 
The present study uses a set of several equations to examine the determinants 
of healthcare decision: insurance, utilization and spending. The model consists of a 
discrete insurance choice from four categories and two types of outcome equations i.e. 
expenditure equations and utilization equations, with binary and expenditure 
dependent variable measuring OOP expenditures and binary and count dependent 
variable measuring utilization. 
4.1 Insurance Choice Equation 
The insurance choice set is composed of four mutually exclusive insurance 
categories that are similar to the study by Pylypchuk (2010): uninsured, private 
non-HMO with drug coverage, HMO with drug coverage, and any private health 
insurance without drug coverage. The specification of this choice set will be presented 
in the next chapter.   
It is assumed that each individual will choose from these four categories, 
which can yield the highest utility to this individual. Let dij = 1 if individual i chooses 
insurance j (j=0,…,3). Let Vj be the latent utility associated with the corresponding jth 
insurance category. Then, for individual i, his insurance choice of j is modeled as: 
dij = 1 if Vij = max (Vi0, …, Vi3)           (1) 
where ' ' ,( , ) 0,...,3ij i i j ijV x z u jα= + = . Vector ix contains a constant term, 
socio-demographic and health status variables. Information contained in this vector 
might also affect prescription expenditures and utilization. Variables assumed to 
affect insurance choice but with no direct impacts on prescription utilization and 
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expenditures are included in vector 'iz . These variables serve as instrumental 
variables (IVs).  jα  is the coefficient varying across insurance choice. The error 
term iju is independently and identically distributed across individual and insurance 
choice. The probability that individual i chooses insurance j is 
' 'Pr( ) Pr( ( , ) )ij ik i i jj V V x z k jα= − > ∀ ≠          (1)’ 
which is specified as a multinomial logit model.  
4.2 Expenditure Equations 
4.2.1 Total Expenditure Equations 
Due to the skewed distribution of prescription drug expenditure data, along 
with a non-trivial percent of chronically ill patients with zero expenditure, the present 
study estimates a two-stage model, which estimates separately: 1) the probability of 
any expenditure on prescription drugs, and 2) the conditional total OOP expenditures, 
only for those individuals with any positive expenditure on prescription drugs. The 
classic two-stage model employs probit and logged-OLS estimation and assumes that 
health insurance is exogenous, as described by (Duan, Manning et al. 1983). This 
model has been widely used in literature (Cutler 1995; Goldman, Hosek et al. 1995; 
Mroz 1999) because it not only addresses the problem of censoring in expenditure and 
utilization data but also enables one to control for the simultaneous relationship 
between equations by approximating the effects that are common but unobservable 
across equations.  
Here, consider drug consumption as a two-stage decision process whereby an 
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individual first decides whether to purchase any prescription drug Pr(Yi>0), where Yi 
is defined as the individual’s positive annual OOP expenditures on prescription drugs 
of selected therapeutic classes that treat each studied condition (please see Appendix 
for selected drug classes). Pr (.) is an indicator function equal to 1 if Yi>0, equal to 0 
otherwise. Given Yi>0, the individual then decides how much to spend. The logarithm 
of annual OOP expenditures *iY  is used mainly because expenditure and utilization 
data are rarely normally distributed. Therefore, it is necessary to transform the data to 
achieve approximately normal distribution outcome. By using this two-stage model, 
the present study could detect any variation in effects of the involved independent 
variables on the decision making of consuming any prescription drug and the 
condition level of consumption.  
More specifically, the first part of the model applies a binary probit model 
with latent variable M*: 
( ) *Pr Y 0  1 if 0i iM> = ≥ , 
* ' '
2i i i iM x d uγ γ= + + .                                            (2) 
Part two is specified as: 
* ln( ) if Pr( 0) 1i i iY Y Y= > =   
* ' '
3i i i iY x d uβ η= + + .                                            (3) 
where vector ix  is the same as in the insurance choice equation. Here 
0, 3,( ... ) 'i i id d d= is the vector of insurance choice. The error terms 2 3( , )i iu u in the 
two-equation system above can be decomposed into uncorrelated and correlated 
components as: 
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2 2 2i i iu c eρ= +  
3 3 3i i iu c eρ= +  
where ic , 2ie  and 3ie  are mutually independent. The distribution of the 
uncorrelated components 2ie  and 3ie  are assumed to be normal with mean zero and 
standard deviation 2iσ and 3iσ , respectively. The correlated component ic  
represents the unobservable heterogeneity that causes the correlation across equations. 
In this study, it represents chronic or permanent conditions that could make 
individuals more likely than others to purchase prescription drugs and more likely to 
have a higher level of consumption conditional upon any. To avoid sample bias as 
such, the two equations are estimated jointly via maximum likelihood. 
4.2.2 Conditional on any expenditure, expenditures on generics drugs only, brand 
drugs only or both? 
To further investigate the association between insurance choice and 
individuals’ prescription fill patterns, the outcome of utilization, conditional on any 
expenditure, is subset to three mutually exclusive categories: conditional expenditures 
on generics drugs only, on brand name drugs only and on both generics and brand 
name drugs. The two-stage model is estimated again with the same sets of 
independent variables as in the total OOP expenditure equation but with three 
different dependent variable sets for different prescription fill patterns. 
For simplicity, the two-stage model can be specified as 
' '
2Pr( 0)i i i iExp x d uγ γ> = + +           (2)’ 
' '
3(ln[ ] 0)i i i i iExp Exp x d uβ η> = + +          (3)’ 
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Case 1: Conditional on any, expenditures on generics drugs only 
The dependent variable of Eq. (2)’ equals 1 if the individual i purchased 
generic drugs only, conditional on any positive expenditure on prescription in selected 
therapeutic classes; otherwise, the variable equals 0. The dependent variable of Eq. 
(3)’ equals the natural logarithm of the annual OOP expenditures on generic drugs if 
the individual i purchased generics drugs only, conditional on any positive 
expenditure on prescription in selected therapeutic classes during the year. 
Case 2: Conditional on any, spending on brand drugs only 
The dependent variable of Eq. (2)’ equals 1 if the individual i purchased brand 
drugs only, conditional on any positive expenditure on prescription in selected 
therapeutic classes; otherwise, the variable equals 0. The dependent variable of Eq. 
(3)’ equals the natural logarithm of the annual OOP expenditures on brand name 
drugs if the individual i purchased brand drugs only, conditional on any positive 
expenditure on prescription in selected therapeutic classes during the year. 
Case 3: Conditional on any, spending on both generic and brand drugs  
The dependent variable of Eq. (2)’ equals 1 if the individual i purchased both 
generic and brand name drugs, conditional on any positive expenditure on 
prescription in selected therapeutic classes during the year; otherwise, the variable 
equals 0. The dependent variable of Eq. (3)’ equals the natural logarithm of the annual 
OOP expenditures on prescription drugs if the individual i purchased both generic and 
brand name drugs, conditional on any positive expenditure on prescription in selected 
therapeutic classes during the year. 
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4.3 Utilization Equations 
For the total use equation, the two-stage model is estimated again with the 
same independent variables as used in total expenditure equations. The dependent 
variable of Eq. (2)’ equals 1 if the individual i used any prescription in selected drug 
classes to treat the target condition during the interviewed year; otherwise, the 
variable equals 0. The dependent variable of Eq. (3)’ equals the count of prescription 
fills, conditional on positive use of prescriptions in selected therapeutic classes to treat 
the target condition during the interviewed year.  
Further, the outcome of prescription utilization can be classified into three 
cases that are similar to the analyses of conditional expenditures in 4.2.2. Eq.(2)’ and 
(3)’ are used to estimate: 1) the probability of : a. generic drug use only, conditional 
on any use during the year, b. brand name drug use only, conditional on any use, c. 
both generic and brand name drug use, conditional on any use; 2) and the count of 
prescription fills in three cases mentioned above, conditional on any use during the 
year.  
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Chapter 5. DATA, VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION 
5.1 Data Overview 
The data for the present empirical application come mainly from the 
2003-2007 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), supplemented by the Red 
Book included in the Medstat MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter 
Database (Thomson Medstat Inc., Ann Arbor, MI).  
MEPS is conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ). It has been used to produce nationally representative estimates of healthcare 
treatment, medications and other healthcare expenditure, sources of payment, health 
insurance coverage, health status, demographic and socio-economic characteristics for 
the US civilian non-institutionalized population. The Household Component (HC) is 
the core survey of MEPS. This survey is designed as an overlapping panel so that 
households are interviewed over the course of two consecutive calendar years through 
five interview rounds and each year a new panel is launched. The full sample during 
the years 2003-2007 ranges from 30,964 to 34,403 and the response rate ranges from 
56.9% to 64.5%.1
In addition, MEPS oversample Hispanics and blacks, individuals aged 18-64 
who are predicted to have high levels of medical spending, and individuals with 
 As the sample size in MEPS for each condition is relatively small, 
five consecutive years of data are selected to assess the consistency of the findings 
and to limit the potential consequences of sampling biases that may occur from one 
year to the next.  
                                                        
1 Estimates from MEPS, available at: http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/survey_comp/hc_response_rate.jsp 
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family income less than 200 percent of the Federal poverty threshold. Considering the 
complex survey design of MEPS which involves clustering, oversampling of certain 
subgroup, and sample stratification into primary sampling unites (PSU), all statistical 
analyses are performed with weights provided in MEPS to correct mean values, 
coefficient estimates and standard errors to be reflective of national averages. 
Specifically, the person-level weight in each annual Consolidated File is adjusted by 
dividing by five, i.e. the total number of years from 2003 to 2007, to obtain unbiased 
nationally representative estimates.  
In sum, four types of files from MEPS are used for this analysis: annual Full 
Year Consolidated data, Medical Conditions and Prescribed Medicines files from 
2003 through 2007, and the 2003-2007 pooled estimation linkage files. These public 
use files can be linked to a condition, an event, a person, and/or a household.  
5.2 Data Construction and Indicator Generation 
In order to perform the data analysis, it is necessary to merge all MEPS data 
files into one. To construct the sample for each condition of interest, I start with the 
annual Full Year Consolidated file, which contains detailed information on 
demographics, income, employment, insurance coverage and health status on all 
respondents in MEPS.  
In this file, HMO and non-HMO status were constructed according to a series 
of questions asked by MEPS. Respondents with private insurance were classified as 
being covered by an HMO if (1) the respondents indicated their insurance was 
purchased directly through an HMO, (2) the plan was identified as being purchased 
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from an insurance company that was an HMO, (3) the plan required the respondents 
to generally received care from HMO physicians unless there was a medical 
emergency or the respondents were referred by HMO. On the contrary, if respondents 
answered “no” to above questions, but had networks of preferred providers, then 
respondents are identified as a non-HMO enrollee. In addition, round specific 
variables were provided in this file, indicating whether the respondents were covered 
by a private health insurance plan that included at least some prescription drug 
insurance for each round of the interviewed year.  
Because the present study focuses on the association of private health 
insurance and prescription drug use and expenditures, the respondents who indicated 
any public coverage during the interviewed year are excluded from the final 
coefficient estimates, given the fact that those public programs could be associated 
with entitlement or military status and are different in nature from private insurance 
plans.  
Based on the insurance information obtained in the annual Full Year 
Consolidated file, the final coding of insurance status consists of four mutually 
exclusive categories: those with private HMO with drug coverage, those with 
non-HMO plans with drug coverage, those with any private insurance without drug 
coverage, and those without insurance. Then to this basic annual file, the annual 
Medical Condition file is linked for each year using unique identifiers. 
The definition for each insurance category is similar to the study of Pylypchuk 
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(2010)2
HIWDC: individuals reporting having non-HMO private insurance plans with 
drug coverage during a year  
:  
HMODC: individuals reporting having HMO private insurance and not having 
HIWDC during a year 
HINDC: individuals reporting having any private insurance with no drug 
coverage during a year  
Uninsured: the remaining population 
The present study focuses on four chronic conditions: hypertension, diabetes, 
depression and asthma. Information on medical condition is contained in the annual 
Medical Condition file. At each round of interviewing, respondents were asked 
whether household members had any medical conditions, when the condition began 
and whether treatment was sought or not. Subsequently, self-reported prescribed 
medicines that were said to be related to certain condition were recorded as verbatim 
text and then converted by professional coders to fully specified International 
Classification of Disease, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes. 
The error rate for any coder did not exceed 2.5% on verification. Assigned codes were 
verified by contacting medical providers and pharmacies that the respondents 
                                                        
2 Pylypchuk (2010) has pointed out that a more precise category set of health insurance would further decompose 
any private health insurance without drug coverage into HMO without drug coverage and non-HMO without drug 
coverage. However, similar to the findings in Pylypchuk’s study (2010), the present data reveals that less than 20 
respondents in each condition sample reported to have HMO without drug coverage. Therefore, the choice of 
HMO without drug coverage is consolidated into the category of any private health insurance without drug 
coverage in the present study. In addition, less than one percent of respondents in each condition sample reported 
to have switched from one type of drug coverage to another during the interviewed year. Further, no significant 
difference in results have been found when switchers are excluded to the analysis 
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identified as their source of care during the interview. Because each record in the 
Medical Condition file represented a single condition reported by a household 
respondent, some household members who had multiple medical conditions were 
represented by multiple records, while others who report no medical conditions had 
no record on this file. 
In order to preserve respondent confidentiality, most ICD-9-CM codes were 
collapsed to three digits. For example, individuals with a code of 250 are identified as 
having diabetes, and individuals with a code of 493 are identified as having asthma. In 
addition, the codes for clinical depression were collapsed to 300, 301, 309 and 311. 
However, ICD-9-CM codes 300, 301, and 309 contain other mental health diagnoses 
(Egede and Zheng 2002), thus only ICD-9-CM code 311 is used in this study to 
identify individuals with depression.  
There are six types of hypertension. Primary hypertension, also known as 
essential hypertension, is the most common type and has no specific, treatable cause. 
Secondary hypertension is a less common form of the disease that is caused by an 
underlying condition such as kidney disorder or a congenital abnormality. The four 
even less common types of hypertension include malignant hypertension, isolated 
systolic hypertension, white coat hypertension, and resistant hypertension. In MEPS, 
the ICD-9 codes 401 to 405 include essential hypertension, hypertensive heart disease, 
hypertensive renal disease, hypertensive heart and renal disease, and secondary 
hypertension. However, only essential hypertension is referred to as hypertension in 
this study, because it is usually asymptomatic and accounts for 90-95% of all cases. 
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Therefore, only individuals with a code of 401 are identified as having hypertension.  
Because the definition for the chronic patients is condition based, the sample 
for each target condition not only includes those who reported having the condition as 
well as the related prescription drug treatment, but also includes those who reported 
having the condition but no related prescription drug treatment during the interviewed 
year. In addition, there is some overlap between the four subsample, especially 
between diabetes and hypertension. As a result, based on existing ICD-9-CM codes in 
the Medical Condition file, the indication variables (0/1) for each target condition is 
created separately for each individual on file for sample extraction later in the next 
few steps. 
MEPS a priori designated certain conditions as priority conditions in view of 
their prevalence, expenditure or relevance to policy. I modified the multimorbidity 
classification in MEPS to focus on profound effects of having more than one of the 
four conditions of interest on individuals’ prescription drug utilization and level of 
expenditures. For example, individuals with diabetes often have two or more 
comorbidities, such as hypertension and depression. Given a budget constraint, 
diabetes patients with comorbid conditions may experience difficult choices between 
forgoing necessary treatments for their diabetes and treatment for their comobid 
conditions. In a study of the predictors of initiating psychiatric treatment, Nutting, 
Rost et al. (2000) suggest that ‘competing demands’ from physical problems lowers 
the odds that patients would initiate depression therapy. However, there are some 
researchers argue that co-occurring chronic conditions are actually related to more 
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appropriate care (Harman, Edlund et al. 2005; Harpole, Williams et al. 2005; Ware, 
Flavell et al. 2006). It would be interesting to see in which direction the impact of 
multimorbidity has on patients’ drug expenditures and utilization among those with 
hypertension, diabetes, depression and asthma.  
Further, the presence of comobidity may affect patients’ drug utilization 
pattern such as generic substitution and brand loyalty for fear of potential more 
adverse interaction of generics with other drugs. Consequently, I indentify an 
individual with a comorbid condition if more than one of the four chronic conditions 
were present during the interviewed year. 
The annual Prescribed Medicines file includes prescription drugs identified in 
the Prescribed Medicines section of the HC survey instrument, along with those 
prescription drugs identified related to other medical events. The MEPS respondents 
were asked to provide the name(s) of any prescription drug(s) obtained by any family 
members during the interviewed year. Prescription-specific information in file 
includes whether a free sample of the drug was received, condition(s) associated with 
the drug, and the date the drug was first used for the condition. If the respondents 
gave written permission to release their pharmacy records, AHRQ requested the 
following information from the pharmacy provider: date filled, national drug code 
(NDC), i.e. a standardized product identifier for drugs for humans, drug name, 
strength, quantity dispensed, total payment and sources of payment3
                                                        
3 The categories of payment sources include: out of pocket, Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, veterans’ 
administration (excluding CHAMPVA), CHAMPUS or CHAMPVA, other federal sources (e.g. Military treatment 
facilities), other state and local sources (e.g. neighborhood clinics), workers’ compensation, other unclassified 
sources, other private and other public (these additional payment source variables were generated for payment 
classification for particular individuals that appear inconsistent due to differences between the survey questions on 
. The resultant 
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data are available in the annual Prescribed Medicines File.  
Similar to the Medical Condition File, each record in the Prescribed Medicines 
File represents a single prescribed drug event reported by a household respondent. 
Some household members who had multiple events of prescribed drug were 
represented by multiple records, while others who reported no prescribed drug event 
had no record on this file. Because each individual with any of the four condition can 
potentially be linked to multiple prescribed drug events associated with the 
condition(s), I assign prescription drugs to one of the two categories – ‘generic drugs’ 
and ‘brand name drugs’ – based on drug names and NDC provided by the Prescribed 
Medicines File and information on category description of drugs available in the Red 
Book included in the Medstat Database.  
In the second step, I drop non-essential variables from the Prescribed 
Medicines File and create an indicator variable (0/1) to identify selected drugs used in 
the treatment for the target condition. For example, this procedure labels drugs only in 
selected therapeutic classes (please refer to Table 1 in Appendix for details) reported 
by the respondents to treat hypertension (ICD-9-CM code 401) with one and other 
drugs as zero.  
The setup of exclusion criteria is mainly due to two concerns. First, some 
drugs can be prescribed for medical conditions other than the condition of interest. 
For example, the use of angiotensin coverting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors can be for the 
treatment of myocardial infarction or congestive heart failure other than for 
                                                                                                                                                              
health insurance coverage and sources of payment for medical events), total payments (sum of all sources), total 
charges.  
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hypertension (Balu and Thomas 2006). Second, physicians may fail to completely 
record on file all the diagnoses from a visit. A careful review of the weighted 
frequency list of drugs reported in MEPS as used to treat hypertension includes not 
only the traditional hypertension drugs such as ACE inhibitors, beta-blockers, calcium 
channel blockers and diuretics, but also drugs prescribed to treat conditions other than 
hypertension. Therefore, recoding the misclassified drugs to zero is necessary.  
Additionally, variables generated using the Prescribed Medicines file include: 
(a) count of fills of selected generic drugs and the corresponding OOP expenditures 
on generic drugs per individual, (b) count of fills of selected brand name drugs only 
and the corresponding OOP expenditures per individual, and (c) total count of fills of 
selected drugs and the total corresponding OOP expenditures per individual to treat 
each condition during the interviewed year. All expenditure data are adjusted to 
constant 2007 U.S. dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all items 
averaged across all U.S. cities4
The third step of merging links the resulting first step file, with an identifier 
for each condition, to the newly generated consolidated Prescribed Medicines file in 
the second step, thus creating a merged file of person-level data for each year from 
2003 to 2007, respectively. The fourth step pools the annual merged data files from 
the 6 years to produce estimates with greater reliability, with a total sample size of 
167,688 observations.  
. 
In the last step, I extract individuals with hypertension, diabetes, depression or 
                                                        
4 The CPI does not include government purchases and investment goods. However, it is most widely used price 
index for consumer expenditures. Based on the guideline provided by MEPS, for pooling only one type of OOP 
expenditure, for example prescription drugs, the CPI component specific to prescription drug is recommended.  
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asthma and create a separate sample for each condition. Each sample is treated as 
cross-sectional data. The total number of observations reporting having hypertension 
is 25,159, diabetes 10,899, asthma 16,831, and depression 11,672. There are more 
observations than individuals because most people were followed for over 2 years. I 
exclude individuals younger than 18 or older than 64. Those under 18 are unlikely to 
have a strong connection to the labor market, and those over 65 face retirement and 
are more likely to have different health care options such as Medicare. This leaves a 
sample of 14,440 observations for hypertension, 6,477 for diabetes, 9,090 for 
depression and 9,288 for asthma. Considering the difficulty in detangling the effect of 
private health insurance from the effect of the supplemental public health insurance 
on the demand for prescription drugs, individuals who had any public coverage during 
the interviewed year are excluded for the present analysis. This leaves 10,595 final 
eligible observations for hypertension, 4,191 for diabetes, 5,924 for depression and 
6,533 for asthma. 
The final merged files for the non-elderly adult population with each condition 
provide rich information not only on individuals’ general health status but also on the 
severity of each condition. Self-reported health index was categorized into five groups, 
which was based on the answer to the following question: “In general, would you say 
your health is excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?” The answer to this question 
was then coded on a 1-5 scale, with 1 being excellent, 2 being very good, 3 being 
good, 4 being fair, and 5 being poor. Various empirical studies show that self-rated 
heath is a valid indicator of health status (Sullivan, Karlsson et al. 1995; Farmer and 
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Ferraro 1997; Miilunpalo, Vuori et al. 1997). It is found to be associated with chronic 
conditions such as epilepsy, heart trouble, diabetes and psychological distress (Manor, 
Matthews et al. 2001) and to reflect differential drug use and healthcare costs 
(Balkrishnan, Christensen et al. 2002; Fleishman, Cohen et al. 2006). 
Further, individuals in MEPS with hypertension were asked the following: if 
they had ever been diagnosed as having coronary heart disease, angina or angina 
pectoris, a heart attack or myocardial infarction, or any other kind of heart disease or 
condition. Similarly, individuals with diabetes were asked if diabetes had caused 
kidney or eye problems. Individuals with asthma were asked if they had ever been 
diagnosed as having emphysema and whether they kept peak flow meter at home. For 
individuals with depression, mental health functioning was measured using the 
Short-Form 12 (SF-12) Mental Component Summary (MCS). For this summary 
measure, a higher score reflects better emotional health status. The MCS has been 
shown in recent research to significantly correlate with some mental health scales 
such as a general mental distress scale (K6) (Kessler, Barker et al. 2003; Fleishman 
and Zuvekas 2007) and a 2-item depression screener (PHQ-2) (Kroenke, Spitzer et al. 
2003). This measure is employed in the present study because the MEPS included the 
Kessler K6 and PHQ-2 depression screener only in 2004 and beyond.  
In addition, two risk preference variables were created in each of the sample 
group. Adrisk was coded 1 if an individual disagreed with the statement: “I am more 
likely to take risks than the average person.” Adsmok is another binary variable for 
individuals who currently smoke.  
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5.3 Estimation Issue 
Numerous studies (Bound, Jaeger et al. 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997; Hahn 
and Hausman 2003) attest that estimation with weak instruments could cause serious 
bias and errors in inference. Fortunately, I have a variable that can affect health 
insurance choice from the supply side yet may not be directly related to drug use and 
spending. Although the MEPS data base includes little information on geographic 
location of respondents due to confidentiality considerations, it does include variables 
indicating the PSU5
 
 and the strata that a given respondent belonged to. Using these 
variables and insurance information on total population from 2003 through 2007 in 
MEPS, I constructed yearly aggregate HMO penetration measures for each PSU in a 
given strata while applying appropriate weights to calculate average HMO market 
share and standard errors. That is, for individual i in sampling area j, HMO 
penetration would be measured as the proportion of all respondents in sampling area j 
that had HMO coverage as defined in the present study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 U.S. is partitioned into 1,995 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and the PSUs are grouped into over 200 design 
strata. Most of these PSUs consist of individual counties, but sometimes they include two or more adjacent 
counties. MEPS is based on subsample of about 200 PSUs from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS).  
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Chapter 6. RESULTS 
6.1 Descriptive Analysis 
6.1.1 Overview of Socio-demographic Characteristics 
In addition to age, education (high school diploma, bachelor’s degree, 
master’s degree), race and ethnicity (Black, Hispanic), socio-demographic controls 
include gender, marital status, family income level, employment information, health 
status, and attitudes toward health risk (smoking, willingness to take any risk). 
Demand theory demonstrates that income should be included as an 
explanatory variable. However, income cannot fully capture the true living condition 
of a family. Therefore, the present study introduces a set of poverty level indicators: 
poor, near poor, low income, middle income and high income to reflect true living 
conditions on the family basis. Employment related variables include indicators for 
whether the respondent is self employed or employed by union, whether the 
respondent received paid vacation and paid sick leave.  
Health and functional status indicators include the respondent’s perception of 
the health status (excellent, very good, good, fair, poor), diagnosed conditions such as 
hyperlipedemia, heart disease, kidney or eye problems and emphysema, and whether 
the respondent needs help with activities of daily living (ADLs) such as dressing and 
eating or help with instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) such as managing 
money and shopping for personal items. All these variables are intended to capture 
differences in health condition, attitude towards insurance and health, and ability to 
pay for prescription drug treatments.  
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Finally, dummy variables are also included to indicate census region 
(Northwest, Midwest, South, and West) and urban or rural status of the respondents’ 
residence for capturing geographic factors that could potentially affect the availability 
of generic drugs.  
Table 2 lists descriptive statistics for the possible explanatory variables in the 
present model, where Table 2A is for non-elderly adult population with hypertension, 
diabetes, depression and asthma, and Table 2B serves as a comparison with the 
general non-elderly adult population, the remaining non-elderly adult population 
without any of the four conditions, and the total population. Each observation has an 
associated weight to extrapolate from the sample to the whole population. These 
tables display weighted means. There are important differences along most 
dimensions.  
The mean value of a dummy variable represents the proportion of individuals 
that satisfy the condition where the dummy variable equals 1. For example, 0.696 for 
the hypertension sample on ‘married’ implies that 69.6% of the individuals in this 
sample group are married. Table 2 indicates that the majority of non-elderly adults in 
the sample was married, employed, lived in metro areas and reported at least a high 
school education. In addition, compared to the comparable subpopulation without any 
of the four studied conditions (49.7%), the general non-elderly adult population 
(50.7%) and the entire population (51%), the proportion of females is higher in 
depression (65.6%) and asthma (58.2%) sample. However, the proportion of females 
is slightly lower in the hypertension (49.2%) and diabetes (49.1%) sample. 
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Although most individuals in the sample are White non-Hispanics, there is a 
difference in the proportion of Blacks diagnosed with hypertension (15.3%), diabetes 
(13.4%) versus Blacks in a comparable subpopulation without any of the four 
conditions (12.2%) or in the general non-elderly adult population (12.1%). However, 
the proportion of Blacks in the depression or asthma sample is much less than that in 
the hypertension or diabetes sample.  
The average age for individuals with hypertension or diabetes is about 51, 
considerably higher than the general non-elderly adult population (40), while the 
average age in the depression and asthma sample is around 43 and 39, respectively. 
This difference in age reflects the prevalence of hypertension and diabetes seen in 
older age groups. However, in the depression and asthma sample, the opposite is true.   
The study sample with any of the four studied conditions is more likely to 
perceived themselves as having fair/poor physical health (diabetes: 31.2%, 
depression:20.6%, hypertension:19.2%, asthma: 15.5%) than a comparable 
subpopulation without any of these four conditions (10.1%). However, there are no 
large disparities in educational attainments and employment status across chronic 
conditions. The other interesting characteristics are that the non-elderly adults without 
chronic conditions are less likely to be union members, to have paid vacation or paid 
sick leave any time during the interviewed year, and more likely to take risks than 
their counterparts with chronic conditions. In addition, they are more likely to smoke 
than their counterparts with hypertension, diabetes or asthma.  
Hypertension is by far the most prevalent condition, with an estimated 14 
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percent of the total non-elderly adult population and 15.9 percent of the U.S. 
population (Table 2B, p< 0.001). This is followed by depression (the total non-elderly 
adult population: 9.2%, the U.S. population: 7.3%), diabetes (the total non-elderly 
adult population: 5.4%, the U.S. population: 5.8%) and asthma (the total non-elderly 
adult population: 4.3%, the U.S. population: 5.2%). As displayed in Table 2A, 
multimorbidity among the conditions is most common in individuals with diabetes 
and hypertension, of whom 55.4 percent and 30 percent, respectively, had more than 
one of the four studied conditions.  
Tables 3A-B present trends from 2003 to 2007 in the proportion and total 
number of non-elderly adults diagnosed with hypertension, diabetes and selected 
multimorbidities. During this 5-year period, the proportion of hypertension increased 
from 12.875% to 16.39% and the proportion of diabetes increased from 4.707% to 
6.176%. Among the non-elderly adults 6
6.1.2 Socio-demographic Characteristics by Health Insurance Status 
, the total number diagnosed with 
hypertension and that with diabetes jumped from 23.292 to 30.93 million and from 
8.515 to 11.654 million, respectively. In addition, the present findings demonstrate the 
widespread rise of multimorbidity over this period. The most common combination of 
chronic conditions – hypertension and hyperlidpidemia, hypertension and diabetes, 
and diabetes and hyperlidpidemia – increased during this period. 
Table 4 displays the distribution of individuals by health insurance status. The 
                                                        
6 A limitation of these reports is that it includes only respondent-reported information of a physician diagnosis. 
Therefore, estimates may be understated because undiagnosed chronic conditions are not included. Further, it is 
not possible to determine to what extent the observed increase in the prevalence of hypertension and diabetes is 
due to changing awareness of this condition and to what extent the increase results from changes in health or other 
factors 
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study sample with chronic conditions has much lower rates of being uninsured 
(14.1%-19.7%), compared to the general non-elderly adult population (29%) and the 
total population (34.2%), indicating evidence of adverse selection. The distribution of 
insurance status across the four conditions is similar although the hypertension sample 
has a slightly higher rate of drug coverage than other sample.  
Tables 5A – D describe the characteristics of the study sample and present 
weighted means of the control variables by insurance status7
However, it could be hardly concluded that the demand for insurance is 
income- and age-sensitive because the feature and availability of insurance plans may 
vary by location and across individuals, and further, employer-sponsored insurance 
has been the largest source of health insurance coverage for years. For example, 
income and fringe benefits such as health insurance may increase with seniority. In 
that case, older and richer individuals are more likely to be insured simply because 
they have access to cheaper insurance (
. Some observations are 
immediate. First, a substantial proportion of the sample is uninsured. Second, the 
uninsured are significantly more likely to be current smoker and risk taker (Adjusted 
Wald, p<0.01). Finally, in general speaking, the uninsured are significantly younger 
and more likely to be poor (Adjusted Wald, p<0.01).  
Cardon and Hendel 2001). One piece of 
evidence from the present study seems to support this claim. Tables 5A-D show that 
there is a significant larger proportion of the uninsured reporting being unemployed 
the whole year than that of insured groups. This finding is consistent across all 
                                                        
7 The differences in sample means grouped by insurance status for each condition are tested. These tests only 
provide a preliminary view of the data. Summary statistics of the mean difference are not presented but available 
upon request.  
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conditions. The gap in proportion of unemployment is even larger between the 
uninsured and those covered by insurance plans with drug coverage.    
In addition, individuals with any of the four chronic conditions generally 
perceived themselves to be in good health; only 3.7% (in the asthma sample) to 7.8% 
(in the diabetes sample) reported that their health status were poor. However, a further 
examination of the statistics broken down by insurance status for each studied 
condition reveals some difference in perceived health status.  
Compared to the insured groups, the proportion of individuals’ self-reporting 
poor health is larger among the uninsured. In particular, the percentage difference in 
perceived poor health between the uninsured and those covered by HMO with drug 
coverage (HMODC) is as high as 8% in the diabetes sample (Adjusted Wald, p<0.01). 
Another noticeable are differences in some observed health characteristics. In the 
hypertension, diabetes and asthma depression sample, there are significantly larger 
proportions of the uninsured reporting cognitive limitation, limitation in activities of 
daily living (ADLs) or instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), and having 
more than one of the studied chronic conditions, compared to the insured with drug 
coverage (Adjusted Wald, p<0.01). However, there are no significant differences in 
those observed health characteristics between individuals covered by HMO with drug 
coverage (HMODC) and those covered by non-HMO with drug coverage (HIWDC). 
In sum, only a few differences in self-reported and observed health status 
measures such as limitation, comorbidities, eye or kidney problems and heart 
problems are observed among the three insured groups. This is consistent with the 
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previous finding that there is little selection into insurance plans on the basis of 
observable health characteristics (Wolfe and Goddeeris 1991; Ettner 1997).  
6.1.3 Expenditures, Cost Sharing and Utilization of Prescription Drugs 
Differences in expenditures by insurance status may result from differential 
selection of enrollees into insurance plans as well as differences in the generosity of 
the coverage. To provide a context for the current estimates of how expenditures on 
prescription drugs would potentially change when individuals gain insurance 
coverage, Table 6 presents individuals’ annual conditional OOP expenditures 
conditional on any expenditure by health insurance status and by chronic condition, 
with controls of therapeutic classes.    
The difference in expenditures by insurance status varies across conditions, 
likely because of difference in demographics and price sensitivity. The prescription 
drugs to treat diabetes are most costly, which are generally over 500 dollars for the 
uninsured and over 200 dollars for the insured with drug coverage. Surprisingly, 
individuals covered by HINDC are likely to spend more on prescriptions than the 
uninsured in the hypertension, diabetes and depression sample. Conditional on any 
positive expenditure, the uninsured spent almost twice as much as the insured with 
drug coverage across conditions partly because of insurance effect. In the 
hypertension and depression sample, individuals covered by HIWDC spend 
significantly more on prescription drugs than others covered by HMODC (mean 
difference in the hypertension sample: 26.154, in the depression sample: 20.450, 
Adjusted Wald, p<0.01). However, in the diabetes and asthma sample, the difference 
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in OOP expenditures between HMODC and HIWDC is insignificant.  
Table 7 presents the average third party payment and individuals’ OOP 
expenditures per prescription for brand-name and generic drugs to treat the studied 
conditions. Prices vary substantially across payer and drug type. OOP expenditures 
are significantly highest for the uninsured across three conditions: hypertension, 
diabetes and asthma, compared to the insured. Conditional on any expenditure, total 
costs (sum of the third party payment and OOP) for brand name drugs under HMODC 
appear to be lower than costs under HIWDC, while there is less difference in total 
costs for generics between HMODC and HIWDC.  
Further, no appreciable differences emerge in terms of how total costs are 
shared among the insurers and the insured with drug coverage. The ratio of OOP to 
third party payment for brand-name drugs is similar between HMODC and HIWDC, 
ranging from approximately 0.4 for anti-diabetes drugs to over 0.7 for 
anti-hypertensive drugs. The ratio of OOP to third party payment for brand-name drug 
is highest for anti-asthma drugs under HIWDC. HMODC generally has a slightly 
lower ratio of OOP to third party payment than HIWDC for generic drugs except for 
the generics that treat depression.   
Table 8 presents the distribution of individuals reporting at least one 
prescription filled by insurance status. The highest utilization rate of prescription 
drugs is among individuals with hypertension (generally over 70%), followed by 
diabetes (>50%), depression (>30%) and asthma (>15%). This finding seems to be 
consistent with the previous literature, which suggests that medications that treat 
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asymptomatic, but life-threatening conditions are sometimes more highly valued than 
medications that aim at symptom relief (Piette, Heisler et al. 2004).  
One interesting finding is worth noting in Table 9. In the hypertension and 
diabetes sample, the average prescriptions filled by the insured with no drug coverage 
are even higher than those by the insured with drug coverage. However, in general 
speaking, the distribution of drug utilization is skewed as expected. The average drug 
use among the insured is higher than that among the uninsured, although the 
difference is modest and significant at the 1 percent level only across a few columns. 
The little gap may be cause by three factors: observable demographic differences, 
price differential and adverse selection.  
The first factor is evident from Tables 5A-D, which indicates that the 
uninsured are generally younger and poorer across conditions. The second factor is 
the cost of health care. If the demand for prescription drugs is price sensitive, the 
quantity demanded by the uninsured is less because they face the full price, whereas 
the insured with drug coverage on average pay only one third to half of the total prices, 
as seen in Table 7. Finally, adverse selection may be contributed to the gap in drug 
usage. Sicker individuals are more likely to buy insurance with drug coverage, and 
then, on average, use more health care than those who are healthier and thus decline 
to buy any insurance. However, mixed evidence from this study provides little support 
for this assumption, as discussed earlier.     
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6.2 Estimation Results  
6.2.1 Health Insurance Choice 
Overview 
Tables 10 presents the coefficient estimates of the multinomial logit model for  
health insurance choice on the sample of 10,595 individuals with hypertension, 4,191 
individuals with diabetes, 5,924 individuals with depression, and 6,533 individuals 
with asthma.  
Identification of the model is secured through exclusion restrictions on the 
sample, socio-demographic and health characteristics control, and instruments. The 
coefficients in the insurance choice equation can tell us the odds of having one type of 
insurance plans, such as private insurance plans without drug coverage (HINDC), 
non-HMO plans with drug coverage (HIWDC) and HMO plans (HMODC) against 
having no insurance. 
As the nature of multinomial logit, the present model for health insurance 
choice produces three sets of coefficient estimates for four choices: Uninsured, 
HINDC, HIWDC and HMODC, when ‘Uninsured’ is set as the reference category. 
However, the coefficients of the model alone are difficult to interpret. Neither the sign 
nor the magnitude of the coefficient has a direct intuitive meaning. Unlike coefficients, 
marginal effects are directly interpretable. They are interpreted as the expected 
instantaneous change in the dependent variable as one unit change in the explanatory 
variable occurs. In other words, it is the net effect holding the other variables at their 
means. Therefore, this study provides not only the coefficient estimates, but also the 
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related marginal effects for the presentation purpose. The related marginal effects 
from this model are presented in Table 15A-D.  
There are two ways of estimating how much the event probability changes 
when a given predictor is changed by one unit. For the first multinomial logit equation, 
marginal effect is measured by the change in predicted probability for a unit change in 
the predictor. The marginal effects of dummy variables are analyzed by taking the 
difference of estimated probabilities between the different levels of dummy covariates 
(1 and 0), while all other independent variables are evaluated at their sample means. 
The "average" or "overall" marginal effect is then measured by computing the 
marginal effect at the sample means of the data.  
For the jointly estimated second (probit) and third (OLS) equations on the 
probability of drug utilization, and the level of conditional utilization and 
expenditures, the marginal effect of a predictor is defined as the partial derivative of 
the event probability with respect to the predictor of interest. The "average" or 
"overall" marginal effect is then measured by computing marginal effect at each 
observation and then to calculate the sample average of individual marginal effects to 
obtain the overall marginal effect. 
It is worth noting that with more than one choice, the marginal effects for a 
particular independent variable depend on the magnitudes and signs of the 
coefficients of that and all other variable (Goodman 2009). Therefore, the coefficients 
of a multinomial logit model and the related marginal effects for a particular variable 
may have different signs. This is also true for multinomial probit models. 
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Socio-Demographic Indicators 
The signs of most coefficients seem generally sensible, although some of them 
are insignificantly identified. Most of the characteristics that are pertinent in 
describing individuals’ differences in Tables 5A-D remain important in the regression 
and the related marginal effect analysis. In addition, many of the socio-demographics 
and health status variables affect the odds in the same direction across health 
insurance status.  
Gender is associated with the probability of enrollment in health plans. To be 
more specific, females are generally more likely to choose insurance over no 
insurance. This predictor is most significant in the depression and asthma sample. For 
example, the odds of a woman choosing HIWDC over no insurance are 1.66 times 
higher than that of a man choosing HIWDC over no insurance, when other indicators 
controlled. The odds of a woman choosing HMODC over no insurance are even 
higher than that of a man choosing HMODC over no insurance (1.71 times). 
In terms of the marginal effect of gender, women with depression are 43.8% 
less likely than men with depression to be uninsured. This result is consistent across 
the other three conditions (hypertension: -17.96%, diabetes: -15.73%, and asthma: 
-32.45%). Except for the hypertension group, gender is statistically significant 
indicator of the choice of HMODC. The biggest marginal effect of gender is found in 
the diabetes group. Holding other factors constant, being female rather than male is 
related to decreased probability of no insurance (-0.007), decreased probability of 
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‘HINDC’ (-0.0046), decreased probability of ‘HIWDC’ (-0.004) and relatively 
distinct increased probability of ‘HMODC’ (+0.057).  
Hispanics appear to be one of the most disadvantaged groups with respect to 
being covered under any non-HMO plans. In term of marginal effects, Hispanics are 
more likely than non-Hispanics (hypertension: 10.93%, diabetes: 4.69%, depression: 
10.61% and asthma: -3.43%) to be uninsured across three conditions. Meanwhile, 
being Hispanics leads to increased probability of ‘HMODC’ (hypertension: +0.002, 
diabetes: +0.056 and asthma: +0.017) and relatively appreciable decreased probability 
of any other types of insurance plans (hypertension: -0.111, diabetes: -0.103 and 
asthma: -0.052). Similar results for the association between Blacks and insurance 
choice are also found in the hypertension and depression sample. These findings are 
consistent with the previous literature (Banthin and Taylor 2001; Paringer 2007), 
which suggest that among the non-elderly privately insured population, Blacks and 
Hispanics are more likely than white and non-Hispanics to be enrolled in a private 
HMO plan. 
An early study (Cutler 1994) pointed out that the demand for protection 
against a high-risk chronic condition might have a connection with income. 
High-income persons might be capable of affording such protection, while persons 
earning less have a greater likelihood of dropping private coverage and receive public 
financing through Medicaid, Medicare or bad debt care later, if a chronic condition 
strikes that could raise their private insurance premiums (Schoen, Lyons et al. 1997; 
Herring and Pauly 2001).  
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To test this hypothesis, total family income as a percentage of the U.S. Census 
poverty threshold by family size was constructed and the sample was split by the 
poverty thresholds. The present result suggests that most income related variables 
have significantly greatest association with health insurance choice across all 
conditions, compared with other explanatory variables. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
the results from the multinomial logit models also indicate that individuals from lower 
income level household are less likely to enroll in private insurance plans, compared 
to individuals with high-income level.  
The risk of being uninsured is greatest for individuals at the lowest income 
level. In terms of the marginal effect, the poor are generally over 100% more likely to 
be uninsured than those with high income. Particularly in the asthma sample, the poor 
are even 139.22% more likely to be uninsured than those with high income. 
Meanwhile, the poor are generally over 30% less likely to have HMODC than those 
with high income. The greatest marginal effect of being poor on the probability of 
having HMODC is found in the hypertension sample. 
As one would expect, the more educated is generally more likely to be insured 
than those who failed to have high school diploma. In terms of the marginal effect, 
individuals with more than a high school diploma are over 13% less likely to be 
uninsured. The association between education and health insurance choice is even 
greater for individuals who have bachelor or master degree. Across the sample with 
any of the four studied conditions, it is found that individuals with master degrees are 
generally over 12% more likely to have HIWDC, 1% more likely to have HMODC.    
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It is also worth noting that employment benefits serves as a consistently 
significant predictor of choosing HMODC across conditions. In particular, individuals 
who have paid vacation during the interviewed year are 12.41% (in the depression 
sample) to 36.68% (in the diabetes sample) more likely to be covered under HMO 
plans, while individuals who are unemployed the whole year are 3.06% (in the 
hypertension sample) to 44.18% (in the diabetes sample) less likely to choose HMO 
plans.  
Region of residence is also important in explaining the choice of health plans 
among the chronically ill population. Consistent with the findings in Tables 5A-D, 
individuals in Northeast are more likely to be covered under HMO plans, indicating 
that HMO enrollment rates are related to HMO penetration rates. 
 
Measures of Health Status and Chronic Conditions 
No consistent pattern is evident between individuals’ health status and 
insurance choice. For each condition of interest, some health characteristics indicate 
favorable selection into health coverage while others indicate the opposite.  
Many worse self-reported health measures are negatively signed and 
statistically significant at the 1% percent level across the columns of Table 10 when 
the reference category is excellent self-reported health status, suggesting some 
favorable selection into health coverage. For example, individuals in poor health are 
0.3% - 6.24% less likely to have HMODC than those in excellent health across 
conditions. However, better self-reported health status does not monotonically 
increase the probability of choosing insurance over no insurance. In the hypertension 
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and depression sample, individuals with very good health are more likely to choose 
insurance over no insurance than those with excellent health; in the asthma sample, 
individuals with very good health are more likely to choose HINDC than those with 
excellent health.  
Further, there is some mixed evidence of adverse selection into health 
coverage. The presence of more than one of the four studied conditions is consistently 
positively associated with the probability of HMODC enrollment, while negatively 
associated with the probability of any alternative insurance status. In the depression 
sample, individuals with lower scores for mental health component summary (MCS) 
are more likely to have private insurance plans with drug coverage (HIWDC or 
HMODC). In the asthma sample, the presence of emphysema largely is associated 
with higher probability of having any non-HMO plans (HINDC or HIWDC) and 
moderately lower probability of having HMODC.    
The situation is less clear in the hypertension and diabetes sample. In the 
hypertension sample, evidences show that some chronic problems are associated with 
lower probability of no insurance. Further, individuals with coronary heart disease or 
other heart disease are generally over 5% more likely to have insurance plans with 
drug coverage (HIWDC or HMODC) and over 10% less likely to have insurance 
plans with no drug coverage (HINDC); individuals with a history of stroke are over 
10% more likely to have non-HMO plans (HINDC or HIWDC), and over 15% less 
likely to have HMODC. The presence of coronary heart disease, other heart disease 
and stroke are also associated with much lower probability of no insurance in the 
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diabetes sample. In contrast, the kidney problem caused by diabetes is positively 
associated with the probability of no drug coverage (no insurance or HINDC), while 
negatively associated with the probability of drug coverage (HIWDC or HMODC). 
In sum, self-reported poor health status increases the probability of no 
insurance while some objective measures of poor health such as multimorbidity, 
physical limitation (IADL/ADL) and heart problems is positively associated with the 
probability of health coverage, especially that of HMODC. However, most of these 
health characteristics do not have any significant conection with individuals’ 
insurance choices, as most health measures are not precisely identified and 
unobserved heterogeneity is hard to capture empirically. Further, these results 
together seem to suggest that health insurance choice between HMO plans (HMODC) 
and non-HMO plans (HINDC and HIWDC), or that between insurance plans with no 
drug coverage (HINDC) and insurance plans with drug coverage (HIWDC and 
HMODC), is unlikely to reflect enrollees’ health status in a significant way.   
 
HMO Penetration Rate 
Overall, instrumental variables affect insurance choice nontrivially, with at 
least a 5 percent level of significance for HMODC across conditions. The HMO 
penetration rate is the most significant and consistent instrument. It is assumed to 
reflect competition intensity among private health insurance plans, which also 
generates externality that affects individuals covered by non-HMO health plans in 
terms of costs, quality and access to health care (Baker and Corts 1996; Litaker and 
Cebul 2003; Pylypchuk 2010). As expected, individuals living in areas with high 
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HMO penetration rate are significantly more likely to have HMODC and significantly 
less likely to have HIWDC. The interaction of HMO penetration rate and marital 
status variable, which indicates whether a response to availability of HMO plans is 
different for married people, have expected signs as well. This variable is significantly 
and positively associated with HMODC enrollment, however, it is insignificant in 
explaining HINDC and HIWDC in the hypertension, diabetes and depression sample.  
 
Risk Preference 
Regarding risk-taking behaviors such as ‘currently smoking’ and ‘likely to 
take risks’, current smokers are significantly less likely to have health coverage than 
their counterparts. Compared with the indicator of risk taker, the coefficient on 
‘currently smoking’ is consistently negative and large across all conditions. In terms 
of the marginal effect, individuals who currently smoke are generally over 34% more 
likely to be uninsured than their counterparts across all conditions. 
6.2.2 Out-of-Pocket Expenditures and Utilization on Prescription Drugs 
Table 10 to Table 14B present coefficient estimates and standard errors in 
brackets from expenditure and utilization equations and Table 15A to Table 16D-2 
present the related marginal effects of the selected variables of interest. Overall, the 
models perform quite well. Most of the individual variables are statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level.  
 
Socio-Demographic Indicators  
As in the insurance choice equation, some individual demographics and health 
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status have important association with drug expenditures. Those in the hypertension, 
depression and asthma sample, who are female, are more likely to spend on 
prescription drugs. However, females in those sample are also found to spend fewer 
amounts than male conditional on any positive expenditure. Another interesting 
finding in those sample is that marital status is significantly related to the probability 
of any expenditure. Married people are over 1%-4% more likely to spend on 
prescription drugs. But the marginal effect of marital status is not consistent across the 
studied conditions. Except for the depression sample, being married increases the 
amount spent conditional on any expenditure. Income is also greatly related to the 
chance to spend. The poor are 0.2%-5.3% less likely to spend on prescription drugs. 
However, they are expected to spend larger amount conditional on positive 
expenditure, possibly because the poor are more likely to be uninsured, given the 
results from the insurance choice equation.   
 
Measures of Health Status and Chronic Conditions 
Self-reported health status is among one of the most significantly important 
predictors in both parts of the expenditure equations (p<.001). Individuals indicating 
fair or poor health are 1.2% -7.1% more likely to spend on prescription drugs, and are 
expected to spend larger amount given positive expenditures. Some indicators of 
certain chronic condition such as emphysema and kidney problem caused by diabetes 
are also positively related to both parts of the expenditure equations (p<.001), 
suggesting that poorer health demands more prescription drugs.  
While the presence of some other chronic conditions may increase the 
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probability of any expenditure, it might also affect individuals’ prescription utilization 
pattern. For example, in the hypertension sample, individuals with heart attack, angina, 
and hyperlipidemia are 3.9%, 1.3% and 1.1%, respectively, more likely to spend on 
prescription drugs. Further, conditional of any positive expenditure, the presence of 
those diseases results in a lower probability of spending on generic drugs only and a 
higher probability of spending on brand name drugs only.  
The association between probability of expenditure and chronic conditions is 
mixed in the diabetes sample. Surprisingly, the signs of the marginal effects of 
coronary heart disease, heart attack, angina, and stroke on general expenditures are all 
reversed, compared to the hypertension sample. However, conditional on any 
expenditure, the marginal effects of these conditions on the probability of spending on 
generic drugs only are consistently negative as those in the hypertension sample. In 
addition, the diabetess who have hypertension or hyperlidpedemia are 12.2%, 6.4%, 
3.7% and 6.6%, respectively, more likely to spend on prescription drugs as expected. 
Conditional on any expenditure, these comobidities also lower the chance to spend on 
generic drugs only.  
 
Risk Preference 
Turning attention to risk preference variables, individuals who currently 
smoke have lower probability of positive expenditures but higher level of 
expenditures if they do spend money, implying that smoking behavior is not only an 
indicator of attitude towards health risks but also reflects current health status to some 
extent.   
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Health Insurance Status 
The primary interest of the present study is the coefficients of the insurance 
variables. The results from the probability of total expenditure equations show that 
health coverage is positively and significantly associated with the chance to spend on 
prescription drugs across insurance plans. Having HINDC increases the probability of 
any drug expenditure by 1.1% (in the diabetes sample, coef.=0.3, p<0.01) - 15.6% (in 
the depression sample, coef.=0.5, p<0.01), HIWDC increases the probability by 4.6% 
(in the asthma sample, coef.=0.2, p<0.01) – 21.1% (in the depression sample, 
coef.=0.6, p<0.01) and HMODC increases the probability by 6.1% (in the asthma 
sample, coef.=0.2, p<0.01) – 18.3 % (in the depression sample, coef.=0.5, p<0.01). 
The evident shows that HINDC has relatively smaller contribution to increasing the 
probability of any expenditure than HIWDC and HMODC. This confirms the 
hypothesis that drug coverage really matters for the chronically ill population. 
Another insight into the association between insurance and the probability of 
any expenditure can be gained by comparing the magnitude of the marginal effects of 
insurance by chronic condition. The greatest main marginal effect of insurance with 
drug coverage is in the depression sample (21.1%), followed by hypertension (11.1%), 
diabetes (9.7%) and asthma (7.3%), meaning that if we move anyone in the sample 
from no insurance to ‘insured with drug coverage’, the probability of any expenditure 
on prescription drugs to treat those condition increases by 21.1%, 11.1%, 9.7% and 
7.3%, respectively. This evidence confirms the hypothesis of the present study, that is, 
the association between health coverage and drug expenditures varies across 
60 
 
 
 
conditions.  
The marginal effect of health insurance on the probability of any expenditure 
on antidepressant is relatively greater than that in other sample. Several factors could 
contribute to this outcome. First, a smaller proportion of individuals report 
prescription drug expenditures in the depression sample (57%), compared to the 
hypertension (83%) and diabetes (67%) sample. Second, conditional on any drug 
expenditure, a larger proportion of individuals in the depression sample (62%) 
reported to have used brand name drugs only, compared to the hypertension (33%), 
diabetes (37%) and asthma (12%) sample. Meanwhile, as presented in Table 5, the 
average OOP expenditure per prescription for brand name drugs is highest in the 
depression sample across insurance status, compared to that in other sample. If 
individuals are cost sensitive, it makes sense that depressed patients respond to 
insurance status more strongly than their counterparts with other conditions. 
In contrast, the marginal effect of insurance with drug coverage is slightly 
smaller in the asthma sample, compared to other sample. This finding is consistent 
with the previous study conducted by Pylypchuk (2010), which demonstrated that 
individuals with physically asymptomatic conditions such as hypertension and 
diabetes are more likely to exhibit moral hazard than those with conditions that 
impose immediate impairment such as asthma.  
It is possible that prescription drugs and physician visits could be considered 
as complements, especially in a managed care setting (Kapur, Joyce et al. 2000; 
Escarce, Kapur et al. 2001; Winkelmann 2004), meaning that the increased 
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consumption of one is accompanied with the increased consumption of the other, and 
vice versa. It is true that one can hardly obtain prescription drugs without visiting a 
physician first in the United States. Therefore, obtaining a prescription is often a 
primary purpose of a physician visit (Allin 2008). It also seems reasonable to believe 
that insured patients are more likely to visit physicians than the uninsured. If the 
patient decides to visit a physician, the physician would then determine whether to 
prescribe any prescription drug and which drug to prescribe, given the patient’s health 
condition and insurance status. In this scenario, it is expected that both insurance and 
physician visits are related to drug expenditures, and further, to the quantity of 
prescriptions filled and to the type of drugs obtained by the patients (generic versus 
brand), if patients do spend on prescription drugs. Thus, the interaction between each 
insurance status and physician office-based visits are included in the present 
two-stage models, with physician office-based visits set as the reference level.  
The present results show that all coefficients on the interaction terms between 
insurance status and the number of office-based physician visits are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, and the positive marginal effect of the interaction 
further increases the probability of any OOP expenditure on prescription drugs by 
0.5% - 7.3% across conditions.  
To further investigate whether the association between insurance status and 
prescription utilization pattern is insurance type- or condition-specific, given positive 
drug expenditures, the two-stage equations (the probability of expenditure and the 
conditional expenditures) are again employed with the same set of explanatory 
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variables as in the total OOP expenditure model.  
Conditional on any expenditure, HMODC consistently increases the 
probability of expenditures on generic drugs only, while decreasing the probability of 
expenditures on brand name drugs only across conditions. Compared to HIWDC and 
HINDC, HMODC contributes more in the probability of expenditures on generic 
drugs only across all conditions except for depression. However, the association 
between HMODC and the probability of expenditures on both generic and brand 
name drugs is ambiguous. The association is negative in the hypertension and 
diabetes sample and positive in the depression and asthma sample, likely because of 
the dominance of brand name drugs to treat depression and asthma (Roebuck, 
Liberman et al. 2011).  
Conditional on any expenditure, some other disparities also arise regarding the 
marginal effects of drug coverage. For example, in the hypertension sample, the main 
marginal effects of HMODC and HIWDC are -0.1% and 7.5%, respectively, meaning 
that HMODC slightly decreases the probability of spending on brand name drugs only 
while the main effect of HIWDC goes to the opposite direction. Further, the small 
negative interaction effect between HIWDC and the number of office-based physician 
visits (-1.3%) tapers the positive effect of HIWDC on the probability of expenditures 
on brand name drugs only, while the negative interaction effect between HMODC and 
the number of office-based physicians visits (-0.2%) reinforces the negative 
association between HMODC and expenditures on brand name drugs only, 
conditional on any expenditure.  
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Several factors could be attributed to this disparity. First, many HMO plans 
have adopted cost-cutting measures such as formularies, in which drugs that are 
covered or not are all listed. Second, tired-cost sharing arrangement in many 
insurance plans has been proved to successfully induce patients to purchase generic 
drugs by lowering the copayment for such drugs. As presented in Table 5, the 
differential in average OOP expenditure per prescription between brand name and 
generic drugs for the insured with drug coverage varies across plans with and without 
drug coverage. Under HMODC, for example, the OOP expenditures on brand name 
drugs are generally twice as high as those on generic drugs. Finally, generic 
substitution policies are often employed in HMO plans, which require prior 
authorization by physicians before a brand name drug rather than its generic 
equivalent is dispensed. It is reasonable that these policies would affect physicians’ 
prescription behavior in practice. An early study conducted by Hellerstein (1994) 
suggests that individuals covered by HMO plans are more likely to receive generic 
drugs due to HMO physicians’ tendencies to prescribe generic drugs. 
While insurance plans, no matter with or without drug coverage, generally 
increase the probability of any expenditure on prescription drugs, plans with drug 
coverage are significantly associated with reduction in individuals’ OOP expenditures, 
although the interaction between different types of insurance and the number of 
office-based physician visits weakens the effect of drug coverage on individuals’ cost 
saving to some degree. HMODC consistently decreases individuals’ OOP 
expenditures, no matter in terms of total expenditures, expenditures on generic drugs 
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only, on brand name drugs only or on both, conditional on any expenditure.  
In comparison with non-HMO plans with drug coverage, the marginal effect 
of HMODC on total OOP expenditure is greater across three conditions, i.e. 
hypertension, diabetes and depression. Among these conditions, the greatest marginal 
effect differential is found in the hypertension sample (HIWDC vs. HMODC: -0.3 vs. 
-0.5). 
In the diabetes, depression and asthma sample, HMODC contribute more in 
reducing individuals’ OOP expenditures on generic drugs only, compared to HIWDC. 
In addition, HMODC has a greater marginal effect on reducing individuals’ OOP 
expenditures on brand name drugs only in the depression and asthma sample. All 
these results suggest that HMO plans are more efficient in cutting back enrollees’ cost 
for prescription drugs.   
In sum, insurance with drug coverage significantly increases the probability of 
any OOP expenditure. Further, insurance coverage significantly lowers the 
conditional OOP expenditures, thereby decreasing the financial burden on the 
chronically ill for prescription drugs. In general, HMO plans have stronger effects 
than non-HMO plans with drug coverage in enrollees’ cost saving.  
With respect to the coefficient estimates and the associated marginal effects of 
socio-demographic and health status variables, results from the utilization model 
regarding the probability of any use are generally similar to those estimates from the 
expenditure model for the probability of any expenditure.  
Consistent with the results of the expenditure analysis, the utilization model 
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estimates indicate that individuals with depression are more responsive to drug 
coverage than individuals with other three conditions. Having HIWDC or HMODC is 
associated with an over 28% increase in individuals’ odds to use any prescription drug 
to treat hypertension. 
Among the individuals with physical chronic conditions, the greatest base 
probability of any prescription drug use is in the hypertension sample (0.82), followed 
by diabetes (0.68) and asthma (0.21). Moreover, the associated marginal effects of 
drug coverage is also greatest in the hypertension sample (HIWDC: 0.11, HMODC: 
0.09 in hypertension; HIWDC: 0.09, HMODC: 0.08 in diabetes; HIWDC: 0.04, 
HMODC: 0.07 in asthma). A combination of these results imply that individuals with 
such asymptomatic physical chronic condition as hypertension will be more likely to 
use prescription drugs than those with such symptomatic chronic physical conditions 
as asthma.  
While drug coverage is negatively associated with OOP expenditures as 
discussed earlier, the results of the utilization analysis indicate that the two types of 
prescription drug insurance are positively and significantly associated with the total 
annual number of prescription fills. This occurs across three conditions: hypertension 
(HIWDC coef=1.3, HMODC coef=0.8, p<0.01), depression (HIWDC coef=0.7, 
HMODC coef=0.9, p<0.01) and asthma (HIWDC coef=0.3, HMODC coef=0.8, 
p<0.01)8
                                                        
8 Although the result from the diabetes sample reveals negative association between HMO plans and the total use 
of drugs, the interaction term of HMO and the number of physician visit is positively related to the total use of 
drugs with greater magnitude.  
, after drug use occurs. As presented in Table 7, it is likely that low cost 
sharing in health insurance plans with drug coverage makes consumers insensitive to 
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the prices, thereby increasing the total use of prescription drugs, conditional on any 
use.  
After drug use occurs, the greatest main marginal effects of drug coverage 
among the individuals with the chronic physical conditions are in the hypertension 
sample (HIWDC: 1.32, HMODC: 0.80) while the smallest marginal effects are in the 
asthma sample (HIWDC: 0.32, HMODC: 0.76). Consistent with Pylypchuk (2010), 
all the present results confirm the hypothesis that the association between health 
insurance and prescription drug utilization varies across individuals with different 
conditions.  
Further, as expected, individuals with HMO plans are more likely to have 
prescription patterns toward less expensive generic drugs in the hypertension and 
asthma sample, compared to their counterparts with HIWDC. However, in the 
diabetes and depression sample, drug coverage contributes more in the probability of 
using both generic and brand name drugs than other prescription utilization patterns, 
regardless of the types of the health insurance plans.  
After drug use occurs, in the hypertension and diabetes sample, health 
coverage substantially increases the use of both generic and brand name drugs, 
compared to their contributions on the use of drugs towards other prescription 
utilization patterns. For example, for individuals with hypertension, HMODC is 
associated with around 4.5 additional prescription filled on both generic and brand 
name drugs, around 0.8 more on generic drugs only and around 0.6 fewer on brand 
name drugs only to treat hypertension. In contrast, HIWDC is associated with around 
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1.6 fewer prescription filled on generic drugs only and around 1.4 more on brand 
name drugs only, although the marginal effect of HIWDC on the use of both generic 
and brand name drugs is close to that of HMODC. 
In the depression and diabetes sample, drug coverage is significantly related to 
the prescription utilization pattern towards more expensive brand name drugs only, 
conditional on any drug use. For example, in the depression sample, HIWDC is 
associated with over 0.3 additional prescription filled on generic antidepressants only 
and over 0.8 more on both brand name antidepressants and generic substitutes. The 
main marginal effect of HIWDC on the use of brand name antidepressants only is 
even greater (> 1.0 additional prescription filled). Similarly, HMODC is associated 
with around 0.3 additional prescription filled on both generic and brand name 
antidepressants and around 1.5 additional prescription filled on brand name 
antidepressants only. However, the association between HMODC and the use of 
generic antidepressants only is surprisingly negative. This could be explained by the 
availability of generic antidepressants as discussed earlier. 
In all, the overall ratio of annual generic and total number of selected 
prescriptions filled per individual conditional on any drug use is significantly greater 
in HMO plans, compared to non-HMO plans with drug coverage across three 
conditions (HIWDC vs. HMODC in hypertension is 0.81:0.86; diabetes, 0.73:0.80; 
depression: 0.77:0.82).  However, it is less clear whether individuals with HMO 
plans are more likely to use generic drugs than their counterparts with non-HMO 
plans with drug coverage. The availability of generic substitutes, price differential in 
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tiers of formulary, severity of conditions as well as physicians’ prescribing behavior 
might have more important effect on individuals’ medication choice than the type of 
insurance plans.  
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Chapter 7. CONCLUSION 
Policy Implication 
This study examines the factors involved in healthcare decisions: insurance, 
utilization and expenditures, while focusing on two main objectives: 1) to investigate 
the link between different insurance status and prescription drug utilization as well as 
the associated expenditures; and 2) to illustrate how different chronic conditions 
affect individuals’ responses to health insurance.  
The present study assumes that more generous health coverage is associated 
with higher drug utilization. The likely endogenous relationship between insurance 
and drug utilization is addressed by controlling for observed health characteristics and 
including variables that reflect individuals’ attitude towards risks as well as the 
supply-side factors that have no direction correlation with the drug use but have 
strong correlation with the plan choice. By doing so, the present study attempts to 
identify any observed self-selection bias as the consequence of the unobserved, 
individual-specific and area-specific characteristics that are unrelated to health risks. 
As the association between individuals’ insurance choice and the demand for 
prescription drugs can be explained largely by the observed variables, it leaves a small 
and statistically insignificant role for the potential hidden variables.  
The analysis of insurance choice shows that health related factors are less 
important in predicting individuals’ health insurance status than usually expected 
(Koc 2005). Using the nationally representative MEPS data and multiple measures of 
health conditions, the present study finds a greater proportion of individuals reporting 
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poor health in the uninsured group compared to the other three insured groups. 
However, there are few statistically significant differences in health characteristics 
found between individuals in different health coverage (HMODC, HIWDC and 
HINDC), and those differences point to either direction, with some health status 
measures such as some heart problem or kidney problem indicating that HMOs incur 
adverse selection and others such as multimorbidity indicating favorable selection.  
The implication of these findings is twofold. First, the observed opposite 
selection effects may create potentially conflicting selection bias in estimating the 
probability of any use as well as the level of utilization. If these effects could offset 
each other, no selection-bias would be observed as a consequence of health risk 
segmentation in health insurance enrollment. A handful of previous studies have 
approved this possibility (Dowd et al.,1991; Taylor et al., 1995; Hurd and McGarry, 
1997). Second, health conditions seem to make little significant difference to decision 
on whether to be insured and what type of health insurance plan to choose, as 
individuals might not freely make their own choices based on their economic budgets 
as well as expectation of future health status at the point of decision making. 
In contrast, gender, marital status and race are significant predictors of 
enrollment decision in private health insurance plans. These results are generally 
consistent with the previous literature (Banthin and Taylor 2001; Paringer 2007; 
Pylypchuk 2010). Generally, women, married people, or Hispanics are more likely to 
be in HMO plans than their counterparts. In addition, individuals with lower family 
income level are less likely to enroll in any type of private insurance plans. All the 
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present findings suggest that a better understanding of individuals’ characteristics 
information could help insurance policy makers better target the population that are 
more likely to be enrolled in certain health insurance plan.  
Second, the results of prescription drug utilization and expenditures have some 
significant policy implications related to the previously described hypotheses for the 
present analysis.  
Hypothesis 1: Insurance plans, especially those with drug coverage are 
positively associated with utilization of prescription drugs for all non-elderly adults 
with chronic conditions. 
Hypothesis 2: Drug coverage is negatively associated with OOP expenditures 
on prescription drugs for all non-elderly adults with chronic conditions. 
In general, health insurance plans, especially those with drug coverage, are 
expected to encourage the use of prescribed medicines, since the insured are more 
likely to visit a doctor and bear lower costs for prescription drugs. However, some of 
the increase in drug use may be attributed to selection effects. Therefore, estimates of 
the association between health coverage and prescription drug utilization may actually 
be inflated. Having failed to find significant evidence of adverse selection, the present 
two-stage models indicate that the drug utilization estimates could be biased but with 
modest value. Most of the gap in prescription drug use between the uninsured and the 
insured has been successfully explained by the observable individuals’ 
socio-demographic differences, health condition differences as well as insurance 
effect (price sensitivity) through their estimated marginal effects.  
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The first dimension of the demand for prescription drugs is whether an 
individual has any prescription drug use or expenditure during the interviewed year, 
given the observed health insurance status chosen at the previous stage. The 
coefficients of the variables for having private insurance with drug coverage (HIWDC 
and HMODC) have much larger magnitude than those of the variables for having 
private insurance without drug coverage (HINDC) across the four studied conditions. 
Similar results are obtained in the relevant marginal effect analyses. Thus, having a 
policy including drug benefits reinforces the effect of having private insurance alone 
on the probability of any prescription drug use.  
Using broader population and different time measures, a recent estimate of the 
impact of health coverage reports a higher increase in the probability of any 
prescription drug use and support this conclusion (Gu, Dillon et al. 2010). According 
to that study, individuals with health coverage are around twice as likely to have used 
at least one prescription drug in the past month than those without health coverage, 
and among individuals with health coverage, those with drug benefits are over 20% 
more likely to use prescription drugs than those without those benefits.   
There is also evidence in the present study that physician visits and 
prescription drug use is complement, since the interaction between insurance status 
and physician visits further increase the probability of any drug use. This is consistent 
with findings of Lillard, Rogowski et al. (1999).  
Interestingly, the estimated marginal effect of non-HMO plans with drug 
coverage is slightly larger than the marginal effect of HMO plans on the probability of 
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any drug use to treat hypertension, diabetes or depression. Further, the pattern of 
prescription drug utilization among the chronically ill across health insurance plans is 
unclear. Although private health insurance plans have developed many ways to 
control moral hazard, and the present study confirms the hypothesis that drug 
coverage are significantly associated with lower OOP expenditures for the covered 
individuals, the decrease in expenditures could be hardly interpreted into higher ratio 
of generic drug use among the covered individuals relative to those without drug 
benefits. 
In common belief, HMOs provide relatively extensive coverage for 
prescription drugs while receiving no marginal revenue associated with any healthcare 
services. Therefore, with a strong incentive to treat each case as economically as 
possible, HMOs are sensitive to generic vs. brand name price differential. However, 
the present study shows mixed evidence about whether HMO plans are associated 
with more use of generic drugs than experienced by the chronically ill with non-HMO 
plans. In the hypertension and asthma sample, individuals with HMODC have higher 
propensity to use generic drugs relative to their counterparts with HIWDC. However, 
after drug use occurs, health coverage is associated with substantial increase in the use 
of both generic and brand name drugs - regardless of the types of the health insurance 
plans – when compared to its contributions on the use of drugs towards other 
utilization patterns such as generic or brand name drugs only.  
These results suggest that although the sponsors of plans with drug benefits 
might intend to lower pharmaceutical costs by encouraging appropriate use of 
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generics, both market-level and individual-level effects would jointly complicate the 
outcome of individuals’ prescription utilization pattern in filling behavior. As new 
drugs are introduced and more generic versions of brand name drugs are available in 
the market, the chronically ill population could have improved health and quality of 
life with the appropriate use of prescription drugs. Current prescription drug 
utilization patterns - regarding how many and what kinds of drugs to treat chronic 
conditions should be prescribed, and who receives them - must be better understood 
for plan designers and policy makers to make optimal decisions. 
Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of the association between private health 
insurance and prescription drug utilization varies across conditions.  
Individuals with different chronic conditions might not face the same financial 
pressure nor invest the same in their own health. The conventional wisdom suggests 
that people prefer short-term drug benefits such as allergy alleviation to long-term 
outcomes such as survival from hypertension (Krahn and Gafni 1993; Chapman and 
Elstein 1995; Ortendahl and Fries 2002).  
However, more recent research finds that individuals are less cost-sensitive to 
the “essential” drugs that prevent deterioration in health and prolong life than to the 
“non-essential” drugs that primarily aim at symptom relief. Focusing on differences in 
demand elasticity by therapeutic class of drugs, Goldman, Joyce et al. (2004) and 
Landsman, Yu et al. (2005) both use drug refill data accompanying with 
cross-sectional variation in health plan benefit designs and conclude that the demand 
for drugs to treat chronic conditions such as antidiabetes, antiasthmatic and 
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antidepressant agents are less price sensitive (-0.2 to -0.1) than drugs to treat more 
acute conditions such as antihistamines, triptans and nonselective nonsteroidal 
anti-inflammatory agents (-0.6 to -0.3). Further, Tamblyn, Laprise et al. (2001) 
document the effect of implementing the prescription drug cost-sharing policy on the 
utilization of essential and less essential drugs among the poor and elderly population. 
Acknowledging that price elasticities for prescription drugs could be heterogeneous 
across drugs of different types, their findings also indicate that the target population 
are more responsive to the introduction of prescription drug cost-sharing with respect 
to the demand for less essential drugs rather than for essential drugs. 
Consistent with these recent studies, the present analyses of prescription drug 
utilization across the four conditions confirm that individuals’ response to health 
insurance is condition specific. Regarding the probability of any prescription drug use, 
the demand for antidepressants reacts most strongly to drug coverage (HIWDC or 
HMODC) compared to other chronic conditions. Among individuals with any of the 
three physical chronic conditions and with drug coverage, those with asymptomatic 
chronic conditions (e.g. hypertension) are generally over three times more likely to 
use prescription drugs than their counterparts with symptomatic chronic conditions 
(e.g. asthma), while the probability of any drug use for others with mild chronic 
symptoms (e.g. diabetes) stands in the middle. Further, conditional on any drug use, 
the marginal effect of HIWDC on drug utilization for individuals with hypertension is 
over four times as high as that for individuals with asthma.  
Such findings provide useful thoughts for plan designers and policy makers to 
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rationalize drug formulary decisions and better match the needs of the chronically ill, 
especially the needs of those with multiple conditions. The existing literature suggests 
that multimorbidity could have profound effects on chronic disease management, 
depending on expected priority of the conditions and whether they interact with each 
other (Piette and Kerr 2006; Turner, Hollenbeak et al. 2008). For example, a recent 
study finds that diabetes-related multimorbidity may increase the probability of 
intensifying antihypertensive treatment, whereas diabetes-unrelated multimorbidity 
may divert resources and attention to the treatment for other coexisting conditions 
known as ‘competing demand’ (Voorham, Haaijer-Ruskamp et al. 2012). As a result, 
medication adherence could be difficult when individuals are juggling regimens with 
limited budget constraints for such multimorbity as hypertension and asthma. 
Consider the different elasticity of demand for prescription drug in response to health 
insurance, expansion of prescription drug benefits or imposition of less cost sharing 
for antihypertensive drugs than that for antiasthmatic drugs could be an efficient way 
to ensure medication adherence and adequate drug utilization for such coexisting 
conditions as hypertension and asthma.    
Future research should concentrate on developing a more complete model to 
investigate the effect of health insurance on decision to purchase prescription drugs 
among individuals with multiple chronic conditions and to which extent and in which 
direction the multimorbidity complicates the decision making. Understanding how 
these decisions are made could also improve the ability of healthcare systems to 
deliver better services to the chronically ill population.  
77 
 
 
 
 
Contributions 
The present study contributes to the literature by updating estimates of the 
association between individuals’ insurance choice and prescription drug utilization 
and expenditures among the non-elderly adult population. In spite of growing research 
on the demand for prescription drugs in general, only a handful of studies focus on 
individuals’ OOP expenditures and utilization specific to certain chronic condition. 
Using the national representative data from the 2003-2007 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS), the present study extend this sparse literature in several directions.  
First, it remains a challenging task to explain the disparity in health care 
utilization between the insured and uninsured population due to selection bias. The 
present study employs multiple-stage model of health insurance choice and demand 
for prescription drugs that controls for selection on both observable and unobservable 
characteristics to some degree. Maximum simulated likelihood methods are used to 
estimate the model. With efforts to control for selection effects, I find that individuals 
with no insurance are found to have significantly higher OOP expenditures and fewer 
prescriptions filled across chronic conditions of interest.  
Second, by including chronic mental and physical conditions in the study and 
comparing those subgroups, the present study provides some interesting results. In 
general, the chronically ill individuals are less sensitive to insurance status than the 
overall population. Moreover, individuals with depression react most strongly to 
insurance status. Among individuals with physical chronic conditions, those with 
asymptomatic conditions such as hypertension and diabetes are more sensitive to 
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insurance status than individuals with symptomatic conditions such as asthma. 
Third, total OOP expenditures and utilization of prescription drugs are 
decomposed into three types of drug consumption pattern: generic drugs only, brand 
name drugs only and both generic and brand name drugs. By doing so, the present 
study can detect if there is any significant difference in individuals’ prescription 
utilization relevant to the types of health insurance plans (HINDC, HIWDC and 
HMODC). However, the findings suggest that the type of health insurance plans has 
no consistent impact on individuals’ prescription utilization pattern.   
 
Limitations and Future Research 
While the MEPS data represent one of the best available information for a 
national population of the chronically ill, the data are vulnerable to reporting biases 
based on respondents’ self-assessment of health care utilization and expenditures. As 
a consequence, misclassification of the medical condition requiring the utilization or 
expenditure, misclassification of prescription drugs, and under- or over-reporting are 
likely problems as in any survey study.  
Further, a number of important issues cannot be addressed due to data 
limitations. Most private health insurance plans cover prescription drugs. However, 
there is variation in terms of the extent of medical benefit coverage across those plans. 
Labels such as HINDC, HIWDC and HMODC are ultimately meaningful only if they 
adequately capture the underlying distinction on individuals’ access to prescription 
drugs, generosity of drug package and the relevant cost sharing features between them. 
Additional information, such as the overall benefit of HMO plans (e.g. premium, 
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deductibles, copayments and annual coverage limits) and competing benefit offerings 
from other alternatives faced by the same individual, could replace the broad labels by 
more desirable variables if the study seeks to explain to which extent there is self 
selection into HMO plans. It would also help in explaining the impact of cost-sharing 
on individuals’ prescription drug utilization and expenditures. 
There are also several methodological limitations as described earlier. Relying 
on a cross-sectional design, the present study faces the classical challenges such the 
potential for bias as a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity and the associated 
difficulties establishing a causal relationship between insurance choice and 
prescription utilization and expenditures due to selection issues (Kamal-Bahl and 
Briesacher 2004). However, current applied econometrics contains many variants of 
the multiple-stage model, some of which involves the presence of endogenous 
treatment dummy variables in equations with discrete and censored outcomes like the 
present study. The approach employed here can be extended to these cases by further 
developing a single simultaneous model, which allows for the consideration of 
selection bias, multiple levels of insurance and complex survey sampling.  
In addition, the present results must be interpreted in light of two important 
sample restrictions. First, the sample is drawn from an insured non-elderly adult 
population with certain chronic condition. Therefore, the findings are not necessarily 
generalizable to other populations such as the low-income, the elderly or those with 
other health problems. Second, individuals with public coverage are excluded. The 
primary concern with this approach is to isolate the independent effect of health 
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coverage for individuals who have supplemental insurance, which would confound 
the main findings of the present study.  
Finally, the present study mainly focuses on the association of health 
insurance choice and prescription drug utilization and expenditures. Future research 
could shed more light on this issue by extending the analysis to other medical care 
services. Additionally, although the results can make predictions regarding 
individuals’ insurance choice and demand for prescription drugs, it is not possible to 
assess the clinical necessity, adequacy or quality of drug treatment received among 
the chronically ill. Moreover, it is not feasible to determine the appropriateness of the 
level of OOP expenditures and utilization for individuals with chronic conditions and 
whether they are actually better off with drug coverage. More rigorous exploration is 
needed into the effects of health insurance choice on the use of different therapeutic 
classes of drugs, particular on the use of drugs that have high costs and require high 
level of adherence and, ultimately, the health outcomes of the chronically ill.   
81 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table 1.  List of Drugs in Selected Drug Classes to Treat Target Conditions 
Hypertension Diabetes Asthma Depression
Cardiac drug, NEC Antidiabetic agents, 
Insulins
Sympathomimetic 
agents, NEC
Phsychother, 
antidepressants
Cardiac,
ACE inhibitors
Antidiatetic agents, 
Misc
Adrenals & Comb 
NEC
Cardiac, 
Beta blockers
Antidiabetic agent, 
Sulfonylureas
Cardiac, 
Calcium channel
Diuretics, 
loop diuretics
Diuretics, potassium-
sparing
Diuretics, 
thiazides & related
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Table 2A. Weighted Means and Definitions of Possible Explanatory Variables for 
Non-elderly Adult Population (2003-2007) 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description Hypertension  
N=10,595 
Diabetes  
N=4,191 
Depression  
N=5,924 
Asthma  
N=6,533 
Sociodemographic 
Age Age at the end of the year 
51.331 
(0.162) 
50.727 
(0.249) 
42.970 
(0.265) 
39.439 
(0.259) 
Female 1 if female else=0 
0.492 
(0.007) 
0.491 
(0.014) 
0.656 
(0.009) 
0.582 
(0.008) 
Black 1 if black else=0 
0.153 
(0.008) 
0.134 
(0.011) 
0.056 
(0.004) 
0.106 
(0.006) 
Hispanic 1 if Hispanic else=0 
0.087 
(0.005) 
0.148 
(0.010) 
0.091 
(0.005) 
0.093 
(0.007) 
Mid Income 1 if family income ranges from 
200% to less than 400% of the 
Federal poverty threshold else=0 
0.320 
(0.007) 
0.345 
(0.010) 
0.342 
(0.009) 
0.330 
(0.008) 
Low Income 1 if family income ranges from 
125% to less than 200% of the 
Federal poverty threshold else=0 
0.089 
(0.003) 
0.115 
(0.006) 
0.108 
(0.005) 
0.096 
(0.004) 
Near Poor 1 if  family income ranges from 
100% to less than 125% of the 
Federal poverty threshold else=0 
0.022 
(0.002) 
0.034 
(0.003) 
0.032 
(0.003) 
0.027 
(0.002) 
Poor 1 if family income is less than 
100% of the Federal poverty 
threshold else=0 
0.050 
(0.003) 
0.065 
(0.005) 
0.086 
(0.005) 
0.075 
(0.004) 
Married 1 if married at the end of the year 
else=0 
0.696 
(0.008) 
0.697 
(0.011) 
0.530 
(0.011) 
0.514 
(0.010) 
Divorced 1 if divorced at the end of the year 
else=0 
0.147 
(0.006) 
0.147 
(0.009) 
0.191 
(0.008) 
0.137 
(0.006) 
Household Family size 
2.624 
(0.021) 
2.763 
(0.035) 
2.611 
(0.029) 
2.728 
(0.034) 
Education 
High School 1 if completed high school at the 
end of the year else=0 
0.475 
(0.008) 
0.490 
(0.011) 
0.449 
(0.011) 
0.443 
(0.010) 
BA 1 if completed BA at the end of 
the year else=0 
0.179 
(0.006) 
0.140 
(0.008) 
0.186 
(0.008) 
0.215 
(0.009) 
MA 1 if completed MA at the end of 
the year else=0 
0.083 
(0.005) 
0.050 
(0.006) 
0.082 
(0.006) 
0.074 
(0.005) 
Employment 
Employed 1 if employed the whole year 
else=0 
0.782 
(0.006) 
0.732 
(0.010) 
0.732 
(0.008) 
0.776 
(0.007) 
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Table 2A.  (Continued) 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description Hypertension  
N=10,595 
Diabetes  
N=4,191 
Depression  
N=5,924 
Asthma  
N=6,533 
Unemployed 1 if unemployed the whole year 
else=0 
0.162 
(0.005) 
0.201 
(0.009) 
0.164 
(0.007) 
0.126 
(0.006) 
Selfemployed 1 if self employed anytime 
during the  year else=0 
0.112 
(0.005) 
0.101 
(0.006) 
0.108 
(0.006) 
0.094 
(0.005) 
Union 1 if employed by union anytime 
during the year else=0 
0.136 
(0.007) 
0.126 
(0.008) 
0.097 
(0.005) 
0.108 
(0.006) 
Payvac 1 if paid vacation anytime during 
the  year else=0 
0.585 
(0.008) 
0.545 
(0.012) 
0.512 
(0.009) 
0.553 
(0.009) 
Sicpay 1 if paid sick leave anytime 
during the  year else=0 
0.528 
(0.009) 
0.481 
(0.012) 
0.465 
(0.009) 
0.510 
(0.010) 
Regions 
Midwest 1 if lives in Midwest Census 
Region else=0 
0.230 
(0.012) 
0.213 
(0.014) 
0.264 
(0.013) 
0.237 
(0.013) 
South 1 if lives in South Census Region 
else=0 
0.399 
(0.013) 
0.392 
(0.015) 
0.333 
(0.015) 
0.334 
(0.013) 
West 1 if subject lives in West Census 
Region else=0 
0.184 
(0.009) 
0.220 
(0.013) 
0.244 
(0.013) 
0.231 
(0.011) 
Urban 1 if lives in metro area else=0 
0.810 
(0.012) 
0.798 
(0.014) 
0.837 
(0.012) 
0.852 
(0.011) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good 
Helath 
1 if self reports very good health 
else=0 
0.307 
(0.006) 
0.214 
(0.009) 
0.313 
(0.008) 
0.332 
(0.007) 
Good Health 1 if self reports good health 
else=0 
0.372 
(0.006) 
0.413 
(0.011) 
0.323 
(0.007) 
0.307 
(0.007) 
Fair Health 1 if self reports fair health else=0 
0.151 
(0.005) 
0.234 
(0.008) 
0.146 
(0.005) 
0.118 
(0.005) 
Poor Health 1 if self reports poor health 
else=0 
0.041 
(0.003) 
0.078 
(0.005) 
0.060 
(0.003) 
0.037 
(0.003) 
Limit 1 if IADL screener or ADL 
screener else=0 
0.038 
(0.002) 
0.056 
(0.005) 
0.061 
(0.004) 
0.031 
(0.003) 
Coglim 1 if has cognitive limitation 
else=0 
0.046 
(0.003) 
0.068 
(0.005) 
0.116 
(0.006) 
0.050 
(0.004) 
MCS Mental component summary 
50.989 
(0.132) 
50.184 
(0.213) 
42.303 
(0.198) 
49.642 
(0.180) 
Conditions 1 if diagnosed with more than 
one of the four target conditions 
else=0 
0.300 
(0.007) 
0.554 
(0.011) 
0.278 
(0.008) 
0.168 
(0.007) 
Lipo_con 1 if had been diagnosed with 
hyperlipedemia else=0 
0.335 
(0.007) 
0.391 
(0.013) 
0.154 
(0.007) 
0.102 
(0.007) 
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Table 2A.  (Continued) 
 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description Hypertension  
N=10,595 
Diabetes  
N=4,191 
Depression  
N=5,924 
Asthma  
N=6,533 
Hyper_con 1 if had been diagnosed with 
hypertension else=0 
- 
- 
0.504 
(0.012) 
0.197 
(0.007) 
0.161 
(0.007) 
Dia_con 1 if had been diagnosed with 
diabetes else=0 
0.175 
(0.006) 
- 
- 
0.077 
(0.005) 
0.056 
(0.004) 
As_con 1 if had been diagnosed with 
asthma else=0 
0.056 
(0.003) 
0.048 
(0.005) 
0.071 
(0.005) 
- 
- 
De_con 1 if had been diagnosed with 
depression else=0 
0.115 
(0.004) 
0.131 
(0.007) 
- 
- 
0.135 
(0.007) 
Chddx 1 if had been diagnosed with 
coronary heart disease else=0 
0.049 
(0.003) 
0.071 
(0.006) 
0.020 
(0.002) 
0.015 
(0.002) 
Midx 1 if had been diagnosed with 
heart attack else=0 
0.046 
(0.003) 
0.060 
(0.005) 
0.019 
(0.002) 
0.014 
(0.002) 
Angidx 1 if had been diagnosed with 
angina else=0 
0.031 
(0.002) 
0.040 
(0.004) 
0.017 
(0.002) 
0.013 
(0.002) 
Ohrtdx 1 if had been diagnosed with 
other heart disease else=0 
0.084 
(0.004) 
0.086 
(0.006) 
0.070 
(0.005) 
0.077 
(0.005) 
Strkdx 1 if had been diagnosed with 
stroke else=0 
0.027 
(0.002) 
0.039 
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.002) 
0.016 
(0.002) 
Dskidn 1 if diabetes caused kidney 
problems else=0 
0.014 
(0.001) 
0.062 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.001) 
Dseypr 1 if diabetes caused eye 
problems else=0 
0.028 
(0.002) 
0.133 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
Emphdx 1 if had been diagnosed with 
emphysema else=0 
0.013 
(0.002) 
0.015 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.001) 
0.021 
(0.002) 
Aspkfl 1 if keeps peak flow meter at 
home else=0 
0.021 
(0.002) 
0.021 
(0.003) 
0.025 
(0.003) 
0.157 
(0.007) 
Risk Reference 
Adrisk More likely to take risk* 0.163 
(0.005) 
0.163 
(0.007) 
0.188 
(0.006) 
0.224 
(0.008) 
Adsmok 1 if subject currently smokes 
else=0 
0.174 
(0.005) 
0.178 
(0.010) 
0.266 
(0.009) 
0.191 
(0.008) 
Others 
HMOrate Mean of the yearly HMO 
enrollment grouped by strata 
and psu 
0.214 
(0.006) 
0.212 
(0.006) 
0.220 
(0.006) 
0.228 
(0.006) 
Source: All calculations of this study is based on the MEPS data (2003-2007). 
Notes: *indicates that the measurement is the following for Adrisk: 1 disagree strongly, 2 disagree 
somewhat, 3 uncertain, 4 agree somewhat, 5 agree strongly. ADL, activities of the daily living; IADL, 
instrumental activities of daily living. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2B.  Weighted Means and Definitions of Possible Explanatory Variables 
(2003-2007) 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Remaining 
Non-elderly 
Adult 
Population 
N=76,335 
Total 
Non-Elderly 
Adult 
Population 
N=98,085 
Total 
Population 
N=167,688 
Sociodemographic 
Age Age at the end of the year 38.443 
(0.110) 
40.137 
(0.102) 
36.182 
(0.171) 
Female 1 if female else=0 0.497 
(0.003) 
0.507 
(0.002) 
0.510 
(0.002) 
Black 1 if black else=0 0.122 
(0.005) 
0.121 
(0.005) 
0.124 
(0.005) 
Hispanic 1 if Hispanic else=0 0.157 
(0.006) 
0.142 
(0.006) 
0.147 
(0.006) 
Mid Income 1 if family income ranges from 200% 
to less than 400% of the Federal 
poverty threshold else=0 
0.309 
(0.004) 
0.313 
(0.003) 
0.313 
(0.003) 
Low Income 1 if family income ranges from 125% 
to less than 200% of the Federal 
poverty threshold else=0 
0.125 
(0.002) 
0.118 
(0.002) 
0.138 
(0.002) 
Near Poor 1 if  family income ranges from 
100% to less than 125% of the 
Federal poverty threshold else=0 
0.038 
(0.001) 
0.035 
(0.001) 
0.045 
(0.001) 
Poor 1 if family income is less than 100% 
of the Federal poverty threshold 
else=0 
0.122 
(0.003) 
0.108 
(0.002) 
0.127 
(0.003) 
Married 1 if married at the end of the year 
else=0 
0.535 
(0.004) 
0.553 
(0.004) 
0.412 
(0.003) 
Divorced 1 if divorced at the end of the year 
else=0 
0.107 
(0.002) 
0.117 
(0.002) 
0.086 
(0.002) 
Household Family size 3.084 
(0.017) 
2.992 
(0.015) 
3.207 
(0.016) 
Education 
High School 1 if completed high school at the end 
of the year else=0 
0.450 
(0.004) 
0.453 
(0.004) 
0.341 
(0.003) 
BA 1 if completed BA at the end of the 
year else=0 
0.176 
(0.004) 
0.179 
(0.004) 
0.126 
(0.003) 
MA 1 if completed MA at the end of the 
year else=0 
0.061 
(0.002) 
0.065 
(0.002) 
0.048 
(0.001) 
Employment 
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Table 2B.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Variable Description Remaining 
Non-elderly 
Adults 
Population 
N=76,335 
Total 
Non-Elderly 
Adults 
Population 
N=98,085 
Total 
Population 
N=167,688 
Employed 1 if employed the whole year else=0 0.723 
(0.004) 
0.736 
(0.003) 
0.480 
(0.003) 
Unemployed 1 if unemployed the whole year 
else=0 
0.177 
(0.003) 
0.169 
(0.003) 
0.213 
(0.003) 
Selfemployed 1 if self employed anytime during the  
year else=0 
0.104 
(0.002) 
0.105 
(0.002) 
0.074 
(0.001) 
Union 1 if employed by union anytime 
during the year else=0 
0.086 
(0.002) 
0.094 
(0.002) 
0.060 
(0.002) 
Payvac 1 if paid vacation anytime during the  
year else=0 
0.480 
(0.004) 
0.501 
(0.003) 
0.319 
(0.002) 
Sicpay 1 if paid sick leave anytime during 
the  year else=0 
0.421 
(0.004) 
0.443 
(0.004) 
0.282 
(0.003) 
Regions 
Midwest 1 if lives in Midwest Census Region 
else=0 
0.218 
(0.009) 
0.223 
(0.009) 
0.223 
(0.008) 
South 1 if lives in South Census Region 
else=0 
0.357 
(0.010) 
0.359 
(0.010) 
0.361 
(0.010) 
West 1 if subject lives in West Census 
Region else=0 
0.237 
(0.009) 
0.231 
(0.009) 
0.232 
(0.009) 
Urban 1 if lives in metro area else=0 
0.847 
(0.009) 
0.842 
(0.009) 
0.836 
(0.009) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good 
Helath 
1 if self reports very good health 
else=0 
0.333 
(0.003) 
0.330 
(0.003) 
0.312 
(0.003) 
Good Health 
1 if self reports good health else=0 
0.237 
(0.003) 
0.263 
(0.003) 
0.244 
(0.003) 
Fair Health 1 if self reports fair health else=0 
0.074 
(0.002) 
0.088 
(0.002) 
0.083 
(0.001) 
Poor Health 
1 if self reports poor health else=0 
0.027 
(0.001) 
0.030 
(0.001) 
0.029 
(0.001) 
Limit 1 if IADL screener or ADL screener 
else=0 
0.038 
(0.001) 
0.037 
(0.001) 
0.053 
(0.001) 
Coglim 
1 if has cognitive limitation else=0 
0.045 
(0.001) 
0.047 
(0.001) 
0.051 
(0.001) 
MCS Mental component summary 51.219 
(0.073) 
50.683 
(0.066) 
50.865 
(0.063) 
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Table 2B.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Variable Description Remaining 
Non-elderly 
Adults 
Population 
N=76,335 
Total 
Non-Elderly 
Adults 
Population 
N=98,085 
Total 
Population 
N=167,688 
Conditions 1 if diagnosed with more than one of 
the four target conditions else=0 
0.027 
(0.001) 
0.061 
(0.001) 
0.064 
(0.001) 
Lipo_con 1 if had been diagnosed with 
hyperlipidemia else=0 
0.062 
(0.002) 
0.098 
(0.002) 
0.105 
(0.002) 
Hyper_con 1 if had been diagnosed with 
hypertension else=0 
0.039 
(0.002) 
0.145 
(0.002) 
0.159 
(0.002) 
Dia_con 1 if had been diagnosed with diabetes 
else=0 
0.021 
(0.001) 
0.054 
(0.001) 
0.058 
(0.001) 
As_con 1 if had been diagnosed with asthma 
else=0 
0.014 
(0.001) 
0.043 
(0.001) 
0.052 
(0.001) 
De_con 1 if had been diagnosed with 
depression else=0 
0.032 
(0.001) 
0.092 
(0.002) 
0.073 
(0.001) 
Chddx 1 if had been diagnosed with 
coronary heart disease else=0 
0.011 
(0.001) 
0.016 
(0.001) 
0.026 
(0.001) 
Midx 1 if had been diagnosed with heart 
attack else=0 
0.011 
(0.001) 
0.015 
(0.001) 
0.023 
(0.001) 
Angidx 1 if had been diagnosed with angina 
else=0 
0.008 
(0) 
0.011 
(0) 
0.016 
(0.001) 
Ohrtdx 1 if had been diagnosed with other 
heart disease else=0 
0.035 
(0.001) 
0.044 
(0.001) 
0.048 
(0.001) 
Strkdx 1 if had been diagnosed with stroke 
else=0 
0.010 
(0.001) 
0.012 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.001) 
Dskidn 1 if diabetes caused kidney problems 
else=0 
0.003 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.000) 
Dseypr 1 if diabetes caused eye problems 
else=0 
0.006 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
Emphdx 1 if had been diagnosed with 
emphysema else=0 
0.006 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
Aspkfl 1 if keeps peak flow meter at home 
else=0 
0.006 
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.001) 
0.017 
(0.001) 
Risk Reference 
Adrisk More likely to take risk* 0.297 
(0.003) 
0.287 
(0.002) 
0.205 
(0.002) 
Adsmok 1 if subject currently smokes else=0 0.212 
(0.004) 
0.210 
(0.003) 
0.142 
(0.002) 
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Table 2B.  (Continued) 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description Remaining 
Non-elderly 
Population 
N=76,335 
Total 
Non-Elderly 
Population 
N=98,085 
Total 
Population 
N=167,688 
Others 
HMOrate Mean of the yearly HMO enrollment 
rate grouped by strata and psu 
0.223 
(0.005) 
0.222 
(0.005) 
0.220 
(0.005) 
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Table 3A.  Weighted Percentage and Total Number of the Non-elderly Adults 
Diagnosed with Hypertension and Comorbid Conditions. 
 
Population size  
(number in millions) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
population diagnosed with hypertension 
 
percent 12.875 
(0.332) 
13.785 
(0.360) 
14.604 
(0.335) 
14.681 
(0.361) 
16.390 
(0.387) 
number in millions 23.293 
(0.332) 
25.276 
(0.360) 
27.039 
(0.335) 
27.480 
(0.361) 
30.930 
(0.387) 
Among persons diagnosed with hypertension, percent diagnosed with 
 
Hyperlipidemia  28.157 
(1.135) 
31.370 
(1.079) 
34.153 
(1.147) 
35.066 
(1.100) 
41.075 
(1.046) 
Diabetes 18.981 
(0.938) 
20.196 
(0.863) 
20.462 
(0.904) 
22.057 
(0.957) 
22.598 
(0.835) 
Depression 12.631 
(0.765) 
13.843 
(0.759) 
15.107 
(0.757) 
15.619 
(0.789) 
14.963 
(0.787) 
Asthma 6.693 
(0.628) 
6.469 
(0.546) 
6.017 
(0.542) 
7.065 
(0.558) 
7.986 
(0.644) 
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Table 3B. Weighted Percentage and Total Number of the Non-elderly Adults 
Diagnosed with Diabetes and Comorbid Conditions. 
 
Population size  
(number in millions) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
population reporting diabetes 
 
percent 4.707 
(0.207) 
5.174 
(0.208) 
5.414 
(0.204) 
5.800 
(0.214) 
6.176 
(0.219) 
number in millions 8.515 
(0.207) 
9.487 
(0.208) 
10.022 
(0.204) 
10.856 
(0.214) 
11.654 
(0.219) 
Among persons diagnosed with hypertension, percent diagnosed with 
 
Hyperlipidemia  35.836 
(1.737) 
37.233 
(2.058) 
42.470 
(1.777) 
43.556 
(1.763) 
49.335 
(1.733) 
Hypertension 51.922 
(1.841) 
53.809 
(1.902) 
55.201 
(1.818) 
55.832 
(1.938) 
59.954 
(1.695) 
Depression 16.737 
(1.475) 
16.320 
(1.402) 
19.818 
(1.319) 
19.971 
(1.442) 
18.702 
(1.238) 
Asthma 7.491 
(0.894) 
6.751 
(0.846) 
7.983 
(0.923) 
7.886 
(0.910) 
8.495 
(0.958) 
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Table 4.  Distribution of Population by Health Insurance Status (2003-2007) 
 
Insurance 
Status 
Hyper- 
tension 
Diabetes Depre- 
ssion 
Asthma Remain
ing 
Non-el
derly 
Adult  
Total 
Non-Elderly 
Adult  
Total 
Population 
HMODC 0.304 
(0.010) 
0.309 
(0.013) 
0.279 
(0.011) 
0.293 
(0.009) 
0.234 
(0.006) 
0.249 
(0.006) 
0.220 
(0.005) 
HIWDC 0.511 
(0.010) 
0.472 
(0.014) 
0.483 
(0.011) 
0.494 
(0.011) 
0.388 
(0.006) 
0.414 
(0.006) 
0.380 
(0.006) 
HINDC 0.043 
(0.003) 
0.036 
(0.004) 
0.041 
(0.004) 
0.044 
(0.004) 
0.048 
(0.002) 
0.047 
(0.001) 
0.059 
(0.001) 
Uninsure
d 
0.141 
(0.005) 
0.183 
(0.008) 
0.197 
(0.008) 
0.170 
(0.007) 
0.330 
(0.005) 
0.290 
(0.004) 
0.342 
(0.005) 
N 10,595 4,191 5,924 6,533 76,335 98,085 167,688 
Notes: HIWDC, any private health insurance with drug coverage; HINDC, private health insurance and 
no drug coverage; HMODC, HMO and drug coverage.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5A.  Weighted Means of Possible Explanatory Variables Grouped by Health 
Insurance Status for Non-elderly Adult Population with Hypertension (2003-2007) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=2,167 
HINDC 
N=473 
HIWDC 
N=4,840 
HMOWD 
N=3,115 
Sociodemographic    
Age 50.891 
(0.275) 
52.411* 
(0.487) 
51.626* 
(0.202) 
50.885 
(0.265)# 
Female 0.504 
(0.014) 
0.543 
(0.021) 
0.481 
(0.010) 
0.496 
(0.011) 
Black 0.200 
(0.014) 
0.151* 
(0.009) 
0.123* 
(0.008) 
0.182 
(0.013)# 
Hispanic 0.194 
(0.013) 
0.089* 
(0.008) 
0.056* 
(0.005) 
0.090* 
(0.007)# 
Mid Income 0.310 
(0.013) 
0.353 
(0.015) 
0.322 
(0.009) 
0.318 
(0.012) 
Low Income 0.213 
(0.010) 
0.098* 
(0.009) 
0.066* 
(0.004) 
0.070* 
(0.005) 
Near Poor 0.067 
(0.006) 
0.022* 
(0.006) 
0.014* 
(0.002) 
0.016* 
(0.002) 
Poor 0.189 
(0.010) 
0.063* 
(0.006) 
0.028* 
(0.003) 
0.020* 
(0.003)# 
Married 0.546 
(0.015) 
0.613* 
(0.020) 
0.741* 
(0.010) 
0.704* 
(0.012)# 
Divorced 0.210 
(0.013) 
0.208 
(0.018) 
0.132* 
(0.007) 
0.135* 
(0.011) 
Household 2.670 
(0.048) 
2.593 
(0.048) 
2.565* 
(0.026) 
2.705 
(0.033)# 
Education     
High School 0.451 
(0.014) 
0.449 
(0.020) 
0.481 
(0.011) 
0.480 
(0.013) 
BA 0.097 
(0.009) 
0.215* 
(0.019) 
0.196* 
(0.008) 
0.184* 
(0.010) 
MA 0.027 
(0.005) 
0.071* 
(0.009) 
0.091* 
(0.007) 
0.098* 
(0.009) 
Employment     
Employed 0.598 
(0.014) 
0.741* 
(0.017) 
0.799* 
(0.009) 
0.843* 
(0.009)# 
Unemployed 0.299 
(0.012) 
0.200* 
(0.015) 
0.150* 
(0.007) 
0.113* 
(0.007)# 
Selfemployed 0.194 
(0.012) 
0.183 
(0.013) 
0.101* 
(0.007) 
0.081* 
(0.006)# 
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Table 5A.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=2,167 
HINDC 
N=473 
HIWDC 
N=4,840 
HMOWD 
N=3,115 
Union 0.044 
(0.006) 
0.108* 
(0.013) 
0.139* 
(0.010) 
0.179* 
(0.010)# 
Payvac 0.236 
(0.012) 
0.447* 
(0.026) 
0.632* 
(0.011) 
0.687* 
(0.012)# 
Sicpay 0.168 
(0.012) 
0.404* 
(0.025) 
0.574* 
(0.011) 
0.636* 
(0.013)# 
Regions     
Midwest 0.200 
(0.018) 
0.238 
(0.011) 
0.259* 
(0.012) 
0.196 
(0.019)# 
South 0.489 
(0.019) 
0.380* 
(0.018) 
0.420* 
(0.017) 
0.326* 
(0.018)# 
West 0.207 
(0.014) 
0.191 
(0.014) 
0.143* 
(0.010) 
0.239* 
(0.016)# 
Urban 0.749 
(0.022) 
0.800* 
(0.018) 
0.778* 
(0.015) 
0.893* 
(0.011)# 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Helath 0.203 
(0.010) 
0.309* 
(0.015) 
0.322* 
(0.009) 
0.331* 
(0.010) 
Good Health 0.365 
(0.013) 
0.355 
(0.017) 
0.369 
(0.008) 
0.383 
(0.010) 
Fair Health 0.253 
(0.011) 
0.152* 
(0.013) 
0.134* 
(0.006) 
0.133* 
(0.007) 
Poor Health 0.085 
(0.006) 
0.046* 
(0.012) 
0.036* 
(0.003) 
0.028* 
(0.003)# 
Limit 0.061 
(0.006) 
0.050 
(0.010) 
0.034* 
(0.003) 
0.032* 
(0.004) 
Coglim 0.097 
(0.009) 
0.070 
(0.013) 
0.041* 
(0.004) 
0.028* 
(0.003)# 
MCS 47.484 
(0.372) 
50.465* 
(0.379) 
51.651* 
(0.170) 
51.539* 
(0.221) 
Conditions 0.356 
(0.016) 
0.311 
(0.021) 
0.288* 
(0.010) 
0.292* 
(0.012) 
Lipo_con 0.230 
(0.012) 
0.3170* 
(0.017) 
0.371* 
(0.011) 
0.325* 
(0.012)# 
Dia_con 0.208 
(0.012) 
0.152* 
(0.012) 
0.164* 
(0.008) 
0.180* 
(0.009) 
As_con 0.054 
(0.007) 
0.070 
(0.007) 
0.054 
(0.005) 
0.059 
(0.006) 
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Table 5A.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=2,167 
HINDC 
N=473 
HIWDC 
N=4,840 
HMOWD 
N=3,115 
De_con 0.159 
(0.010) 
0.147 
(0.022) 
0.113* 
(0.005) 
0.091* 
(0.007)# 
Chddx 0.050 
(0.006) 
0.060 
(0.005) 
0.050 
(0.004) 
0.045 
(0.005) 
Midx 0.050 
(0.007) 
0.044 
(0.004) 
0.048 
(0.004) 
0.041 
(0.004) 
Angidx 0.041 
(0.006) 
0.040 
(0.005) 
0.030 
(0.003) 
0.028* 
(0.004) 
Ohrtdx 0.080 
(0.007) 
0.078 
(0.012) 
0.088 
(0.005) 
0.081 
(0.005) 
Strkdx 0.030 
(0.004) 
0.036 
(0.007) 
0.030 
(0.003) 
0.019* 
(0.003)# 
Dskidn 0.018 
(0.003) 
0.019 
(0.004) 
0.012 
(0.002) 
0.014 
(0.002) 
Dseypr 0.040 
(0.005) 
0.040 
(0.005) 
0.026* 
(0.003) 
0.024* 
(0.003) 
Emphdx 0.023 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.000) 
0.014* 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.002)# 
Aspkfl 0.017 
(0.003) 
0.029 
(0.005) 
0.022 
(0.003) 
0.021 
(0.003) 
Risk Reference 
Adrisk 0.215 
(0.012) 
0.195 
(0.014) 
0.151* 
(0.006) 
0.154* 
(0.009) 
Adsmok 0.268 
(0.013) 
0.162* 
(0.013) 
0.160* 
(0.007) 
0.156* 
(0.009) 
Others 
HMOrate 0.184 
(0.006) 
0.206* 
(0.005) 
0.173* 
(0.005) 
0.299* 
(0.006)# 
Note: *indicates that the estimate is significantly different from the reference group (Uninsured) at the 
5 percent level. ＃indicates that the estimate is significantly different from the reference group 
(HIWDC) at the 5 percent level. Same rules and notation apply to Table 5A-D.  
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Table 5B.  Weighted Means of Possible Explanatory Variables Grouped by Health 
Insurance Status for Non-elderly Adult Population with Diabetes (2003-2007) 
 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,124 
HINDC 
N=168 
HIWDC 
N=1,693 
HMOWD 
N=1,206 
Sociodemographic    
Age 48.900 
(0.419) 
51.327* 
(0.343) 
51.388* 
(0.354) 
50.729* 
(0.378) 
Female 0.501 
(0.018) 
0.485 
(0.028) 
0.478 
(0.017) 
0.504 
(0.019) 
Black 0.147 
(0.012) 
0.233* 
(0.015) 
0.115* 
(0.011) 
0.145 
(0.016)# 
Hispanic 0.306 
(0.019) 
0.117* 
(0.011) 
0.087* 
(0.010) 
0.152* 
(0.012)# 
Mid Income 0.287 
(0.016) 
0.393* 
(0.022) 
0.368* 
(0.015) 
0.339* 
(0.017) 
Low Income 0.229 
(0.014) 
0.101* 
(0.008) 
0.085* 
(0.007) 
0.094* 
(0.009) 
Near Poor 0.091 
(0.008) 
0.037* 
(0.002) 
0.018* 
(0.004) 
0.025* 
(0.005) 
Poor 0.206 
(0.014) 
0.059* 
(0.004) 
0.035* 
(0.005) 
0.026* 
(0.005) 
Married 0.589 
(0.019) 
0.633 
(0.033) 
0.725* 
(0.014) 
0.724* 
(0.018) 
Divorced 0.175 
(0.013) 
0.118 
(0.006) 
0.144 
(0.012) 
0.139 
(0.014) 
Household 2.948 
(0.056) 
2.852 
(0.059) 
2.626* 
(0.043) 
2.853 
(0.069)# 
Education     
High School 0.434 
(0.019) 
0.515 
(0.028) 
0.510* 
(0.015) 
0.488* 
(0.017) 
BA 0.072 
(0.012) 
0.182* 
(0.020) 
0.156* 
(0.012) 
0.150* 
(0.014) 
MA 0.034 
(0.004) 
0.018 
(0.001) 
0.054* 
(0.008) 
0.058* 
(0.010) 
Employment     
Employed 0.565 
(0.017) 
0.715* 
(0.024) 
0.758* 
(0.014) 
0.792* 
(0.014) 
Unemployed 0.322 
(0.015) 
0.254 
(0.025) 
0.187* 
(0.012) 
0.142* 
(0.012)# 
Selfemployed 0.163 
(0.013) 
0.154 
(0.038) 
0.089* 
(0.008) 
0.077* 
(0.009) 
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Table 5B.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,124 
HINDC 
N=168 
HIWDC 
N=1,693 
HMOWD 
N=1,206 
Union 0.037 
(0.010) 
0.121* 
(0.013) 
0.131* 
(0.012) 
0.172* 
(0.014)# 
Payvac 0.223 
(0.019) 
0.456* 
(0.023) 
0.600* 
(0.017) 
0.661* 
(0.018)# 
Sicpay 0.149 
(0.016) 
0.430* 
(0.022) 
0.543* 
(0.019) 
0.590* 
(0.019)# 
Regions     
Midwest 0.198 
(0.011) 
0.168 
(0.008) 
0.239* 
(0.015) 
0.185 
(0.015)# 
South 0.467 
(0.017) 
0.424 
(0.023) 
0.418* 
(0.019) 
0.303* 
(0.020)# 
West 0.226 
(0.014) 
0.236 
(0.012) 
0.176* 
(0.013) 
0.281* 
(0.022)# 
Urban 0.712 
(0.026) 
0.775 
(0.026) 
0.762* 
(0.017) 
0.907* 
(0.011)# 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Helath 0.146 
(0.011) 
0.220 
(0.011) 
0.231* 
(0.012) 
0.228* 
(0.016) 
Good Health 0.374 
(0.015) 
0.368 
(0.017) 
0.414 
(0.014) 
0.439* 
(0.017) 
Fair Health 0.305 
(0.015) 
0.249 
(0.020) 
0.226* 
(0.012) 
0.202* 
(0.013) 
Poor Health 0.134 
(0.010) 
0.088 
(0.008) 
0.069* 
(0.007) 
0.059* 
(0.007) 
Limit 0.073 
(0.008) 
0.090 
(0.004) 
0.053 
(0.007) 
0.047* 
(0.007) 
Coglim 0.098 
(0.008) 
0.133 
(0.009) 
0.061* 
(0.007) 
0.052* 
(0.006) 
MCS 47.157 
(0.455) 
49.587* 
(0.350) 
51.115* 
(0.276) 
50.596* 
(0.289) 
Conditions 0.509 
(0.019) 
0.550 
(0.029) 
0.559* 
(0.015) 
0.573* 
(0.017) 
Lipo_con 0.266 
(0.017) 
0.410* 
(0.034) 
0.437* 
(0.015) 
0.393* 
(0.022)# 
Hyper_con 0.457 
(0.019) 
0.522 
(0.032) 
0.513 
(0.016) 
0.517 
(0.016) 
As_con 0.049 
(0.008) 
0.104 
(0.014) 
0.043 
(0.006) 
0.048 
(0.006) 
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Table 5B.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,124 
HINDC 
N=168 
HIWDC 
N=1,693 
HMOWD 
N=1,206 
De_con 0.139 
(0.013) 
0.125 
(0.008) 
0.129 
(0.009) 
0.129 
(0.013) 
Chddx 0.057 
(0.009) 
0.069 
(0.003) 
0.073 
(0.007) 
0.077 
(0.009) 
Midx 0.047 
(0.006) 
0.061 
(0.003) 
0.058 
(0.008) 
0.071* 
(0.008) 
Angidx 0.038 
(0.006) 
0.084 
(0.005) 
0.036 
(0.005) 
0.043 
(0.007) 
Ohrtdx 0.069 
(0.011) 
0.096 
(0.008) 
0.085 
(0.007) 
0.097 
(0.009) 
Strkdx 0.030 
(0.006) 
0.050 
(0.002) 
0.038 
(0.006) 
0.044 
(0.006) 
Dskidn 0.072 
(0.008) 
0.094 
(0.007) 
0.057 
(0.006) 
0.061 
(0.007) 
Dseypr 0.168 
(0.014) 
0.195 
(0.013) 
0.128* 
(0.008) 
0.114* 
(0.009) 
Emphdx 0.023 
(0.006) 
0.052 
(0.010) 
0.016 
(0.005) 
0.006* 
(0.003)# 
Aspkfl 0.015 
(0.005) 
0.052 
(0.014) 
0.021 
(0.004) 
0.021 
(0.006) 
Risk Reference     
Adrisk 0.211 
(0.013) 
0.158 
(0.010) 
0.141* 
(0.010) 
0.168* 
(0.011) 
Adsmok 0.244 
(0.019) 
0.112* 
(0.010) 
0.167* 
(0.014) 
0.163* 
(0.014) 
Others     
HMOrate 0.185 
(0.006) 
0.194 
(0.008) 
0.173 
(0.005) 
0.290* 
(0.007)# 
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Table 5C.  Weighted Means of Possible Explanatory Variables Grouped by Health 
Insurance Status for Non-elderly Adult Population with Depression (2003-2007) 
 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,550 
HINDC 
N=237 
HIWDC 
N=2,577 
HMOWD 
N=1,560 
Sociodemographic    
Age 41.164 
(0.451) 
43.602* 
(0.624) 
43.670* 
(0.377) 
42.939* 
(0.329) 
Female 0.567 
(0.017) 
0.601 
(0.027) 
0.680* 
(0.014) 
0.687* 
(0.013) 
Black 0.083 
(0.009) 
0.073 
(0.004) 
0.035* 
(0.004) 
0.069 
(0.007)# 
Hispanic 0.183 
(0.012) 
0.111* 
(0.017) 
0.052* 
(0.005) 
0.091* 
(0.009)# 
Mid Income 0.292 
(0.014) 
0.377* 
(0.027) 
0.348* 
(0.013) 
0.363* 
(0.015) 
Low Income 0.190 
(0.011) 
0.115* 
(0.014) 
0.087* 
(0.006) 
0.086* 
(0.008) 
Near Poor 0.083 
(0.008) 
0.026* 
(0.002) 
0.019* 
(0.003) 
0.017* 
(0.003) 
Poor 0.278 
(0.015) 
0.073* 
(0.010) 
0.039* 
(0.004) 
0.032* 
(0.005) 
Married 0.360 
(0.018) 
0.438* 
(0.026) 
0.577* 
(0.015) 
0.584* 
(0.019) 
Divorced 0.250 
(0.014) 
0.156* 
(0.016) 
0.189* 
(0.011) 
0.157* 
(0.014)# 
Household 2.602 
(0.055) 
2.396* 
(0.067) 
2.559 
(0.037) 
2.740* 
(0.052)# 
Education     
High School 0.449 
(0.016) 
0.479 
(0.030) 
0.463 
(0.017) 
0.419 
(0.017)# 
BA 0.113 
(0.013) 
0.193* 
(0.022) 
0.206* 
(0.012) 
0.203* 
(0.014) 
MA 0.019 
(0.004) 
0.083* 
(0.012) 
0.096* 
(0.009) 
0.101* 
(0.011) 
Employment     
Employed 0.550 
(0.015) 
0.662* 
(0.021) 
0.773* 
(0.011) 
0.802* 
(0.011)# 
Unemployed 0.283 
(0.014) 
0.211* 
(0.018) 
0.141* 
(0.010) 
0.115* 
(0.010)# 
Selfemployed 0.171 
(0.014) 
0.201 
(0.016) 
0.086* 
(0.007) 
0.088* 
(0.009) 
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Table 5C.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,550 
HINDC 
N=237 
HIWDC 
N=2,577 
HMOWD 
N=1,560 
Union 0.030 
(0.006) 
0.082* 
(0.023) 
0.112* 
(0.009) 
0.120* 
(0.010) 
Payvac 0.180 
(0.013) 
0.345* 
(0.024) 
0.605* 
(0.012) 
0.612* 
(0.016) 
Sicpay 0.151 
(0.012) 
0.298* 
(0.026) 
0.542* 
(0.012) 
0.578* 
(0.016)# 
Regions     
Midwest 0.218 
(0.017) 
0.247 
(0.029) 
0.306* 
(0.016) 
0.227 
(0.020)# 
South 0.425 
(0.022) 
0.341* 
(0.022) 
0.348* 
(0.018) 
0.240* 
(0.016)# 
West 0.250 
(0.020) 
0.238 
(0.014) 
0.216* 
(0.014) 
0.290* 
(0.019)# 
Urban 0.798 
(0.021) 
0.800 
(0.031) 
0.820 
(0.015) 
0.898* 
(0.010)# 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Helath 0.206 
(0.013) 
0.304* 
(0.021) 
0.337* 
(0.012) 
0.348* 
(0.013) 
Good Health 0.344 
(0.013) 
0.289 
(0.023) 
0.329 
(0.010) 
0.302* 
(0.012) 
Fair Health 0.204 
(0.013) 
0.166 
(0.018) 
0.126* 
(0.007) 
0.139* 
(0.009) 
Poor Health 0.102 
(0.009) 
0.085 
(0.021) 
0.050* 
(0.005) 
0.045* 
(0.006) 
Limit 0.088 
(0.009) 
0.117 
(0.014) 
0.050* 
(0.005) 
0.053* 
(0.006) 
Coglim 0.177 
(0.011) 
0.152 
(0.023) 
0.102* 
(0.007) 
0.093* 
(0.009) 
MCS 40.037 
(0.354) 
41.270 
(0.651) 
43.021* 
(0.262) 
42.813* 
(0.329) 
Conditions 0.254 
(0.014) 
0.283 
(0.026) 
0.288* 
(0.011) 
0.277 
(0.015) 
Lipo_con 0.095 
(0.010) 
0.205* 
(0.022) 
0.173* 
(0.009) 
0.155* 
(0.013) 
Hyper_con 0.196 
(0.014) 
0.262 
(0.025) 
0.206 
(0.009) 
0.170 
(0.011) 
Dia_con 0.076 
(0.009) 
0.067 
(0.010) 
0.073 
(0.006) 
0.086 
(0.009) 
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Table 5C.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,550 
HINDC 
N=237 
HIWDC 
N=2,577 
HMOWD 
N=1,560 
As_con 0.054 
(0.007) 
0.029* 
(0.006) 
0.081* 
(0.008) 
0.073 
(0.009) 
Chddx 0.019 
(0.005) 
0.033 
(0.002) 
0.019 
(0.003) 
0.018 
(0.004) 
Midx 0.023 
(0.004) 
0.014 
(0.004) 
0.020 
(0.003) 
0.014 
(0.004) 
Angidx 0.023 
(0.004) 
0.023 
(0.006) 
0.015 
(0.002) 
0.015 
(0.003) 
Ohrtdx 0.051 
(0.007) 
0.055 
(0.012) 
0.081* 
(0.007) 
0.068 
(0.008) 
Strkdx 0.018 
(0.003) 
0.030 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.003) 
Dskidn 0.013 
(0.004) 
0.013 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.002) 
0.013 
(0.003) 
Dseypr 0.019 
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.003) 
Emphdx 0.024 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.000) 
0.008* 
(0.002) 
0.007* 
(0.002) 
Aspkfl 0.010 
(0.002) 
0.013 
(0.003) 
0.031* 
(0.004) 
0.029* 
(0.006) 
Risk Reference     
Adrisk 0.266 
(0.016) 
0.214 
(0.022) 
0.168* 
(0.009) 
0.164* 
(0.012) 
Adsmok 0.415 
(0.020) 
0.262* 
(0.026) 
0.232* 
(0.011) 
0.222* 
(0.015) 
Others     
HMOrate 0.187 
(0.005) 
0.201 
(0.005) 
0.183 
(0.005) 
0.310* 
(0.007)# 
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Table 5D.  Weighted Means of Possible Explanatory Variables Grouped by Health 
Insurance Status for Non-elderly Adult Population with Asthma (2003-2007) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,475 
HINDC 
N=276 
HIWDC 
N=2,911 
HMOWD 
N=1,871 
Sociodemographic 
Age 36.175 
(0.565) 
41.803* 
(0.494) 
40.070* 
(0.383) 
39.921* 
(0.392) 
Female 0.500 
(0.017) 
0.539 
(0.025) 
0.599* 
(0.012) 
0.609* 
(0.014) 
Black 0.155 
(0.012) 
0.135 
(0.024) 
0.077* 
(0.007) 
0.122* 
(0.010)# 
Hispanic 0.159 
(0.013) 
0.099* 
(0.010) 
0.061* 
(0.007) 
0.110* 
(0.011)# 
Mid Income 0.291 
(0.013) 
0.288 
(0.032) 
0.323 
(0.010) 
0.371* 
(0.015)# 
Low Income 0.175 
(0.013) 
0.137 
(0.013) 
0.069* 
(0.005) 
0.090* 
(0.007)# 
Near Poor 0.086 
(0.009) 
0.019* 
(0.005) 
0.015* 
(0.003) 
0.014* 
(0.003) 
Poor 0.277 
(0.015) 
0.089* 
(0.011) 
0.031* 
(0.003) 
0.029* 
(0.004) 
Married 0.330 
(0.018) 
0.488* 
(0.030) 
0.559* 
(0.013) 
0.547* 
(0.016) 
Divorced 0.183 
(0.016) 
0.146 
(0.015) 
0.122* 
(0.008) 
0.134* 
(0.010) 
Household 2.673 
(0.063) 
2.757 
(0.089) 
2.714 
(0.040) 
2.781 
(0.054) 
Education     
High School 0.489 
(0.016) 
0.454 
(0.028) 
0.420* 
(0.013) 
0.455 
(0.019)# 
BA 0.096 
(0.012) 
0.189* 
(0.013) 
0.254* 
(0.013) 
0.223* 
(0.015)# 
MA 0.020 
(0.005) 
0.071* 
(0.017) 
0.090* 
(0.008) 
0.080* 
(0.009) 
Employment     
Employed 0.614 
(0.016) 
0.769* 
(0.026) 
0.804* 
(0.009) 
0.825* 
(0.011) 
Unemployed 0.216 
(0.013) 
0.145* 
(0.021) 
0.114* 
(0.008) 
0.090* 
(0.008)# 
Selfemployed 0.128 
(0.012) 
0.176 
(0.021) 
0.077* 
(0.007) 
0.090* 
(0.008) 
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Table 5D.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,475 
HINDC 
N=276 
HIWDC 
N=2,911 
HMOWD 
N=1,871 
Union 0.028 
(0.004) 
0.112* 
(0.027) 
0.120* 
(0.008) 
0.135* 
(0.010) 
Payvac 0.246 
(0.013) 
0.429* 
(0.035) 
0.608* 
(0.011) 
0.656* 
(0.014)# 
Sicpay 0.171 
(0.013) 
0.349* 
(0.033) 
0.584* 
(0.013) 
0.606* 
(0.015) 
Regions     
Midwest 0.202 
(0.013) 
0.229 
(0.014) 
0.275* 
(0.016) 
0.194 
(0.017)# 
South 0.431 
(0.021) 
0.302* 
(0.023) 
0.350* 
(0.017) 
0.257* 
(0.014)# 
West 0.229 
(0.014) 
0.245 
(0.018) 
0.186* 
(0.012) 
0.304* 
(0.021)# 
Urban 0.805 
(0.015) 
0.825 
(0.021) 
0.839* 
(0.016) 
0.907* 
(0.009)# 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Helath 0.274 
(0.014) 
0.371* 
(0.025) 
0.339* 
(0.010) 
0.348* 
(0.014) 
Good Health 0.314 
(0.016) 
0.365 
(0.025) 
0.304 
(0.010) 
0.301 
(0.014) 
Fair Health 0.178 
(0.012) 
0.089* 
(0.015) 
0.096* 
(0.006) 
0.123* 
(0.009)# 
Poor Health 0.068 
(0.008) 
0.016* 
(0.003) 
0.036* 
(0.004) 
0.021* 
(0.003)# 
Limit 0.049 
(0.006) 
0.020* 
(0.004) 
0.032* 
(0.004) 
0.022* 
(0.003)# 
Coglim 0.081 
(0.008) 
0.054 
(0.020) 
0.045* 
(0.005) 
0.038* 
(0.007) 
MCS 47.774 
(0.351) 
50.385* 
(0.374) 
49.867* 
(0.262) 
50.241* 
(0.281) 
Conditions 0.136 
(0.010) 
0.137 
(0.012) 
0.169* 
(0.010) 
0.187* 
(0.013) 
Lipo_con 0.055 
(0.007) 
0.108* 
(0.010) 
0.113* 
(0.010) 
0.111* 
(0.013) 
Hyper_con 0.129 
(0.009) 
0.192 
(0.016) 
0.166 
(0.010) 
0.168 
(0.012) 
Dia_con 0.053 
(0.006) 
0.050 
(0.007) 
0.049 
(0.005) 
0.071 
(0.007)# 
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Table 5D.  (Continued) 
Variable Name Uninsured 
N=1,475 
HINDC 
N=276 
HIWDC 
N=2,911 
HMOWD 
N=1,871 
De_con 0.146 
(0.012) 
0.069* 
(0.011) 
0.139 
(0.009) 
0.130 
(0.011) 
Chddx 0.012 
(0.004) 
0.029 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.003) 
0.012 
(0.004) 
Midx 0.018 
(0.007) 
0.026 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.002) 
Angidx 0.009 
(0.003) 
0.039 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.002) 
0.013 
(0.003) 
Ohrtdx 0.057 
(0.007) 
0.086 
(0.013) 
0.088* 
(0.007) 
0.070 
(0.007)# 
Strkdx 0.011 
(0.002) 
0.018 
(0.005) 
0.020* 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.003)# 
Dskidn 0.009 
(0.002) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
Dseypr 0.013 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
Emphdx 0.031 
(0.005) 
0.026 
(0.005) 
0.020* 
(0.004) 
0.016* 
(0.003) 
Aspkfl 0.117 
(0.010) 
0.159 
(0.020) 
0.167* 
(0.010) 
0.163* 
(0.010) 
Risk Reference     
Adrisk 0.288 
(0.014) 
0.261 
(0.029) 
0.209* 
(0.011) 
0.206* 
(0.012) 
Adsmok 0.372 
(0.016) 
0.124* 
(0.014) 
0.152* 
(0.009) 
0.161* 
(0.012) 
Others     
HMOrate 0.197 
(0.006) 
0.215 
(0.012) 
0.191 
(0.006) 
0.311* 
(0.007)# 
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Table 6.  Summary Statistics of Non-elderly Adults’ Annual OOP Expenditures for 
Prescription Drugs to Treat the Studied Chronic Conditions, Conditional on any 
Expenditure (2003-2007, $ in 2007). 
 
 Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
Uninsured 351.234 
(11.771) 
545.298 
(28.407) 
384.013 
(19.133) 
145.594 
(13.127) 
HINDC 377.079 
(12.701) 
566.197 
(47.739) 
464.813 
(34.076) 
110.786 
(11.353) 
HIWDC 197.392* 
(5.139) 
249.251* 
(8.420) 
199.881* 
(8.057) 
65.870* 
(2.981) 
HMODC 171.239* 
(6.198)＃ 
223.156* 
(14.347)  
179.433* 
(10.691)＃ 
66.575* 
(2.936) 
N 8,545 2,727 3,220 1,371 
Note: *indicates that the estimate is significantly different from the reference group (Uninsured) at the 
1 percent level, two-tailed test. ＃indicates that the estimate is significantly different from the reference 
group (HIWDC) at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test. The same rules and notation apply to Table 6-9.  
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Table 7.  Summary Statistics of Average OOP and Third Party Payment Per 
Prescription across Brand-Name and Generic Drugs, Conditional on any Expenditure 
on Brands/Generics (2003-2007, $ in 2007). 
 
 
Brand 
Name  
Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
Third 
Party 
OOP Third 
Party 
OOP Third 
Party 
OOP Third 
Party 
OOP 
Uninsured - 59.134 
(1.739) 
- 88.908 
(3.767) 
- 79.515 
(3.248) 
- 63.544 
(3.312) 
HINDC - 55.804 
(1.113) 
- 71.965 
(2.497) 
- 93.146 
(2.233) 
- 57.980 
(8.663) 
HIWDC 45.022 
(1.180) 
32.209* 
(0.740) 
100.832 
(3.064) 
33.099* 
(0.732) 
74.211 
(2.615) 
34.769* 
(1.037) 
59.146 
(3.198) 
27.677* 
(0.794) 
HMODC 44.968 
(1.404) 
32.140* 
(1.094) 
90.833 
(3.123) 
32.450* 
(1.259) 
69.880 
(3.518) 
34.015* 
(1.334) 
50.644 
 (2.771)＃ 
31.500* 
(1.556)＃ 
N 3,758 4,711 1,285 1,708 1,953 2,452 341 416 
 
Generic 
Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
Third 
Party 
OOP Third 
Party 
OOP Third 
Party 
OOP Third 
Party 
OOP 
Uninsured - 28.086 
(0.938) 
- 45.684 
(1.777) 
- 40.712 
(1.490) 
- 27.063 
(1.427) 
HINDC - 24.859 
(0.757) 
- 34.735 
(1.898) 
- 55.409 
(4.718) 
- 23.071 
(0.610) 
HIWDC 21.241 
(0.618) 
11.533* 
(0.259) 
30.996 
(1.066) 
12.529* 
(0.460) 
45.796 
(1.698) 
15.400* 
(0.760) 
13.832 
(0.822) 
13.682* 
(0.496) 
HMODC 24.642 
(0.960) 
11.720* 
(0.294)＃ 
35.640 
(1.181) 
13.026* 
(0.752) 
44.524 
(1.988) 
16.870* 
(1.713) 
15.256 
(0.891) 
12.812* 
(0.329) 
N 4,391 5,716 1,287 1,738 973 1,229 874 1,112 
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Table 8.  Utilization Rate of Prescription Drugs to Treat the Studied Chronic 
Conditions among Non-elderly Adults (2003-2007) 
 
 Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
Uninsured 0.736  
(0.012) 
0.558 
(0.018) 
0.389 
(0.015) 
0.153 
(0.011) 
HINDC 0.828* 
(0.019) 
0.622 
(0.045) 
0.570* 
(0.035) 
0.221* 
(0.026) 
HIWDC 0.866* 
(0.005) 
0.750* 
(0.012) 
0.653* 
(0.010) 
0.223* 
(0.008) 
HMODC 0.833* 
(0.008)＃ 
0.703* 
 (0.015)＃  
0.603* 
(0.014)＃ 
0.245* 
(0.011) 
N 10,324 4,049 5,722 6,225 
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Table 9.  Non-elderly Adults’ Annual Utilization of Prescription Drugs to Treat the 
Studied Chronic Conditions, Conditional on any Use (2003-2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
＃of Fills     
Uninsured 9.038 
(0.182) 
8.932 
(0.325） 
5.949 
(0.224) 
4.041 
(0.225) 
HINDC 10.091 
(0.250) 
12.464* 
(1.066) 
6.092 
(0.308) 
4.030 
(0.298) 
HIWDC 9.741* 
(0.173) 
10.544* 
(0.288) 
7.175* 
(0.182) 
3.776 
(0.159) 
HMODC 9.183 
(0.217)＃ 
9.890 
(0.368) 
6.954* 
(0.258) 
4.062 
(0.143) 
N 8,603 2,832 3,309 1,391 
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Table 10.  Regression Results from Insurance Choice Equation 
             Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  
Demongranphic 
age 0.0131 (0.0103) 
0.0014 
(0.0055) 
-0.0016 
(0.0061) 
0.0234** 
(0.0116) 
0.0131* 
(0.0074) 
0.0045 
(0.0089) 
0.0024 
(0.0096) 
-0.0118** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0109* 
(0.0063) 
0.0294*** 
(0.0097) 
0.0029 
(0.0065) 
0.0034 
(0.0069) 
female 0.3046** (0.1446) 
0.1089 
(0.0894) 
0.1708 
(0.1053) 
0.0287 
(0.2256) 
0.1193 
(0.1400) 
0.2707* 
(0.1540) 
0.2397 
(0.2177) 
0.5070*** 
(0.1308) 
0.5362*** 
(0.1362) 
0.2018 
(0.1793) 
0.3518*** 
(0.1241) 
0.4042*** 
(0.1237) 
black -0.3311* (0.1796) 
-0.5505*** 
(0.1243) 
-0.1112 
(0.1396) 
0.3553 
(0.3461) 
-0.5814*** 
(0.1884) 
-0.2681 
(0.1947) 
0.0112 
(0.3582) 
-0.7525*** 
(0.2278) 
-0.0181 
(0.2196) 
-0.0046 
(0.2824) 
-0.8232*** 
(0.1823) 
-0.2035 
(0.1796) 
hispanic -0.7534*** (0.2476) 
-1.1608*** 
(0.1327) 
-0.7033*** 
(0.1307) 
-0.9705*** 
(0.3399) 
-1.2237*** 
(0.1862) 
-0.6670*** 
(0.1857) 
-0.2863 
(0.3295) 
-1.2574*** 
(0.1593) 
-0.7757*** 
(0.1714) 
-0.4739* 
(0.2636) 
-1.0751*** 
(0.1679) 
-0.4231** 
(0.1839) 
mid-income -0.2621 (0.1649) 
-0.4341*** 
(0.1141) 
-0.4422*** 
(0.1181) 
-0.1985 
(0.2879) 
-0.3359* 
(0.1901) 
-0.4197** 
(0.1870) 
-0.5838** 
(0.2283) 
-0.7326*** 
(0.1537) 
-0.6077*** 
(0.1726) 
-0.6579*** 
(0.2469) 
-0.7177*** 
(0.1534) 
-0.4531*** 
(0.1570) 
low-income -0.9047*** (0.2394) 
-1.2726*** 
(0.1380) 
-1.2503*** 
(0.1493) 
-1.2159*** 
(0.3558) 
-1.2101*** 
(0.2099) 
-1.1187*** 
(0.2204) 
-1.1823*** 
(0.2744) 
-1.4251*** 
(0.1731) 
-1.3508*** 
(0.2005) 
-0.6789** 
(0.2728) 
-1.5395*** 
(0.2055) 
-1.0978*** 
(0.2151) 
near poor -1.1955*** (0.3608) 
-1.4755*** 
(0.1999) 
-1.3516*** 
(0.2391) 
-0.9380*** 
(0.3535) 
-1.6705*** 
(0.3120) 
-1.3221*** 
(0.2992) 
-1.8168*** 
(0.4537) 
-1.7873*** 
(0.2598) 
-1.9908*** 
(0.3044) 
-1.8573*** 
(0.4646) 
-2.1196*** 
(0.2824) 
-2.1004*** 
(0.3194) 
poor -1.0023*** (0.2717) 
-1.6125*** 
(0.1555) 
-1.8216*** 
(0.1929) 
-1.5081** 
(0.6167) 
-1.7511*** 
(0.2491) 
-1.8479*** 
(0.2753) 
-2.1093*** 
(0.3410) 
-2.2013*** 
(0.2194) 
-2.3151*** 
(0.2696) 
-1.3672*** 
(0.3074) 
-2.4612*** 
(0.2001) 
-2.3216*** 
(0.2264) 
married 0.1551 (0.2979) 
0.7645*** 
(0.2044) 
0.4582** 
(0.2278) 
-0.0632 
(0.4349) 
0.2881 
(0.2803) 
0.4434 
(0.3470) 
-0.4832 
(0.3890) 
0.7025*** 
(0.2307) 
0.0961 
(0.2791) 
-0.6287 
(0.4130) 
-0.0528 
(0.2534) 
-0.1674 
(0.2941) 
divorced 0.1308 (0.2376) 
0.0525 
(0.1471) 
-0.0320 
(0.1667) 
-0.7051* 
(0.3600) 
-0.1392 
(0.2254) 
0.0703 
(0.2414) 
-0.8381** 
(0.3270) 
-0.0277 
(0.1529) 
-0.2148 
(0.2064) 
-0.5485* 
(0.3083) 
-0.4739*** 
(0.1690) 
-0.3184 
(0.2045) 
household 0.0261 (0.0616) 
-0.0958*** 
(0.0299) 
-0.0538 
(0.0340) 
0.1003 
(0.0764) 
-0.0633 
(0.0442) 
-0.0025 
(0.0502) 
-0.1145 
(0.0787) 
-0.1077** 
(0.0465) 
-0.0239 
(0.0520) 
0.1068 
(0.0673) 
0.0396 
(0.0397) 
0.0513 
(0.0460) 
Education 
high school 0.1750 (0.1779) 
0.2851*** 
(0.0999) 
0.3668*** 
(0.1127) 
0.4109 
(0.2558) 
0.2950* 
(0.1511) 
0.1852 
(0.1652) 
0.4012* 
(0.2369) 
0.2608* 
(0.1370) 
0.0878 
(0.1317) 
0.1129 
(0.2216) 
0.1552 
(0.1196) 
0.2398* 
(0.1369) 
BA 0.5765** (0.2360) 
0.4115*** 
(0.1491) 
0.2738* 
(0.1635) 
0.4722 
(0.3800) 
0.2555 
(0.2936) 
-0.0826 
(0.3025) 
0.4372 
(0.3594) 
0.2355 
(0.2036) 
-0.0072 
(0.2110) 
0.3351 
(0.3111) 
0.6139*** 
(0.2001) 
0.4396** 
(0.2075) 
MA 0.6850* (0.4045) 
0.8687*** 
(0.3164) 
0.8879*** 
(0.3322) 
-0.9951 
(0.6570) 
-0.0571 
(0.3464) 
-0.1505 
(0.4006) 
1.0863** 
(0.4244) 
0.9896*** 
(0.3741) 
0.8450** 
(0.3565) 
0.4534 
(0.5092) 
0.6977* 
(0.4005) 
0.5173 
(0.4045) 
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Table 10.  (Continued) 
 
Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  
Employment 
employed 0.1425 (0.2685) 
-0.0239 
(0.1646) 
0.1992 
(0.1603) 
0.6722 
(0.4188) 
-0.0886 
(0.1885) 
-0.0810 
(0.2178) 
-0.2387 
(0.2949) 
-0.0955 
(0.1467) 
-0.0475 
(0.1921) 
0.2954 
(0.3064) 
-0.0113 
(0.1581) 
-0.0674 
(0.1805) 
unemployed 0.2670 (0.2792) 
0.2996* 
(0.1689) 
0.1966 
(0.1838) 
0.9935** 
(0.4568) 
0.2610 
(0.2170) 
-0.0038 
(0.2768) 
-0.0294 
(0.3385) 
0.0629 
(0.1913) 
-0.1908 
(0.2431) 
0.2451 
(0.3197) 
0.1226 
(0.2076) 
-0.0194 
(0.2126) 
selemployed 0.2020 (0.2314) 
-0.1325 
(0.1482) 
-0.2928* 
(0.1671) 
0.2948 
(0.3919) 
-0.0658 
(0.2240) 
-0.1852 
(0.2651) 
0.3720 
(0.2697) 
-0.3346* 
(0.1868) 
-0.2779 
(0.2044) 
0.2355 
(0.3117) 
-0.2412 
(0.1854) 
0.0690 
(0.2275) 
union 0.3805 (0.2879) 
0.4201* 
(0.2204) 
0.5462** 
(0.2257) 
0.7206 
(0.5023) 
0.5989 
(0.3918) 
0.7469* 
(0.3915) 
0.6433 
(0.4859) 
0.6812** 
(0.2805) 
0.4833 
(0.3024) 
0.8224* 
(0.4698) 
0.7421** 
(0.3711) 
0.7247* 
(0.3808) 
sicpay 0.6577*** (0.2194) 
0.9561*** 
(0.1408) 
0.9727*** 
(0.1529) 
1.1138*** 
(0.4300) 
1.1482*** 
(0.2217) 
0.9792*** 
(0.2244) 
-0.0594 
(0.3471) 
0.3413* 
(0.1894) 
0.6271*** 
(0.2286) 
0.2034 
(0.3125) 
1.0555*** 
(0.2082) 
1.0331*** 
(0.2037) 
payvac 0.5457** (0.2441) 
1.0130*** 
(0.1422) 
1.0366*** 
(0.1643) 
0.3195 
(0.4229) 
0.8260*** 
(0.2305) 
1.1164*** 
(0.2758) 
0.9147*** 
(0.3349) 
1.4871*** 
(0.1753) 
1.2726*** 
(0.2182) 
0.5481* 
(0.3220) 
0.6489*** 
(0.1903) 
0.8663*** 
(0.2159) 
Region 
midwest -0.2982 (0.2755) 
-0.3039 
(0.1881) 
-0.4218** 
(0.1747) 
-0.5491 
(0.4206) 
-0.4140 
(0.2620) 
-0.5627** 
(0.2749) 
-0.2696 
(0.3243) 
0.1668 
(0.2011) 
-0.3074 
(0.2103) 
-0.1298 
(0.4258) 
0.1291 
(0.2234) 
-0.0642 
(0.2104) 
south -0.5488** (0.2526) 
-0.5193*** 
(0.1756) 
-0.4869*** 
(0.1729) 
-0.2647 
(0.4037) 
-0.3208 
(0.2510) 
-0.3987* 
(0.2293) 
-0.5475* 
(0.3202) 
-0.3444* 
(0.1905) 
-0.7142*** 
(0.2098) 
-0.5864 
(0.3902) 
-0.3534* 
(0.2119) 
-0.4023** 
(0.1900) 
west -0.5073* (0.2905) 
-0.7140*** 
(0.1828) 
-0.3840** 
(0.1924) 
0.0973 
(0.4269) 
-0.2966 
(0.2534) 
-0.2514 
(0.2587) 
-0.4416 
(0.3484) 
-0.2191 
(0.2005) 
-0.3468* 
(0.1973) 
-0.3967 
(0.4281) 
-0.4851** 
(0.2411) 
-0.1913 
(0.2188) 
urban 0.1419 (0.2154) 
0.2573* 
(0.1371) 
0.4037*** 
(0.1439) 
0.3512 
(0.3318) 
0.5127*** 
(0.1833) 
1.0605*** 
(0.2161) 
-0.0625 
(0.2815) 
0.2704 
(0.1678) 
0.2931* 
(0.1768) 
0.0564 
(0.3017) 
0.2298 
(0.1694) 
0.3407* 
(0.1869) 
HMO rate 0.3154 (0.6877) 
-1.7261*** 
(0.6523) 
3.9042*** 
(0.6140) 
-0.8271 
(1.2006) 
-2.7187*** 
(0.7494) 
2.8978*** 
(0.7378) 
-0.4160 
(0.9847) 
-1.0903** 
(0.5407) 
3.9204*** 
(0.7374) 
-0.6699 
(0.9212) 
-1.5024** 
(0.5896) 
3.7597*** 
(0.5637) 
HMO rate * 
married 
0.4800 
(0.9678) 
0.7841 
(0.8373) 
1.4572** 
(0.7188) 
-0.5024 
(1.6027) 
1.5443 
(1.0733) 
1.3400 
(1.0750) 
1.4159 
(1.4787) 
0.5306 
(0.8043) 
2.6128*** 
(0.9991) 
2.3581* 
(1.3738) 
1.4285 
(0.9088) 
2.2709*** 
(0.8454) 
Health Characteristics 
very good 
health 
0.0631 
(0.2403) 
0.1030 
(0.1526) 
0.2309 
(0.1642) 
-0.3309 
(0.5979) 
-0.1751 
(0.2642) 
-0.2624 
(0.2890) 
0.3487 
(0.2761) 
0.4383** 
(0.1745) 
0.4183** 
(0.1963) 
0.3342 
(0.2260) 
-0.1650 
(0.1436) 
-0.0464 
(0.1564) 
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Table 10.  (Continued) 
 
Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  
good 
health 
-0.1879 
(0.2385) 
-0.1070 
(0.1425) 
0.0528 
(0.1518) 
-0.7747 
(0.5443) 
-0.3698 
(0.2656) 
-0.4997* 
(0.2854) 
-0.1312 
(0.2954) 
0.0192 
(0.1533) 
-0.1451 
(0.1869) 
0.2380 
(0.2614) 
-0.2829* 
(0.1635) 
-0.2507 
(0.1735) 
fair health -0.4830* (0.2763) 
-0.3985** 
(0.1606) 
-0.3175* 
(0.1723) 
-0.7134 
(0.5818) 
-0.4477* 
(0.2647) 
-0.7943*** 
(0.2951) 
0.1448 
(0.3082) 
0.0124 
(0.2001) 
0.0527 
(0.2413) 
-0.5509 
(0.3780) 
-0.7103*** 
(0.1797) 
-0.4033** 
(0.1832) 
poor 
health 
-0.6457 
(0.4101) 
-0.4840** 
(0.1947) 
-0.4620** 
(0.2180) 
-1.1207* 
(0.6527) 
-0.5972** 
(0.3037) 
-0.9763*** 
(0.3419) 
0.0935 
(0.4131) 
-0.0555 
(0.2526) 
-0.0716 
(0.3066) 
-1.2410** 
(0.5123) 
-0.5543** 
(0.2626) 
-0.7920*** 
(0.3009) 
limit 0.3656 (0.3178) 
0.2430 
(0.1854) 
0.4809** 
(0.2072) 
0.3228 
(0.4008) 
0.0994 
(0.2518) 
0.3221 
(0.2712) 
0.6512* 
(0.3452) 
-0.0059 
(0.1825) 
0.2333 
(0.2669) 
-0.4747 
(0.5005) 
0.1808 
(0.2477) 
-0.0686 
(0.2686) 
coglim 0.1149 (0.2777) 
-0.3131 
(0.1931) 
-0.6419*** 
(0.2263) 
0.6535 
(0.4472) 
-0.1314 
(0.2114) 
-0.2672 
(0.2764) 
-0.0093 
(0.3089) 
0.0999 
(0.1575) 
-0.0316 
(0.1813) 
0.5441 
(0.5172) 
0.1441 
(0.2114) 
0.0535 
(0.2723) 
chddx 0.4455 (0.3953) 
0.10551 
(0.2534) 
0.2611 
(0.2839) 
-0.4201 
(0.4952) 
0.0167 
(0.3110) 
0.0360 
(0.3310)       
midx -0.0794 (0.3967) 
0.2638 
(0.2368) 
0.3085 
(0.2459) 
0.1127 
(0.6573) 
0.4955 
(0.3822) 
0.9628*** 
(0.3446)       
angidx -0.0557 (0.4345) 
-0.3341 
(0.2289) 
-0.2114 
(0.2687) 
0.8634 
(0.7317) 
-0.3279 
(0.3555) 
-0.2544 
(0.3789)       
ohrtdx -0.0128 (0.2669) 
0.2444* 
(0.1418) 
0.1624 
(0.1507) 
0.0587 
(0.5239) 
0.1112 
(0.2822) 
0.3768 
(0.2944)       
strkdx 0.5177 (0.3682) 
0.4837** 
(0.2404) 
0.1953 
(0.2563) 
0.1882 
(0.6107) 
0.3554 
(0.3299) 
0.4992 
(0.3335)       
dskidn    
0.3576 
(0.4091) 
0.0037 
(0.2552) 
0.1968 
(0.3000)       
dseypr    
0.2198 
(0.3342) 
-0.0577 
(0.1689) 
-0.1961 
(0.1750)       
MCS       
-0.0018 
(0.0089) 
0.0055 
(0.0042) 
0.0053 
(0.0052)    
aspkfl          
0.2492 
(0.2506) 
0.3114* 
(0.1688) 
0.2440 
(0.1762) 
emphdx                   0.3896 (0.5589) 
0.2574 
(0.3137) 
0.0621 
(0.3638) 
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Table 10.  (Continued) 
             
Hypertension Diabetes Depression Asthma 
  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  HINDC  HIWDC  HMODC  
conditions -0.0143 (0.1619) 
-0.0300 
(0.1110) 
0.0460 
(0.1091) 
0.0713 
(0.2056) 
0.1152 
(0.1410) 
0.2994** 
(0.1474) 
0.0694 
(0.2810) 
0.1303 
(0.1451) 
0.1636 
(0.1453) 
0.0308 
(0.2579) 
0.4158*** 
(0.1457) 
0.5837*** 
(0.1757) 
Risk Preferences 
adrisk 0.0937 (0.1644) 
-0.1409 
(0.1043) 
-0.1269 
(0.1223) 
-0.0852 
(0.2720) 
-0.2324 
(0.1488) 
-0.0227 
(0.1595) 
-0.1598 
(0.2245) 
-0.2949** 
(0.1275) 
-0.2941** 
(0.1381) 
0.0459 
(0.2041) 
-0.2021* 
(0.1182) 
-0.2057* 
(0.1230) 
adsmok -0.4327*** (0.1670) 
-0.4165*** 
(0.1028) 
-0.3619*** 
(0.1280) 
-0.7331** 
(0.3044) 
-0.3440* 
(0.1763) 
-0.2706 
(0.1848) 
-0.5019** 
(0.2234) 
-0.5827*** 
(0.1224) 
-0.5897*** 
(0.1453) 
-1.1123*** 
(0.2269) 
-0.7220*** 
(0.1230) 
-0.6016*** 
(0.1298) 
Year Dummy 
2003 -0.0182 (0.1936) 
0.2025 
(0.1288) 
0.1838 
(0.1343) 
0.6869** 
(0.2884) 
0.1466 
(0.1757) 
0.4054** 
(0.1781) 
0.7149*** 
(0.2707) 
0.4957*** 
(0.1591) 
0.4973*** 
(0.1601) 
-0.4768** 
(0.2218) 
-0.0140 
(0.1609) 
0.0864 
(0.1698) 
2004 -0.1514 (0.2063) 
0.0747 
(0.1291) 
0.0549 
(0.1339) 
0.5181 
(0.3304) 
0.1334 
(0.1628) 
0.3578** 
(0.1823) 
0.6440** 
(0.2622) 
0.6535*** 
(0.1634) 
0.6171*** 
(0.1870) 
-0.1015 
(0.2602) 
0.1303 
(0.1522) 
0.2121 
(0.1662) 
2005 -0.3670* (0.2078) 
0.0334 
(0.1257) 
-0.0364 
(0.1355) 
0.3757 
(0.3175) 
-0.0981 
(0.1728) 
0.2586 
(0.1858) 
0.2601 
(0.2838) 
0.4427*** 
(0.1453) 
0.4561*** 
(0.1748) 
0.0298 
(0.2765) 
0.1747 
(0.1481) 
0.1486 
(0.1510) 
2006 -0.2795 (0.1785) 
0.0577 
(0.0939) 
-0.0200 
(0.1030) 
0.1910 
(0.2628) 
-0.0318 
(0.1361) 
0.2201 
(0.1372) 
-0.2072 
(0.2545) 
0.2328* 
(0.1254) 
0.2751* 
(0.1473) 
-0.1326 
(0.2309) 
0.3302** 
(0.1358) 
0.2583** 
(0.1274) 
Intercept -1.8945** (0.8207) 
1.1693** 
(0.4916) 
-1.1112** 
(0.4979) 
-2.7335*** 
(0.9235) 
0.9202 
(0.6246) 
-1.1508 
(0.7173) 
-0.5190 
(0.8905) 
0.8034 
(0.5003) 
-0.8356 
(0.5655) 
-2.0779*** 
(0.7186) 
1.3419*** 
(0.4422) 
-1.1828*** 
(0.4501) 
             
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses.            
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-taileded test.  
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-taileded test.         
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, two-taileded test. 
The same notation applies to Table 10-14B. 
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Table 11A.  Regression Results from Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates for the Hypertension Sample) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Insurance and Utilization 
HINDC 0.3071*** (0.0021) 
-0.2142*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0308*** 
(0.0022) 
0.2422*** 
(0.0023)  
0.1759*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0363*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0974*** 
(0.0031) 
0.4742*** 
(0.0034) 
HIWDC 0.4624*** (0.0012) 
-0.3021*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2178*** 
(0.0013) 
0.1544*** 
(0.0014)  
-0.3289*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.5835*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.4829*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.2023*** 
(0.0021) 
HMODC 0.4050*** (0.0013) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.0015)  
-0.4596*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.5001*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.5017*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.2610*** 
(0.0021) 
HINDC*Obnum 0.1535*** (0.0012) 
-0.0520*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0522*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0008)  
0.0641*** 
(0.0007) 
0.1187*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0417*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0547*** 
(0.0012) 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.0524*** (0.0003) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0389*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0450*** 
(0.0002)  
0.0316*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0165*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0438*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
HMODC*Obnum 0.0598*** (0.0004) 
-0.0478*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0661*** 
(0.0003)  
0.0421*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0098*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0334*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0036*** 
(0.0005) 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.1225*** (0.0004) 
-0.0887*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0482*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0539*** 
(0.0004)  
0.1140*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0894*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0669*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0797*** 
(0.0006) 
Demographic 
Age 0.0217*** (0.0000) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0084*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0114*** 
(0.0000)  
0.0102*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0104*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0075*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0070*** 
(0.0001) 
Female 0.1906*** (0.0007) 
0.0392*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.1213*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0968*** 
(0.0007)  
-0.0323*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0477*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
-0.0635*** 
(0.0011) 
Black -0.0086*** (0.0010) 
-0.1440*** 
(0.0009) 
0.1328*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0307*** 
(0.0010)  
0.1317*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0286*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0982*** 
(0.0014) 
0.1240*** 
(0.0014) 
Hispanic -0.1220*** (0.0012) 
-0.0604*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1849*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.1617*** 
(0.0014)  
0.0142*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0128*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0231*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0395*** 
(0.0022) 
Mid Income -0.0035*** (0.0008) 
0.0514*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0392*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0242*** 
(0.0008)  
0.0241*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0577*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0041*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0678*** 
(0.0011) 
Low Income -0.1079*** (0.0013) 
0.2057*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.2501*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0289*** 
(0.0014)   
-0.0241*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0641*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0765*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0307*** 
(0.0018) 
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Table 11A.  (Continued) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expbraonly|Exp>0 Pr. Expboth|Exp>0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
Ln(Expgenonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Near Poor -0.2453*** (0.0022) 
0.2653*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.2679*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0407*** 
(0.0026)  
-0.0589*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0025 
(0.0028) 
0.1735*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0711*** 
(0.0035) 
Poor -0.1718*** (0.0017) 
0.1097*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1461*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0515*** 
(0.0018)  
0.0141*** 
(0.0015) 
0.1040*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0048** 
(0.0023) 
Married 0.0857*** (0.0011) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0443*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0465*** 
(0.0011)  
0.0270*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0868*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0151*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0966*** 
(0.0015) 
Divorced -0.1276*** (0.0012) 
-0.0263*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1180*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.1030*** 
(0.0013)  
0.0273*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0456*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0100*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0207*** 
(0.0017) 
Household -0.0545*** (0.0003) 
0.0181*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0164*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0467*** 
(0.0003)  
-0.0097*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0288*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0359*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0186*** 
(0.0005) 
Education          
High School -0.0199*** (0.0008) 
-0.0621*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0284*** 
(0.0008) 
0.1203*** 
(0.0009)  
0.1058*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0761*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0457*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0916*** 
(0.0014) 
BA 0.0324*** (0.0011) 
-0.1050*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0409*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0892*** 
(0.0011)  
0.0758*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0552*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0527*** 
(0.0014) 
0.1006*** 
(0.0016) 
MA -0.0427*** (0.0014) 
0.0264*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0972*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0925*** 
(0.0014)  
-0.0592*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0931*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0486*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0269*** 
(0.0019) 
Empolyment          
Employed -0.0170*** (0.0015) 
-0.0219*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0622*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0399*** 
(0.0016)  
-0.0103*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0077*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0436*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0885*** 
(0.0020) 
Unemployed 0.0449*** (0.0017) 
-0.1215*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0608*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0905*** 
(0.0018)  
0.0325*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0780*** 
(0.0020) 
0.1675*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0487*** 
(0.0023) 
Selfemployed 0.0709*** (0.0013) 
-0.0750*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0282*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0618*** 
(0.0014)  
0.2148*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1551*** 
(0.0016) 
0.2917*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0617*** 
(0.0020) 
Union 0.0027** (0.0010) 
-0.0442*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0078*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0638*** 
(0.0010)  
-0.1159*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.1318*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0876*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.2052*** 
(0.0014) 
Sicpay 0.1305*** (0.0011) 
-0.0506*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0547*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0068*** 
(0.0012)   
0.0273*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0108*** 
(0.0013) 
0.1136*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.1440*** 
(0.0015) 
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Table 11A.  (Continued) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expboth|Exp>0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
Ln(Expgenonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Payvac -0.0297*** (0.0012) 
-0.0645*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0425*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1393*** 
(0.0013)   
0.0460*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0818*** 
(0.0014) 
0.1199*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0208*** 
(0.0018) 
Regions          
Midwest -0.0234*** (0.0011) 
0.3063*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.2983*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0423*** 
(0.0011)  
0.0172*** 
(0.0009) 
0.1871*** 
(0.0014) 
0.1919*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0052*** 
(0.0014) 
South 0.0793*** (0.0010) 
0.0325*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0356*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0008 
(0.0010)  
0.1378*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2666*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2359*** 
(0.0013) 
West -0.1620*** (0.0011) 
0.4501*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.4644*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0572*** 
(0.0012)  
-0.0828*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0700*** 
(0.0016) 
0.1301*** 
(0.0022) 
0.1228*** 
(0.0016) 
Urban -0.0478*** (0.0009) 
0.0353*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0301*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0009)  
-0.0584*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0820*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0437*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0268*** 
(0.0012) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Health 0.1618*** (0.0011) 
-0.0527*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0841*** 
(0.0011) 
0.1904*** 
(0.0012)  
0.1300*** 
(0.0010) 
0.1645*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0212*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0641*** 
(0.0021) 
Good Health 0.1687*** (0.0011) 
-0.0950*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0357*** 
(0.0011) 
0.1975*** 
(0.0012)  
0.2220*** 
(0.0010) 
0.2469*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0776*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0805*** 
(0.0022) 
Fair Health 0.1492*** (0.0013) 
0.0439*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.2140*** 
(0.0013) 
0.2279*** 
(0.0014)  
0.2146*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2981*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0831*** 
(0.0020) 
0.1301*** 
(0.0024) 
Poor Health 0.0968*** (0.0021) 
-0.1301*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.1904*** 
(0.0020) 
0.4213*** 
(0.0021)  
0.3201*** 
(0.0018) 
0.2372*** 
(0.0026) 
0.1632*** 
(0.0031) 
0.1311*** 
(0.0036) 
Limit 0.0470*** (0.0020) 
-0.1065*** 
(0.0018) 
0.1169*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0208*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.0377*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1988*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0697*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0505*** 
(0.0023) 
Coglim -0.0916*** (0.0018) 
0.2732*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1868*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.1246*** 
(0.0018)  
-0.0361*** 
(0.0015) 
0.1949*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0847*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0180*** 
(0.0024) 
Chddx 0.2291*** (0.0023) 
-0.0871*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.2430*** 
(0.0018) 
0.3080*** 
(0.0017)  
0.0644*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.1367*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0307*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0947*** 
(0.0026) 
Midx 0.1647*** (0.0022) 
-0.2339*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0783*** 
(0.0017) 
0.1662*** 
(0.0017)   
0.1721*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0579*** 
(0.0026) 
0.1288*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0302*** 
(0.0022) 
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Table 11A.  (Continued) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Angidx 0.0554*** (0.0026) 
-0.1525*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0179*** 
(0.0020) 
0.1257*** 
(0.0019)  
0.1861*** 
(0.0018) 
0.1075*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0987*** 
(0.0031) 
0.1163*** 
(0.0022) 
Ohrtdx 0.1753*** (0.0014) 
-0.2242*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0368*** 
(0.0011) 
0.2874*** 
(0.0011)  
0.0638*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.1349*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0274*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0102*** 
(0.0021) 
Strkdx -0.0762*** (0.0022) 
-0.1763*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.2087*** 
(0.0021) 
0.3518*** 
(0.0019)  
0.2985*** 
(0.0018) 
0.1884*** 
(0.0028) 
0.1100*** 
(0.0033) 
0.2437*** 
(0.0029) 
Diabetes 0.0775*** (0.0010) 
-0.1313*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0029*** 
(0.0009) 
0.1405*** 
(0.0009)      
Hyerlidpedemia 0.0466*** (0.0008) 
-0.0468*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0560*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.0008)      
Conditions      
0.0542*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0098*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0018* 
(0.0010) 
0.0765*** 
(0.0011) 
Risk Preference          
Adrisk -0.1406*** (0.0009) 
0.0521*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0283*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0295*** 
(0.0010)  
-0.0518*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0402*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0889*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0382*** 
(0.0013) 
Adsmok -0.0562*** (0.0009) 
-0.0102*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0070*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.0009)  
0.0546*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0114*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0574*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1001*** 
(0.0012) 
Year Dummy          
2004 -0.5248*** (0.0010) 
-0.3275*** 
(0.0010) 
0.3955*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0480*** 
(0.0011)  
0.2397*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2173*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0628*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0015) 
2005 -0.2967*** (0.0010) 
-0.3328*** 
(0.0010) 
0.3923*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0337*** 
(0.0011)  
0.3261*** 
(0.0010) 
0.2778*** 
(0.0014) 
0.1846*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0267*** 
(0.0014) 
2006 0.1677*** (0.0011) 
-0.2438*** 
(0.0009) 
0.2888*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0250*** 
(0.0010)  
0.3597*** 
(0.0009) 
0.3869*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1898*** 
(0.0017) 
0.1298*** 
(0.0013) 
2007 0.1686*** (0.0011) 
-0.1486*** 
(0.0009) 
0.2077*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0481*** 
(0.0010)  
0.3168*** 
(0.0009) 
0.3046*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2685*** 
(0.0016) 
0.1758*** 
(0.0013) 
Intercept -0.5759*** (0.0034) 
0.2471*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.1480*** 
(0.0035) 
-1.7627*** 
(0.0039)  
3.8769*** 
(0.0045) 
3.4519*** 
(0.0047) 
4.3115*** 
(0.0063) 
4.8263*** 
(0.0177) 
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Table 11A.  (Continued) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
 
  Conditional on Exp > 0 
 
  Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expboth|Exp>0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
Ln(Expgenonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
 
Sigma      
1.1722*** 
(0.0002) 
1.1050*** 
(0.0005) 
1.0720*** 
(0.004) 
0.8736*** 
(0.0003) 
Rho           -0.0163*** (0.003) 
0.1931*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0606*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0105*** 
(-0.0091) 
 
Notes: Rho (ρ) is a measure of the correlation of errors in the two equations; sigma (σ) is the error for the second equation when the error of the first equation is normalized to 1.  
 
The same notation applies to Table 11A-14B. 
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Table 11B.  Regression Results from Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates for the Hypertension Sample) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Exp>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Insurance and Utilization 
HINDC 0.2720*** (0.0021) 
0.0084*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0495*** 
(0.0020) 
0.2111*** 
(0.0023)  
1.7323*** 
(0.0118) 
0.0893*** 
(0.0189) 
-0.3182*** 
(0.0204) 
4.9816*** 
(0.0325) 
HIWDC 0.4593*** (0.0012) 
-0.1502*** 
(0.0011) 
0.1255*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1297*** 
(0.0014)  
1.3199*** 
(0.0072) 
-1.5913*** 
(0.0112) 
1.4340*** 
(0.0122) 
4.0920*** 
(0.0202) 
HMODC 0.3851*** (0.0013) 
0.0704*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0835*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0235*** 
(0.0015)  
0.8022*** 
(0.0077) 
0.7523*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.6636*** 
(0.0132) 
4.4822*** 
(0.0218) 
HINDC*Obnum 0.1485*** (0.0012) 
-0.0133*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0277*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0056*** 
(0.0008)  
-0.0019 
(0.0046) 
-0.0935*** 
(0.0076) 
0.3172*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.5358*** 
(0.0127) 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.0593*** (0.0003) 
-0.0036*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0148*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0463*** 
(0.0002)  
0.1712*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0097*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.1040*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.2551*** 
(0.0032) 
HMODC*Obnum 0.0685*** (0.0004) 
-0.0407*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0237*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0648*** 
(0.0003)  
0.3558*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.4148*** 
(0.0029) 
0.2594*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0801*** 
(0.0042) 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.1488*** (0.0005) 
-0.0396*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0288*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0501*** 
(0.0004)  
0.3128*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.4056*** 
(0.0036) 
0.4025*** 
(0.0037) 
0.4634*** 
(0.0057) 
Demographic          
Age 0.0238*** (0.0000) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0076*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0110*** 
(0.0000)  
0.0616*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0780*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0414*** 
(0.0007) 
Female 0.1638*** (0.0007) 
0.0457*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.1480*** 
(0.0006) 
0.1006*** 
(0.0007)  
0.1441*** 
(0.0038) 
0.4815*** 
(0.0061) 
-1.5245*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.3792*** 
(0.0100) 
Black -0.0044*** (0.0010) 
-0.0233*** 
(0.0008) 
0.1061*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0347*** 
(0.0010)  
1.0290*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.2722*** 
(0.0088) 
1.0737*** 
(0.0088) 
2.7179*** 
(0.0140) 
Hispanic -0.1423*** (0.0012) 
-0.0796*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0465*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.1594*** 
(0.0014)  
-0.7587*** 
(0.0070) 
-0.8493*** 
(0.0113) 
0.4760*** 
(0.0117) 
0.4623*** 
(0.0207) 
Mid Income -0.0064*** (0.0008) 
0.0080*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0412*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0291*** 
(0.0008)  
0.1566*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0737*** 
(0.0070) 
-0.4581*** 
(0.0072) 
0.2858*** 
(0.0113) 
Low Income -0.1241*** (0.0013) 
0.0836*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.1973*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0284*** 
(0.0013)   
0.1603*** 
(0.0071) 
0.8473*** 
(0.0114) 
-2.0061*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.5732*** 
(0.0185) 
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Table 11B.  (Continued) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. Usebraonly|Exp>0 Pr. Useboth|Exp>0   Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Near Poor -0.1899*** (0.0022) 
0.0104*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0484*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0951*** 
(0.0026)  
-0.2666*** 
(0.0131) 
-0.0416** 
(0.0209) 
-0.3344*** 
(0.0227) 
-0.5112*** 
(0.0368) 
Poor -0.1446*** (0.0017) 
0.0330*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0346*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0542*** 
(0.0018)  
0.1061*** 
(0.0095) 
0.2865*** 
(0.0153) 
-0.2595*** 
(0.0162) 
-1.1811*** 
(0.0240) 
Married 0.0801*** (0.0011) 
0.0047*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0245*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0361*** 
(0.0011)  
-0.0997*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0336*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.2144*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.2040*** 
(0.0153) 
Divorced -0.1299*** (0.0012) 
-0.0286*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0538*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0889*** 
(0.0013)  
0.0247*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.3102*** 
(0.0108) 
0.5795*** 
(0.0112) 
0.5958*** 
(0.0171) 
Household -0.0542*** (0.0003) 
0.0121*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0040*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0478*** 
(0.0003)  
-0.0743*** 
(0.0017) 
0.1275*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0323*** 
(0.0028) 
0.1001*** 
(0.0049) 
Education          
High School -0.0027*** (0.0009) 
-0.0628*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0376*** 
(0.0007) 
0.1178*** 
(0.0009)  
0.2792*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.6750*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.3393*** 
(0.0074) 
0.3088*** 
(0.0122) 
BA 0.0403*** (0.0011) 
-0.1407*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0026*** 
(0.0009) 
0.1094*** 
(0.0011)  
0.0436*** 
(0.0057) 
-1.4772*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0093 
(0.0095) 
0.1836*** 
(0.0156) 
MA -0.0451*** (0.0015) 
-0.0758*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0158*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1018*** 
(0.0014)  
0.0183** 
(0.0073) 
-0.8362*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.1067*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.2122*** 
(0.0196) 
Empolyment          
Employed -0.0114*** (0.0016) 
0.0188*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.1049*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0249*** 
(0.0016)  
0.4074*** 
(0.0082) 
0.2089*** 
(0.0132) 
-1.1529*** 
(0.0139) 
1.4586*** 
(0.0212) 
Unemployed 0.0584*** (0.0018) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0393*** 
(0.0015) 
0.1062*** 
(0.0017)  
0.3727*** 
(0.0091) 
-0.3735*** 
(0.0147) 
-0.3763*** 
(0.0157) 
0.0711*** 
(0.0239) 
Selfemployed 0.0608*** (0.0014) 
-0.0509*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0736*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0856*** 
(0.0014)  
0.4764*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.5234*** 
(0.0116) 
0.8118*** 
(0.0123) 
0.3229*** 
(0.0202) 
Union -0.0155*** (0.0011) 
-0.0281*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0275*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0595*** 
(0.0010)  
-0.3554*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.2811*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.2398*** 
(0.0092) 
-1.4409*** 
(0.0143) 
Sicpay 0.1455*** (0.0011) 
-0.0638*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0330*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0151*** 
(0.0012)   
-0.4277*** 
(0.0060) 
-0.6474*** 
(0.0096) 
0.4057*** 
(0.0101) 
-1.2849*** 
(0.0158) 
  
 
119 
Table 11B.  (Continued) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Useboth|Exp>0   Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Payvac -0.0457*** (0.0012) 
-0.0572*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0327*** 
(0.0011) 
0.1377*** 
(0.0013)   
0.4445*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.6205*** 
(0.0105) 
0.3627*** 
(0.0111) 
-0.1761*** 
(0.0175) 
Regions          
Midwest -0.0074*** (0.0011) 
0.1690*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.1411*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0011)  
1.0530*** 
(0.0056) 
1.7844*** 
(0.0091) 
-1.4232*** 
(0.0094) 
1.0200*** 
(0.0144) 
South 0.0921*** (0.0010) 
-0.1164*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0535*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0002 
(0.0010)  
0.8909*** 
(0.0051) 
-1.2442*** 
(0.0086) 
0.5781*** 
(0.0084) 
2.1056*** 
(0.0133) 
West -0.1554*** (0.0011) 
0.1901*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.2437*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0757*** 
(0.0012)  
0.5821*** 
(0.0060) 
1.9861*** 
(0.0096) 
-2.4881*** 
(0.0104) 
1.1429*** 
(0.0162) 
Urban -0.0627*** (0.0009) 
-0.0387*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0844*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0251*** 
(0.0009)  
-0.2113*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.4319*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.8721*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0755*** 
(0.0121) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Health 0.1802*** (0.0011) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0457*** 
(0.0010) 
0.1747*** 
(0.0012)  
0.3518*** 
(0.0060) 
-0.0699*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.3931*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.3945*** 
(0.0185) 
Good Health 0.1735*** (0.0011) 
0.0280*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0666*** 
(0.0010) 
0.1830*** 
(0.0012)  
1.0647*** 
(0.0060) 
0.3077*** 
(0.0096) 
0.7551*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.4634*** 
(0.0185) 
Fair Health 0.1973*** (0.0014) 
0.1358*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0975*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2200*** 
(0.0014)  
1.3242*** 
(0.0072) 
1.4321*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.9505*** 
(0.0121) 
0.0975*** 
(0.0210) 
Poor Health 0.1414*** (0.0021) 
0.1404*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0411*** 
(0.0018) 
0.4051*** 
(0.0020)  
2.4431*** 
(0.0110) 
1.5312*** 
(0.0178) 
0.4447*** 
(0.0187) 
0.0557** 
(0.0281) 
Limit 0.0538*** (0.0021) 
-0.0741*** 
(0.0016) 
0.1541*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0074*** 
(0.0019)  
0.6925*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.7677*** 
(0.0165) 
1.7108*** 
(0.0172) 
1.9993*** 
(0.0243) 
Coglim -0.1102*** (0.0018) 
0.1458*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0819*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1303*** 
(0.0018)  
1.0706*** 
(0.0094) 
1.5437*** 
(0.0150) 
-0.6184*** 
(0.0166) 
1.8442*** 
(0.0234) 
Chddx 0.2864*** (0.0024) 
-0.0234*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.1566*** 
(0.0017) 
0.3092*** 
(0.0017)  
1.4692*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.2236*** 
(0.0158) 
-1.1847*** 
(0.0172) 
1.8209*** 
(0.0208) 
Midx 0.1534*** (0.0023) 
0.1470*** 
(0.0015) 
0.2144*** 
(0.0016) 
0.1832*** 
(0.0017)   
1.6049*** 
(0.0096) 
1.5617*** 
(0.0160) 
2.2001*** 
(0.0162) 
-1.2189*** 
(0.0212) 
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Table 11B.  (Continued) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Useboth|Exp>0   Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Angidx 0.0158*** (0.0027) 
0.0038** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0343*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1083*** 
(0.0019)  
1.1512*** 
(0.0110) 
0.1499*** 
(0.0185) 
-0.2951*** 
(0.0192) 
1.9035*** 
(0.0223) 
Ohrtdx 0.1781*** (0.0014) 
-0.1446*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0010) 
0.3157*** 
(0.0011)  
1.4534*** 
(0.0063) 
-1.5352*** 
(0.0105) 
0.1688*** 
(0.0107) 
1.7286*** 
(0.0150) 
Strkdx -0.0292*** (0.0024) 
0.2149*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0433*** 
(0.0019) 
0.3243*** 
(0.0019)  
3.1613*** 
(0.0109) 
2.4750*** 
(0.0180) 
-0.8889*** 
(0.0196) 
3.1532*** 
(0.0230) 
Diabetes 0.0993*** (0.0010) 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0003) 
0.1623*** 
(0.0009)      
Hyerlidpedemia 0.0600*** (0.0008) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0029*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0046*** 
(0.0008)      
Conditions      
0.7685*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.0169*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0937*** 
(0.0024) 
1.8045*** 
(0.0106) 
Risk Preference          
Adrisk -0.1618*** (0.0009) 
-0.0230*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.1179*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0242*** 
(0.0010)  
-0.1731*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.2347*** 
(0.0081) 
-1.2790*** 
(0.0085) 
0.8700*** 
(0.0136) 
Adsmok -0.0368*** (0.0009) 
-0.0124*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0245*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0107*** 
(0.0009)  
0.1241*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.1232*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.2216*** 
(0.0082) 
0.8256*** 
(0.0128) 
Year Dummy          
2004 -0.5793*** (0.0010) 
-0.1578*** 
(0.0009) 
0.1706*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0465*** 
(0.0011)  
0.1189*** 
(0.0062) 
-1.6769*** 
(0.0096) 
1.6444*** 
(0.0099) 
0.9676*** 
(0.0153) 
2005 -0.3219*** (0.0011) 
-0.1561*** 
(0.0009) 
0.1800*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0447*** 
(0.0011)  
0.0824*** 
(0.0056) 
-1.6421*** 
(0.0091) 
1.7835*** 
(0.0094) 
0.6379*** 
(0.0145) 
2006 0.1499*** (0.0011) 
-0.0501*** 
(0.0008) 
0.1395*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0176*** 
(0.0010)  
0.5128*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.4906*** 
(0.0085) 
1.3874*** 
(0.0090) 
0.7493*** 
(0.0135) 
2007 0.1947*** (0.0011) 
0.0504*** 
(0.0008) 
0.1116*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0512*** 
(0.0010)  
0.6746*** 
(0.0052) 
0.5656*** 
(0.0084) 
1.1191*** 
(0.0090) 
1.0236*** 
(0.0137) 
Intercept -0.6303*** (0.0034) 
0.0319*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0791*** 
(0.0032) 
-1.7354*** 
(0.0039)  
2.2933*** 
(0.0211) 
1.1641*** 
(0.0315) 
1.4295*** 
(0.0324) 
5.9893*** 
(0.0858) 
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Table 11B.  (Continued) 
Hypertension 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 
Pr. 
Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Exp>0 
  Use|Use>0 
Usegenonly|Use>
0 
Usebraonly|Use
>0 
Useboth|Use
>0 
 
Sigma      
7.4184*** 
(0.0013) 
10.5865*** 
(0.0031) 
10.2508*** 
(0.0037) 
9.2285*** 
(0.0045) 
Rho           -0.1121*** (0.0013) 
0.0099*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0606*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.1340*** 
(-0.0033) 
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Table 12A.  Regression Results from Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates for the Diabetes sample) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 Pr. Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Insurance and Utilization 
HINDC 0.0334*** (0.0034) 
-0.0207*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.1318*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0744*** 
(0.0049)  
-0.0096** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0085 
(0.0071) 
0.0072 
(0.0082) 
0.1641*** 
(0.0082) 
HIWDC 0.2984*** (0.0018) 
0.0323*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.1484*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0882*** 
(0.0025)  
-1.0652*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.9850*** 
(0.0036) 
-1.0007*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.6745*** 
(0.0041) 
HMODC 0.2053*** (0.0019) 
0.1523*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0978*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.1452*** 
(0.0027)  
-1.1362*** 
(0.0025) 
-1.0387*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.9818*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.5704*** 
(0.0045) 
HINDC*Obnum 0.1133*** (0.0009) 
-0.0245*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0098*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0081*** 
(0.0010)  
-0.0339*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0012 
(0.0013) 
-0.0581*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0938*** 
(0.0017) 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.0845*** (0.0003) 
-0.0524*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0091*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0221*** 
(0.0002)  
0.0024*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0691*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0158*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0119*** 
(0.0003) 
HMODC*Obnum 0.0712*** (0.0003) 
-0.0208*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0094*** 
(0.0003)  
0.0187*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0267*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0384*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0292*** 
(0.0005) 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.0961*** (0.0004) 
-0.0106*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0128*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0226*** 
(0.0005)  
-0.0070*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0660*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0037*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0279*** 
(0.0009) 
Demographic 
Age 0.0147*** (0.0001) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0209*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0196*** 
(0.0001)  
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0093*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0085*** 
(0.0001) 
Female -0.0045*** (0.0010) 
0.0064*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0125*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0180*** 
(0.0013)  
0.0098*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0565*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0730*** 
(0.0021) 
Black -0.0244*** (0.0015) 
0.0310*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0733*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0571*** 
(0.0020)  
0.0415*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1485*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0419*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0614*** 
(0.0032) 
Hispanic 0.0549*** (0.0016) 
0.3112*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.2369*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1137*** 
(0.0021)  
-0.2121*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.4099*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0622*** 
(0.0033) 
0.1613*** 
(0.0034) 
Mid Income 0.0088*** (0.0012) 
0.0287*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0978*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0925*** 
(0.0014)  
0.0639*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0566*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0752*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0211*** 
(0.0022) 
Low Income 0.1155*** (0.0018) 
0.1979*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.1707*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0577*** 
(0.0023)   
-0.0836*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0390*** 
(0.0034) 
0.1135*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.2144*** 
(0.0037) 
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Table 12A.  (Continued) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Near Poor -0.1890*** (0.0028) 
0.2482*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.2331*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0605*** 
(0.0040)  
0.0154*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0160*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0724*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0178*** 
(0.0065) 
Poor -0.0055** (0.0023) 
0.1411*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.1882*** 
(0.0029) 
0.1084*** 
(0.0030)  
-0.1044*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0473*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0431*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.4075*** 
(0.0049) 
Married -0.0708*** (0.0015) 
-0.0224*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.1756*** 
(0.0018) 
0.2668*** 
(0.0020)  
0.0412*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1346*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0782*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.3942*** 
(0.0035) 
Divorced -0.1548*** (0.0018) 
0.1263*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.2028*** 
(0.0022) 
0.1097*** 
(0.0024)  
0.0246*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0917*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0007 
(0.0034) 
-0.2206*** 
(0.0039) 
Household -0.0098*** (0.0004) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0262*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0300*** 
(0.0005)  
-0.0145*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0140*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0022** 
(0.0008) 
Education          
High School -0.0376*** (0.0011) 
-0.0645*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0049*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0581*** 
(0.0014)  
-0.0566*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0410*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1597*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.1788*** 
(0.0023) 
BA -0.1513*** (0.0016) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0105*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0131*** 
(0.0021)  
-0.1356*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0360*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.5094*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0622*** 
(0.0033) 
MA -0.1584*** (0.0024) 
-0.4967*** 
(0.0033) 
0.2993*** 
(0.0030) 
0.1630*** 
(0.0031)  
0.1935*** 
(0.0030) 
0.4679*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0010 
(0.0041) 
-0.3131*** 
(0.0048) 
Empolyment          
Employed 0.0813*** (0.0020) 
0.2515*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.1800*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0597*** 
(0.0027)  
-0.1473*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.4796*** 
(0.0046) 
0.1252*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0817*** 
(0.0042) 
Unemployed 0.0416*** (0.0023) 
0.2038*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0737*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.1297*** 
(0.0030)  
-0.2117*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.5785*** 
(0.0051) 
0.1698*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.1258*** 
(0.0048) 
Selfemployed 0.0347*** (0.0019) 
0.0002 
(0.0024) 
0.0888*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0957*** 
(0.0026)  
-0.0335*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.1001*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0503*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0087** 
(0.0041) 
Union -0.0871*** (0.0016) 
0.0128*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0243*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.1861*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.2852*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.1472*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.2912*** 
(0.0030) 
Sicpay 0.0702*** (0.0016) 
0.0170*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0903*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0903*** 
(0.0020)   
0.0588*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1151*** 
(0.0031) 
0.2943*** 
(0.0030) 
0.1584*** 
(0.0032) 
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Table 12A.  (Continued) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Payvac 0.1401*** (0.0018) 
-0.0558*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1332*** 
(0.0023) 
0.1808*** 
(0.0023)   
-0.1561*** 
(0.0022) 
0.1220*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.2622*** 
(0.0033) 
0.020807*** 
(0.001832) 
Regions          
Midwest 0.0231*** (0.0016) 
0.0307*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0507*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0477*** 
(0.0020)  
-0.1012*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1221*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.2238*** 
(0.0028) 
0.1346*** 
(0.0032) 
South 0.1277*** (0.0014) 
-0.1085*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0425*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0795*** 
(0.0018)  
-0.0192*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0611*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0701*** 
(0.0025) 
0.2331*** 
(0.0029) 
West 0.1102*** (0.0016) 
0.2443*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.4040*** 
(0.0020) 
0.1677*** 
(0.0020)  
-0.1029*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.2523*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.1715*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1098*** 
(0.0033) 
Urban -0.0318*** (0.0013) 
0.2324*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0213*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.2100*** 
(0.0016)  
-0.1275*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1391*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.1073*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0663*** 
(0.0024) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Health 0.0051** (0.0022) 
-0.0098*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0468*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0511*** 
(0.0031)  
0.1127*** 
(0.0029) 
0.2752*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0593*** 
(0.0042) 
0.3045*** 
(0.0050) 
Good Health 0.1859*** (0.0021) 
-0.0635*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0175*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0400*** 
(0.0029)  
0.0563*** 
(0.0028) 
0.3095*** 
(0.0044) 
0.1000*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0944*** 
(0.0048) 
Fair Health 0.1752*** (0.0022) 
-0.0784*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0193*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0799*** 
(0.0031)  
0.0878*** 
(0.0030) 
0.3817*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0287*** 
(0.0042) 
0.1551*** 
(0.0050) 
Poor Health -0.0918*** (0.0028) 
-0.1788*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0207*** 
(0.0037) 
0.1718*** 
(0.0038)  
0.4474*** 
(0.0036) 
0.5876*** 
(0.0060) 
0.1187*** 
(0.0052) 
0.2996*** 
(0.0061) 
Limit -0.1380*** (0.0024) 
0.1468*** 
(0.0030) 
0.1837*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.3546*** 
(0.0031)  
-0.0483*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.3471*** 
(0.0048) 
0.1770*** 
(0.0042) 
0.2657*** 
(0.0050) 
Coglim -0.0526*** (0.0022) 
0.0653*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.1346*** 
(0.0027) 
0.1072*** 
(0.0027)  
0.0387*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0474*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0905*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.2820*** 
(0.0042) 
Chddx 0.3819*** (0.0025) 
-0.0577*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0803*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0931*** 
(0.0027)  
-0.2967*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.2906*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0107*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.1607*** 
(0.0042) 
Midx -0.1268*** (0.0025) 
-0.2383*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0559*** 
(0.0029) 
0.1344*** 
(0.0028)   
0.2677*** 
(0.0029) 
0.2106*** 
(0.0052) 
0.3527*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0705*** 
(0.0042) 
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Table 12A.  (Continued) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Angidx -0.2129*** (0.0030) 
0.3400*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0778*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.3610*** 
(0.0035)  
0.0055 
(0.0034) 
-0.1562*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.2301*** 
(0.0046) 
0.7015*** 
(0.0056) 
Ohrtdx -0.1175*** (0.0019) 
-0.1080*** 
(0.0023) 
0.1020*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0348*** 
(0.0022)  
0.0489*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1012*** 
(0.0038) 
0.1079*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0111*** 
(0.0034) 
Strkdx 0.0528*** (0.0028) 
-0.1443*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0167*** 
(0.0031) 
0.1643*** 
(0.0030)  
0.1135*** 
(0.0031) 
0.2100*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.1159*** 
(0.0048) 
0.1405*** 
(0.0047) 
Hypertension 0.1130*** (0.0010) 
-0.0016 
(0.0012) 
0.0270*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0294*** 
(0.0012)  - - - - 
Hyerlidpedemia 0.2030*** (0.0010) 
-0.0425*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.1184*** 
(0.0013) 
0.1341*** 
(0.0011)  - - - - 
Dskidn 0.3754*** (0.0023) 
-0.2197*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0679*** 
(0.0024) 
0.2623*** 
(0.0024)  
-0.0006 
(0.0025) 
0.2568*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.2478*** 
(0.0034) 
0.1706*** 
(0.0037) 
Dseypr 0.1957*** (0.0016) 
-0.3943*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1135*** 
(0.0018) 
0.2556*** 
(0.0018)  
0.0284*** 
(0.0018) 
0.3225*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0107*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.2413*** 
(0.0028) 
Conditions - - - -  
-0.0356*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0828*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0345*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0273*** 
(0.0020) 
Risk Preference          
Adrisk -0.0326*** (0.0013) 
0.1281*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1283*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0158*** 
(0.0017)  
0.0309*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.2152*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0772*** 
(0.0026) 
0.1174*** 
(0.0027) 
Adsmok -0.0839*** (0.0013) 
0.1677*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0746*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1171*** 
(0.0017)  
0.0066*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1361*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0785*** 
(0.0024) 
0.1258*** 
(0.0027) 
Year Dummy          
2003 -0.6080*** (0.0016) 
-0.7479*** 
(0.0022) 
0.9665*** 
(0.0020)    
0.6875*** 
(0.0021) 
1.0192*** 
(0.0041) 
0.1473*** 
(0.0052) 
0.4369*** 
(0.0036) 
2004 -0.4140*** (0.0015) 
-0.4088*** 
(0.0019) 
0.6444*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.2873*** 
(0.0020)  
0.3519*** 
(0.0019) 
0.4862*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0350*** 
(0.0042) 
0.1425*** 
(0.0033) 
2005 -0.1694*** (0.0015) 
-0.1280*** 
(0.0017) 
0.1056*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0527*** 
(0.0018)   
0.2247*** 
(0.0018) 
0.2290*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0540*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0587*** 
(0.0028) 
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Table 12A.  (Continued) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
2006 -0.0146*** (0.0015) 
-0.1219*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0943*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0017)  
0.2837*** 
(0.0017) 
0.4310*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0454*** 
(0.0028) 
0.1654*** 
(0.0026) 
Intercept -0.7971*** (0.0048) 
-0.8012*** 
(0.0065) 
1.0206*** 
(0.0065) 
-1.8067*** 
(0.0070)  
6.4157*** 
(0.0070) 
6.1672*** 
(0.0111) 
5.4298*** 
(0.0087) 
8.0168*** 
(0.0142) 
Sigma      
1.4158*** 
(0.0009) 
1.4734*** 
(0.0018) 
1.1537*** 
(0.0007) 
1.3729*** 
(0.0020) 
Rho           -0.7416*** (0.0011) 
-0.8572*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0930*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.8636*** 
(0.0009) 
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Table 12B.  Regression Results from Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates for the Diabetes sample) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. Usebraonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Use>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Insurance and Utilization 
HINDC -0.0030 (0.0034) 
-0.0196*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.1029*** 
(0.0048) 
0.1186*** 
(0.0049)  
4.2117*** 
(0.0293) 
2.5916*** 
(0.0294) 
2.3857*** 
(0.0520) 
7.2239*** 
(0.0695) 
HIWDC 0.2906*** (0.0018) 
0.0044* 
(0.0024) 
-0.1593*** 
(0.0024) 
0.1924*** 
(0.0024)  
0.6369*** 
(0.0147) 
0.1947*** 
(0.0151) 
0.0190 
(0.0222) 
1.7877*** 
(0.0337) 
HMODC 0.2474*** (0.0019) 
0.0910*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0626*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0342*** 
(0.0026)  
-0.1146*** 
(0.0154) 
-0.1281*** 
(0.0152) 
0.0983*** 
(0.0235) 
0.7259*** 
(0.0375) 
HINDC*Obnum 0.1092*** (0.0009) 
-0.0199*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0086*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0112*** 
(0.0010)  
-0.2880*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.2178*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.4054*** 
(0.0120) 
0.1408*** 
(0.0143) 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.1332*** (0.0004) 
-0.0536*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0208*** 
(0.0002)  
0.1261*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0370 
(.) 
0.1281*** 
(0.0021) 
0.1120*** 
(0.0021) 
HMODC*Obnum 0.0921*** (0.0003) 
-0.0261*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0155*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0051*** 
(0.0002)  
0.2589*** 
(0.0015) 
0.1634*** 
(0.0016) 
0.2635*** 
(0.0016) 
0.6001*** 
(0.0044) 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.0918*** (0.0004) 
-0.0116*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0254*** 
(0.0005)  
0.2268*** 
(0.0032) 
0.2747*** 
(0.0029) 
0.2395*** 
(0.0055) 
0.2024*** 
(0.0073) 
Demographic 
Age 0.0175*** (0.0001) 
0.0049*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0191*** 
(0.0001)  
0.0805*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0623*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0218 
(.) 
0.1004*** 
(0.0013) 
Female -0.0339*** (0.0011) 
-0.0317*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0170*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0259*** 
(0.0013)  
-0.1049*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.5994*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.2134*** 
(0.0114) 
0.4750*** 
(0.0166) 
Black -0.0328*** (0.0016) 
-0.0124*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0769*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0789*** 
(0.0019)  
1.3012*** 
(0.0115) 
1.2827*** 
(0.0132) 
0.0978*** 
(0.0167) 
3.1177*** 
(0.0256) 
Hispanic 0.0351*** (0.0016) 
0.3369*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.2426*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1246*** 
(0.0020)  
-1.3679*** 
(0.0118) 
-1.1968 
(.) 
-0.8579*** 
(0.0172) 
-0.8637*** 
(0.0282) 
Mid Income 0.0092*** (0.0012) 
0.0041*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0945*** 
(0.0014) 
0.1042*** 
(0.0014)  
0.6377*** 
(0.0085) 
1.0022*** 
(0.0100) 
0.6911*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.6284*** 
(0.0181) 
Low Income 0.1286*** (0.0018) 
0.2011*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.1777*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0297*** 
(0.0022)   
-0.2557*** 
(0.0130) 
1.3555*** 
(0.0099) 
0.3908*** 
(0.0186) 
-2.5826*** 
(0.0304) 
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Table 12B.  (Continued) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Use>0 
Pr. Useboth|Use>0   Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Near Poor 0.0240*** (0.0029) 
0.3662*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.2686*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.1218*** 
(0.0038)  
-1.4968*** 
(0.0218) 
-0.1543*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.4393*** 
(0.0359) 
-2.5467*** 
(0.0536) 
Poor 0.0412*** (0.0024) 
0.1517*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.2030*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0790*** 
(0.0030)  
0.0264 
(0.0177) 
0.7273*** 
(0.0172) 
0.9586*** 
(0.0268) 
-1.6015*** 
(0.0397) 
Married -0.0755*** (0.0016) 
-0.0434*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.1663*** 
(0.0018) 
0.2470*** 
(0.0019)  
0.6051*** 
(0.0113) 
-0.4532*** 
(0.0124) 
0.8687*** 
(0.0152) 
0.4563*** 
(0.0287) 
Divorced -0.1233*** (0.0019) 
0.0684*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1912*** 
(0.0022) 
0.1430*** 
(0.0023)  
0.4755*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.7077*** 
(0.0144) 
0.5591*** 
(0.0194) 
1.4638*** 
(0.0308) 
Household -0.0080*** (0.0004) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0275*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0331*** 
(0.0005)  
-0.2019*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0303*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.3116*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.1991*** 
(0.0069) 
Education          
High School -0.0479*** (0.0012) 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0150*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0059*** 
(0.0014)  
-0.1524*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.3452*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.5997*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.6591*** 
(0.0181) 
BA -0.1269*** (0.0017) 
0.0317*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0282*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0600*** 
(0.0020)  
-1.0073*** 
(0.0121) 
0.2474*** 
(0.0136) 
-2.9264*** 
(0.0179) 
-0.2168*** 
(0.0265) 
MA -0.1607*** (0.0025) 
-0.4717*** 
(0.0033) 
0.3270*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0482*** 
(0.0030)  
-0.0583*** 
(0.0179) 
-1.6768*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.1111*** 
(0.0223) 
-2.5292*** 
(0.0381) 
Empolyment          
Employed 0.1345*** (0.0021) 
0.2622*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.1861*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.0026)  
-0.0201 
(0.0158) 
-0.0380** 
(0.0157) 
1.7144*** 
(0.0213) 
0.2217*** 
(0.0341) 
Unemployed 0.0489*** (0.0024) 
0.3041*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0892*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.1996*** 
(0.0030)  
-0.1732*** 
(0.0180) 
-1.0574*** 
(0.0168) 
2.6286*** 
(0.0264) 
-0.8958*** 
(0.0379) 
Selfemployed 0.0187*** (0.0020) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0627*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0597*** 
(0.0025)  
-0.0098 
(0.0149) 
-0.2246*** 
(0.0165) 
0.1444*** 
(0.0224) 
-0.7888*** 
(0.0331) 
Union -0.0866*** (0.0016) 
0.0574*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0533*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0177*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.8585*** 
(0.0113) 
-0.3358*** 
(0.0124) 
0.1673*** 
(0.0176) 
-3.1005*** 
(0.0240) 
Sicpay 0.1088*** (0.0017) 
0.0329*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0836*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1059*** 
(0.0020)   
0.3311*** 
(0.0120) 
-1.0690*** 
(0.0131) 
1.5100*** 
(0.0183) 
1.4889*** 
(0.0258) 
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Table 12B.  (Continued) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Use>0 
Pr. Useboth|Use>0   Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Payvac 0.0920*** (0.0018) 
-0.0026 
(0.0022) 
-0.1251*** 
(0.0022) 
0.1208*** 
(0.0022)   
0.4392*** 
(0.0134) 
0.5589*** 
(0.0151) 
-0.2736*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0147 
(0.0295) 
Regions          
Midwest -0.0132*** (0.0017) 
0.0178*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0114*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0061*** 
(0.0020)  
0.1688*** 
(0.0118) 
0.4195*** 
(0.0134) 
-2.7392*** 
(0.0176) 
4.3271*** 
(0.0258) 
South 0.0697*** (0.0015) 
-0.0968*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0591*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0289*** 
(0.0018)  
0.3605*** 
(0.0106) 
0.1026*** 
(0.0112) 
-2.1569*** 
(0.0154) 
4.1806*** 
(0.0232) 
West 0.0764*** (0.0017) 
0.2020*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.3385*** 
(0.0020) 
0.1187*** 
(0.0020)  
0.4231*** 
(0.0118) 
0.7100*** 
(0.0086) 
-3.4074*** 
(0.0154) 
3.8212*** 
(0.0259) 
Urban 0.0093*** (0.0013) 
0.1964*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0068*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.1816*** 
(0.0016)  
-0.8231*** 
(0.0095) 
0.8727*** 
(0.0061) 
-1.2961*** 
(0.0142) 
-0.0094 
(0.0197) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Health 0.0674*** (0.0022) 
-0.0188*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0552*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0425*** 
(0.0031)  
1.3625*** 
(0.0181) 
-0.2443*** 
(0.0198) 
2.6239*** 
(0.0265) 
3.1832*** 
(0.0405) 
Good Health 0.2805*** (0.0021) 
-0.0946*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0167*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0799*** 
(0.0029)  
1.1986*** 
(0.0172) 
-0.2068*** 
(0.0183) 
2.4739*** 
(0.0251) 
2.0443*** 
(0.0384) 
Fair Health 0.2822*** (0.0023) 
-0.0855*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0148*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0767*** 
(0.0030)  
1.3063*** 
(0.0181) 
-0.3902*** 
(0.0196) 
2.1557*** 
(0.0267) 
3.1011*** 
(0.0405) 
Poor Health 0.0499*** (0.0028) 
-0.1696*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0183*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1529*** 
(0.0037)  
1.8513*** 
(0.0222) 
-0.0496** 
(0.0243) 
2.3108*** 
(0.0327) 
1.9696*** 
(0.0488) 
Limit -0.2516*** (0.0025) 
0.0047 
(0.0030) 
0.2004*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.2115*** 
(0.0030)  
0.3704*** 
(0.0181) 
-0.9222*** 
(0.0216) 
2.2844*** 
(0.0252) 
0.1841*** 
(0.0393) 
Coglim -0.0226*** (0.0023) 
0.1495*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.1897*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0572*** 
(0.0026)  
-0.1535*** 
(0.0162) 
0.8726*** 
(0.0167) 
-0.4494*** 
(0.0252) 
-0.7128*** 
(0.0337) 
Chddx 0.3295*** (0.0026) 
0.0044 
(0.0028) 
0.0599*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0753*** 
(0.0027)  
-0.2556*** 
(0.0161) 
-1.7729*** 
(0.0207) 
2.3027*** 
(0.0228) 
-1.8441*** 
(0.0333) 
Midx -0.1355*** (0.0027) 
-0.2121*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0697*** 
(0.0028) 
0.1034*** 
(0.0028)   
0.5793*** 
(0.0176) 
0.6345*** 
(0.0205) 
1.7480*** 
(0.0268) 
-1.6637*** 
(0.0338) 
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Table 12B.  (Continued) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Use>0 
Pr. Useboth|Use>0   Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Angidx -0.2065*** (0.0031) 
0.3202*** 
(0.0034) 
0.1098*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.3914*** 
(0.0034)  
0.2900*** 
(0.0203) 
0.0830*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.6680*** 
(0.0281) 
6.3726*** 
(0.0468) 
Ohrtdx -0.1072*** (0.0020) 
-0.1612*** 
(0.0023) 
0.1063*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0386*** 
(0.0022)  
0.1669*** 
(0.0132) 
0.0765*** 
(0.0145) 
-0.1249*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0825*** 
(0.0265) 
Strkdx 0.0308*** (0.0029) 
-0.0597*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0156*** 
(0.0030) 
0.1093*** 
(0.0030)  
1.1505*** 
(0.0188) 
0.8278*** 
(0.0221) 
-0.9593*** 
(0.0300) 
2.8276*** 
(0.0378) 
Hypertension 0.1643*** (0.0011) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0346*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0339*** 
(0.0013)  - - - - 
Hyerlidpedemia 0.2344*** (0.0011) 
0.0034*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.1465*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1536*** 
(0.0012)  - - - - 
Dskidn 0.3110*** (0.0024) 
-0.1639*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0995*** 
(0.0024) 
0.2347*** 
(0.0024)  
0.7595*** 
(0.0148) 
-0.4667*** 
(0.0175) 
-0.8718*** 
(0.0214) 
2.8329*** 
(0.0297) 
Dseypr 0.2166*** (0.0017) 
-0.4331*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1304*** 
(0.0018) 
0.2506*** 
(0.0018)  
0.4477*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.1794 
(.) 
0.2673*** 
(0.0151) 
-0.7539*** 
(0.0227) 
Conditions - - - -  
0.3007*** 
(0.0079) 
0.9300*** 
(0.0089) 
0.7116*** 
(0.0118) 
-0.5913*** 
(0.0172) 
Risk Preference          
Adrisk -0.0169*** (0.0014) 
0.1002*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1417*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0496*** 
(0.0017)  
0.5061*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.4794*** 
(0.0095) 
1.0264*** 
(0.0153) 
0.7650*** 
(0.0213) 
Adsmok -0.0250*** (0.0013) 
0.1533*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0835*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0694*** 
(0.0016)  
-0.3869*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.5485*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.1506*** 
(0.0146) 
0.5983*** 
(0.0213) 
Year Dummy          
2003 -0.5264*** (0.0016) 
-0.8237*** 
(0.0022) 
1.0305*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.3821*** 
(0.0021)  
0.7356*** 
(0.0126) 
0.3343 
(.) 
0.9739 
(.) 
1.0167*** 
(0.0321) 
2004 -0.3117*** (0.0016) 
-0.4971*** 
(0.0019) 
0.7023*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.2521*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.2280*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.9445 
(.) 
1.2676 
(.) 
-1.7591*** 
(0.0272) 
2005 -0.1102*** (0.0016) 
-0.0723*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0595*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0459*** 
(0.0018)   
0.0121 
(0.0108) 
-0.6261*** 
(0.0107) 
0.5917*** 
(0.0187) 
-1.2033*** 
(0.0222) 
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Table 12B.  (Continued) 
Diabetes 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Use>0 
Pr. Useboth|Use>0   Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
2006 0.0333*** (0.0016) 
-0.0993*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0585*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0637*** 
(0.0017)  
0.6926*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.5379*** 
(0.0096) 
0.2526*** 
(0.0179) 
1.7944*** 
(0.0203) 
Intercept -1.1167*** (0.0049) 
-0.7831*** 
(0.0065) 
0.9204*** 
(0.0064) 
-1.7524*** 
(0.0069)  
4.2577*** 
(0.0428) 
3.8754 
(.) 
4.7937*** 
(0.0517) 
3.4979*** 
(0.1376) 
Sigma      
8.2536*** 
(0.0029) 
5.2630*** 
(0.0028) 
7.4113*** 
(0.0037) 
9.2470*** 
(0.0081) 
Rho           -0.2145*** (0.0016) 
-0.0023 
(0.1128) 
-0.0028 
(0.1891) 
-0.1857*** 
(0.0049) 
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Table 13A.  Regression Results from Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates for the Depression Sample) 
Depression 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Insurance and Utilization 
HINDC 0.4513*** (0.0022) 
-0.0629*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.1617*** 
(0.0031) 
0.4465*** 
(0.0038)  
0.1125*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0901*** 
(0.006) 
0.3148*** 
(0.0034) 
0.4528*** 
(0.0092) 
HIWDC 0.6089*** (0.0012) 
-0.18*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0106*** 
(0.0018) 
0.3093*** 
(0.0024)  
-0.8502*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.6128*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.4295*** 
(0.002) 
-0.8783*** 
(0.0062) 
HMODC 0.5294*** (0.0013) 
-0.0584*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.1254*** 
(0.002) 
0.338*** 
(0.0026)  
-0.8834*** 
(0.002) 
-0.715*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.4602*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.8224*** 
(0.0066) 
HINDC*Obnum 0.033*** (0.0004) 
-0.0397*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0105*** 
(0.0003) 
0.031*** 
(0.0004)  
0.004*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0632*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0312*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0191*** 
(0.0004) 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.0158*** (0.0001) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0092*** 
(0.0001)  
0.0086*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0135*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0166*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0084*** 
(0.0002) 
HMODC*Obnum 0.0279*** (0.0001) 
-0.0027*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0067*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0124*** 
(0.0001)  
0.0019*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0086*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0156*** 
(0.0001) 
0.011*** 
(0.0002) 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.0642*** (0.0002) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0084*** 
(0.0002) 
0.008*** 
(0.0002)  
-0.0068*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0275*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0163*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0327*** 
(0.0005) 
Demographic 
Age 0.0107*** (0) 
0.005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0001)  
-0.0032*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0056*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
Female 0.2441*** (0.0008) 
0.1097*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.2062*** 
(0.0011) 
0.188*** 
(0.0014)  
-0.0578*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1078*** 
(0.0024) 
0.1211*** 
(0.0013) 
0.1625*** 
(0.0034) 
Black -0.6743*** (0.0017) 
-0.0834*** 
(0.0034) 
0.0381*** 
(0.003) 
0.0404*** 
(0.0035)  
-0.0582*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.2963*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.7427*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.48*** 
(0.0056) 
Hispanic -0.2574*** (0.0014) 
0.0515*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0027 
(0.0021) 
-0.0849*** 
(0.0027)  
-0.142*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.3865*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.3327*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1204*** 
(0.0047) 
Mid Income -0.0148*** (0.0009) 
0.0342*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0249*** 
(0.0014)  
-0.0211*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.027*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0336*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0894*** 
(0.0023) 
Low Income -0.1231*** (0.0014) 
0.0618*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0374*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0232*** 
(0.0023)   
0.2142*** 
(0.0019) 
0.2206*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1964*** 
(0.002) 
-0.2868*** 
(0.0039) 
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Table 13A.  (Continued) 
Depression 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expboth|Exp>0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
Ln(Expgenonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Near Poor -0.1162*** (0.0023) 
-0.0574*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0892*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0526*** 
(0.0043)  
0.338*** 
(0.0033) 
0.7946*** 
(0.0069) 
0.0539*** 
(0.0035) 
0.1561*** 
(0.0072) 
Poor -0.1523*** (0.0016) 
0.0402*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0611*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.1473*** 
(0.0031)  
0.323*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0971*** 
(0.0047) 
0.2685*** 
(0.0026) 
0.153*** 
(0.0055) 
Married 0.1195*** (0.0011) 
-0.0065*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1198*** 
(0.0015) 
0.2139*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.0436*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.128*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0974*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1235*** 
(0.0044) 
Divorced -0.0719*** (0.0012) 
0.0081*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0343*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0594*** 
(0.0021)  
0.036*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1092*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0034* 
(0.0018) 
0.0251*** 
(0.0036) 
Household 0.0083*** (0.0003) 
-0.0538*** 
(0.0005) 
0.074*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0501*** 
(0.0006)  
0.0089*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0692*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0026*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0213*** 
(0.0011) 
Education          
High School 0.1071*** (0.0009) 
0.003** 
(0.0014) 
0.0373*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0824*** 
(0.0015)  
-0.1375*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0084*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0579*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.086*** 
(0.0027) 
BA 0.1173*** (0.0012) 
0.0126*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0025 
(0.0015) 
-0.0421*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.0706*** 
(0.0016) 
0.3018*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0689*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0251*** 
(0.003) 
MA 0.1291*** (0.0016) 
-0.1352*** 
(0.0022) 
0.058*** 
(0.002) 
0.0875*** 
(0.0023)  
0.0531*** 
(0.002) 
0.2943*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0842*** 
(0.0021) 
0.107*** 
(0.0038) 
Empolyment          
Employed -0.0026* (0.0013) 
0.0695*** 
(0.0021) 
0.1339*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.3019*** 
(0.0022)  
-0.1103*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0149*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.087*** 
(0.002) 
-0.1743*** 
(0.0053) 
Unemployed -0.0116*** (0.0016) 
0.1003*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0144*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0891*** 
(0.0025)  
-0.1928*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1073*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.1846*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.2015*** 
(0.0041) 
Selfemployed 0.0382*** (0.0014) 
-0.0388*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0103*** 
(0.0019) 
0.056*** 
(0.0024)  
0.0832*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.1217*** 
(0.0037) 
0.2324*** 
(0.002) 
0.1498*** 
(0.0042) 
Union 0.0278*** (0.0013) 
-0.1771*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0958*** 
(0.0017) 
0.086*** 
(0.0021)  
-0.1449*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0466*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.3336*** 
(0.0018) 
0.1924*** 
(0.0036) 
Sicpay 0.1069*** (0.0013) 
0.0151*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0499*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0709*** 
(0.0021)   
-0.1459*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0556*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0707*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0361*** 
(0.0038) 
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Table 13A.  (Continued) 
Depression 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expboth|Exp>0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
Ln(Expgenonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Payvac -0.0601*** (0.0014) 
0.0989*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0594*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0154*** 
(0.0022)   
0.0844*** 
(0.0018) 
0.1239*** 
(0.0035) 
0.1103*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0916*** 
(0.0039) 
Regions          
Midwest 0.0016 (0.0012) 
-0.0196*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0795*** 
(0.0016) 
0.1506*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.0087*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.3959*** 
(0.0029) 
0.011*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0735*** 
(0.0037) 
South 0.0778*** (0.0012) 
-0.2537*** 
(0.0017) 
0.1394*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0903*** 
(0.0019)  
0.0086*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.2184*** 
(0.0036) 
0.037*** 
(0.0017) 
0.1095*** 
(0.0033) 
West -0.0925*** (0.0012) 
0.022*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0804*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0932*** 
(0.002)  
-0.0103*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.184*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0729*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0297*** 
(0.0035) 
Urban -0.1618*** (0.001) 
-0.0927*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0382*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0574*** 
(0.0016)  
0.1935*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0273*** 
(0.0025) 
0.106*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0982*** 
(0.0028) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Health 0.0447*** (0.0011) 
-0.0521*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1087*** 
(0.0016) 
0.31*** 
(0.0021)  
0.2222*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0516*** 
(0.003) 
0.3235*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0227*** 
(0.0058) 
Good Health 0.084*** (0.0012) 
-0.0445*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1111*** 
(0.0016) 
0.318*** 
(0.0021)  
0.1999*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0247*** 
(0.003) 
0.285*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0759*** 
(0.0059) 
Fair Health 0.1647*** (0.0014) 
-0.0164*** 
(0.002) 
-0.22*** 
(0.0019) 
0.4407*** 
(0.0024)  
0.1504*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.047*** 
(0.0036) 
0.3337*** 
(0.0022) 
0.1275*** 
(0.0074) 
Poor Health 0.2059*** (0.002) 
-0.0741*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.099*** 
(0.0025) 
0.3395*** 
(0.0031)  
0.1014*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.27*** 
(0.005) 
0.426*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.2234*** 
(0.0069) 
Limit 0.2770*** (0.0017) 
-0.039*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0994*** 
(0.0021) 
0.1750*** 
(0.0024)  
-0.0468*** 
(0.0022) 
0.2496*** 
(0.004) 
0.1091*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0559*** 
(0.0042) 
Coglim 0.0157*** (0.0013) 
0.0633*** 
(0.002) 
-0.1094*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0637*** 
(0.002)  
0.0615*** 
(0.0018) 
0.2623*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0407*** 
(0.002) 
0.2181*** 
(0.0034) 
MCS -0.0030*** (0.0000) 
0.0089*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0062*** 
(0.0001)   
-0.0013*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0038*** 
(0.0001) 
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Table 13A.  (Continued) 
Depression 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Conditions - - - -  
0.0135*** 
(0.001) 
0.0745*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0305*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1582*** 
(0.0023) 
Risk Preference          
Adrisk -0.2178*** (0.001) 
-0.0154*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0891*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.1127*** 
(0.0018)  
0.1089*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.007** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0276*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0261*** 
(0.0034) 
Adsmok -0.058*** (0.0009) 
-0.1291*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0593*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2508*** 
(0.0014)  
0.0629*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.1265*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0128*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0384*** 
(0.004) 
Year Dummy          
2003 -0.432*** (0.0012) 
-0.7405*** 
(0.0019) 
0.8291*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.4065*** 
(0.0022)  
0.3079*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0696*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.1135*** 
(0.003) 
-0.1721*** 
(0.0067) 
2004 -0.3028*** (0.0012) 
-0.6635*** 
(0.0018) 
0.6771*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.24*** 
(0.002)  
0.2146*** 
(0.0016) 
0.1441*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.1502*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.1497*** 
(0.0045) 
2005 -0.0729*** (0.0012) 
-0.4201*** 
(0.0016) 
0.3767*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0451*** 
(0.0018)  
0.2109*** 
(0.0015) 
0.1619*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0147*** 
(0.0021) 
0.1199*** 
(0.0029) 
2006 -0.0225*** (0.0012) 
-0.1479*** 
(0.0015) 
0.072*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0945*** 
(0.0017)  
0.2283*** 
(0.0015) 
0.3061*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0742*** 
(0.0018) 
0.3461*** 
(0.0031) 
Intercept -0.6557*** (0.0035) 
-0.6828*** 
(0.0052) 
0.5148*** 
(0.0048) 
-1.6456*** 
(0.0061)  
5.9797*** 
(0.0052) 
4.0767*** 
(0.0165) 
4.7182*** 
(0.0059) 
6.2146*** 
(0.0368) 
Sigma      
1.4228*** 
(0.0008) 
1.1686*** 
(0.0007) 
1.0859*** 
(0.0004) 
-1.6456 
(0.0061) 
Rho           0.7696*** (0.0008) 
-0.0485*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0454*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0143 
(0.0184) 
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Table 13B.  Regression Results from Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates for the Depression Sample) 
Depression 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Use>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Insurance and Utilization 
HINDC 0.45*** (0.0022) 
-0.0767*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.1208*** 
(0.0031) 
0.4196*** 
(0.0037)  
-0.322*** 
(0.0128) 
-2.1355*** 
(0.0234) 
0.1867*** 
(0.0141) 
1.0828*** 
(0.0615) 
HIWDC 0.5904*** (0.0012) 
-0.2497*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0274*** 
(0.0018) 
0.3491*** 
(0.0023)  
0.7178*** 
(0.008) 
0.3248*** 
(0.0148) 
1.0717*** 
(0.0081) 
0.7831*** 
(0.0437) 
HMODC 0.5179*** (0.0013) 
-0.1271*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0767*** 
(0.0019) 
0.3609*** 
(0.0025)  
0.8801*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.3875*** 
(0.014) 
1.4931*** 
(0.0087) 
0.2655*** 
(0.0456) 
HINDC*Obnum 0.0294*** (0.0004) 
-0.047*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0083*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0308*** 
(0.0003)  
0.2056*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0635*** 
(0.0067) 
0.1152*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0919*** 
(0.0026) 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.0177*** (0.0001) 
-0.0124*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0088*** 
(0.0001)  
0.1053*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0117*** 
(0.001) 
0.1161*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0683*** 
(0.0014) 
HMODC*Obnum 0.0307*** (0.0001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0055*** 
(0.0001) 
0.011*** 
(0.0001)  
0.0371*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0461*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0132*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0504*** 
(0.0015) 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.07*** (0.0002) 
-0.0076*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0201*** 
(0.0002)  
0.0952*** 
(0.0007) 
0.149*** 
(0.0013) 
0.1158*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0359*** 
(0.0026) 
Demographic 
Age 0.0105*** (0) 
0.0049*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0068*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0045*** 
(0.0001)  
0.0341*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0387*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0327*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0319*** 
(0.0009) 
Female 0.2338*** (0.0008) 
0.0506*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.1554*** 
(0.0011) 
0.1788*** 
(0.0014)  
1.1109*** 
(0.0048) 
1.261*** 
(0.0091) 
0.8415*** 
(0.0052) 
1.3704*** 
(0.0233) 
Black -0.6454*** (0.0017) 
0.0244*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0047* 
(0.0029) 
-0.0319*** 
(0.0034)  
-1.7474*** 
(0.0123) 
-1.3666*** 
(0.0216) 
-2.5754*** 
(0.0127) 
-0.665*** 
(0.0398) 
Hispanic -0.2873*** (0.0014) 
0.0044* 
(0.0023) 
0.0482*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.1048*** 
(0.0027)  
-1.1099*** 
(0.0088) 
-1.9255*** 
(0.0157) 
-0.946*** 
(0.0092) 
-1.7022*** 
(0.0344) 
Mid Income -0.0372*** (0.0009) 
0.0081*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0234*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0303*** 
(0.0014)  
0.0732*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0268*** 
(0.0091) 
0.1183*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0813*** 
(0.0168) 
Low Income -0.1593*** (0.0014) 
0.0409*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0045** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0454*** 
(0.0023)   
0.6232*** 
(0.0079) 
0.9069*** 
(0.0144) 
0.2995*** 
(0.0084) 
1.7965*** 
(0.0283) 
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Table 13B.  (Continued) 
Depression 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Exp>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Near Poor -0.0574*** (0.0023) 
0.0916*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0261*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0589*** 
(0.004)  
0.5219*** 
(0.0136) 
0.9002*** 
(0.0245) 
-0.0634*** 
(0.0147) 
3.3164*** 
(0.05) 
Poor -0.1569*** (0.0017) 
0.0438*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0896*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.2001*** 
(0.0031)  
0.275*** 
(0.0099) 
0.1648*** 
(0.0183) 
0.2969*** 
(0.0106) 
3.0903*** 
(0.0416) 
Married 0.1394*** (0.0011) 
0.0213*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1187*** 
(0.0015) 
0.1735*** 
(0.0019)  
0.41*** 
(0.0062) 
0.1967*** 
(0.0119) 
0.3702*** 
(0.0067) 
0.4352*** 
(0.0281) 
Divorced -0.0626*** (0.0012) 
0.0504*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0446*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0168*** 
(0.002)  
0.3625*** 
(0.0069) 
-0.287*** 
(0.0126) 
0.1371*** 
(0.0075) 
1.4013*** 
(0.0248) 
Household 0.0064*** (0.0003) 
-0.0636*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0713*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0373*** 
(0.0005)  
0.031*** 
(0.0018) 
0.1258*** 
(0.0043) 
0.1051*** 
(0.002) 
-0.1972*** 
(0.0074) 
Education          
High School 0.1147*** (0.0009) 
-0.0343*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0588*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.073*** 
(0.0015)  
-0.1734*** 
(0.0051) 
0.1851*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.1119*** 
(0.0056) 
-0.2488*** 
(0.0185) 
BA 0.1097*** (0.0012) 
-0.0356*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0171*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.01*** 
(0.0018)  
-0.2789*** 
(0.0063) 
0.4054*** 
(0.0117) 
-0.4832*** 
(0.0069) 
0.0298 
(0.0213) 
MA 0.1455*** (0.0016) 
-0.1705*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0425*** 
(0.002) 
0.149*** 
(0.0023)  
0.7611*** 
(0.0082) 
1.1587*** 
(0.0169) 
-0.3112*** 
(0.0088) 
3.5873*** 
(0.0292) 
Empolyment          
Employed 0.0367*** (0.0014) 
0.0967*** 
(0.0021) 
0.1074*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.2886*** 
(0.0022)  
-0.4348*** 
(0.0076) 
0.9221*** 
(0.0158) 
0.0653*** 
(0.0083) 
-0.9681*** 
(0.0364) 
Unemployed 0.0299*** (0.0016) 
0.1234*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0621*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0464*** 
(0.0025)  
-0.4004*** 
(0.0089) 
0.7619*** 
(0.018) 
-0.2081*** 
(0.0098) 
-1.1801*** 
(0.029) 
Selfemployed 0.0292*** (0.0014) 
-0.0849*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0193*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0968*** 
(0.0023)  
-0.0898*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.9586*** 
(0.0149) 
0.1041*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.4*** 
(0.03) 
Union 0.0246*** (0.0013) 
-0.1543*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1049*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0435*** 
(0.0021)  
0.4106*** 
(0.0071) 
0.6637*** 
(0.0146) 
-0.0581*** 
(0.0076) 
2.0845*** 
(0.025) 
Sicpay 0.112*** (0.0013) 
-0.0015 
(0.0019) 
-0.0698*** 
(0.0017) 
0.1232*** 
(0.0021)   
-0.1204*** 
(0.0071) 
0.0886*** 
(0.0132) 
-0.6144*** 
(0.0075) 
1.9688*** 
(0.0288) 
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Table 13B.  (Continued) 
Depression 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Use>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Payvac -0.0496*** (0.0014) 
0.1028*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0524*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0359*** 
(0.0022)   
0.4147*** 
(0.0074) 
0.9674*** 
(0.0143) 
0.3775*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.6398*** 
(0.0277) 
Regions          
Midwest -0.0085*** (0.0012) 
-0.0098*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0385*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0727*** 
(0.0019)  
0.2258*** 
(0.0065) 
-1.0818*** 
(0.0117) 
0.6196*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.9919*** 
(0.0231) 
South 0.1027*** (0.0012) 
-0.2258*** 
(0.0016) 
0.1467*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0463*** 
(0.0018)  
-0.3793*** 
(0.0063) 
-1.3848*** 
(0.0139) 
0.1576*** 
(0.0069) 
-1.8484*** 
(0.0223) 
West -0.1005*** (0.0012) 
0.0366*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0524*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0303*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.3132*** 
(0.0067) 
-1.0887*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.1119*** 
(0.0074) 
-1.1152*** 
(0.0231) 
Urban -0.1785*** (0.0011) 
-0.0724*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0304*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0431*** 
(0.0016)  
0.3362*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0328*** 
(0.01) 
0.432*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0778*** 
(0.0195) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Health 0.0518*** (0.0012) 
-0.06*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1126*** 
(0.0016) 
0.3214*** 
(0.0021)  
0.6596*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0955*** 
(0.012) 
0.664*** 
(0.0069) 
-1.2165*** 
(0.0411) 
Good Health 0.111*** (0.0012) 
-0.0509*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1242*** 
(0.0016) 
0.3461*** 
(0.0021)  
0.4417*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.2812*** 
(0.0123) 
0.4762*** 
(0.007) 
-1.5649*** 
(0.0431) 
Fair Health 0.184*** (0.0014) 
-0.0294*** 
(0.002) 
-0.2084*** 
(0.0019) 
0.4378*** 
(0.0024)  
1.055*** 
(0.008) 
-0.0278* 
(0.0144) 
1.1477*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.3724*** 
(0.0515) 
Poor Health 0.2907*** (0.002) 
-0.0331*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.1288*** 
(0.0025) 
0.3391*** 
(0.003)  
0.5034*** 
(0.0105) 
0.2826*** 
(0.019) 
0.6191*** 
(0.0115) 
-2.0958*** 
(0.0492) 
Limit 0.3088*** (0.0018) 
-0.0362*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1162*** 
(0.002) 
0.204*** 
(0.0023)  
0.6165*** 
(0.0087) 
0.883*** 
(0.0156) 
0.2135*** 
(0.0101) 
0.6151*** 
(0.0313) 
Coglim 0.0221*** (0.0013) 
0.0499*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.112*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0703*** 
(0.002)  
0.8303*** 
(0.0072) 
0.5273*** 
(0.0129) 
0.0059 
(0.0083) 
3.4357*** 
(0.0241) 
MCS -0.0035*** (0) 
0.008*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0025*** 
(0) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.0001)   
0.0122*** 
(0.0002) 
0.021*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0125*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0023** 
(0.0009) 
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Table 13B.  (Continued) 
Depression 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Use>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Conditions - - - -  
0.359*** 
(0.0047) 
0.4663*** 
(0.0086) 
0.4681*** 
(0.0052) 
0.9833*** 
(0.0162) 
Risk Preference          
Adrisk -0.2142*** (0.001) 
-0.0234*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0678*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0706*** 
(0.0017)  
0.1302*** 
(0.0059) 
0.1153*** 
(0.011) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0368* 
(0.0218) 
Adsmok -0.049*** (0.0009) 
-0.0961*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0805*** 
(0.0012) 
0.2422*** 
(0.0014)  
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.755*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0895*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0303 
(0.0274) 
Year Dummy          
2003 -0.4797*** (0.0012) 
-0.7596*** 
(0.0019) 
0.8406*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.3942*** 
(0.0021)  
-0.8187*** 
(0.0073) 
-1.0981*** 
(0.0293) 
-0.5921*** 
(0.0118) 
-0.3443*** 
(0.0459) 
2004 -0.3104*** (0.0012) 
-0.6748*** 
(0.0017) 
0.6456*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1695*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.7843*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0852*** 
(0.0256) 
-0.81*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.858*** 
(0.0272) 
2005 -0.0839*** (0.0012) 
-0.3948*** 
(0.0015) 
0.3701*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0589*** 
(0.0018)  
-0.2476*** 
(0.0062) 
0.3953*** 
(0.0166) 
-0.2884*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.649*** 
(0.0215) 
2006 -0.0577*** (0.0012) 
-0.164*** 
(0.0015) 
0.068*** 
(0.0014) 
0.1233*** 
(0.0017)  
0.2159*** 
(0.0062) 
0.1462*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.1121*** 
(0.0074) 
0.5104*** 
(0.023) 
Intercept -0.6075*** (0.0035) 
-0.5363*** 
(0.0051) 
0.4171*** 
(0.0048) 
-1.6635*** 
(0.0059)  
2.9471*** 
(0.0223) 
1.7427*** 
(0.0624) 
1.1132*** 
(0.0245) 
8.6834*** 
(0.2545) 
Sigma      
5.4318*** 
(0.0017) 
4.7594*** 
(0.0026) 
4.5290*** 
(0.0015) 
6.9507*** 
(0.0046) 
Rho           -0.1724*** (0.0017) 
-0.0030 
(0.0092) 
-0.0115*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0008 
(0.0171) 
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Table 14A.  Regression Results from Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates for the Asthma Sample) 
Asthma 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 Pr. Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Insurance and Utilization 
HINDC 0.1265*** (0.0024) 
0.5973*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.6407*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0641*** 
(0.0068)  
-0.3167*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.3855*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.1799*** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0011 
(0.0120) 
HIWDC 0.1827*** (0.0014) 
-0.2245*** 
(0.0032) 
0.1781*** 
(0.0035) 
0.1334*** 
(0.0043)  
-0.6927*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.5858*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.5356*** 
(0.0061) 
-1.0473*** 
(0.0073) 
HMODC 0.2926*** (0.0015) 
0.0375*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.1995*** 
(0.0037) 
0.1834*** 
(0.0045)  
-0.6721*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.5223*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.7733*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.7871*** 
(0.0073) 
HINDC*Obnum 0.2837*** (0.0016) 
-0.2813*** 
(0.0029) 
0.1599*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0448*** 
(0.0013)  
-0.0326*** 
(0.0010) 
0.2379*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0938*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0186*** 
(0.0027) 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.1841*** (0.0004) 
0.0157*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0144*** 
(0.0005)  
-0.0237*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0511*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0305*** 
(0.0008) 
HMODC*Obnum 0.1464*** (0.0004) 
-0.0291*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0386*** 
(0.0004)  
0.0133*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0162*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0249*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.2912*** (0.0009) 
0.0706*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0907*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0077*** 
(0.0019)  
-0.0210*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0664*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0206*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0129*** 
(0.0034) 
Demographic          
Age 0.0000 (0.0000) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0030*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0001)  
0.0035*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0092*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0055*** 
(0.0002) 
Female 0.0148*** (0.0009) 
-0.1068*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0647*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1268*** 
(0.0023)  
-0.2315*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.2920*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.2571*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.3182*** 
(0.0041) 
Black -0.1263*** (0.0014) 
0.0258*** 
(0.0029) 
0.1198*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.1582*** 
(0.0037)  
0.0997*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0163*** 
(0.0025) 
0.3549*** 
(0.0056) 
-0.0777*** 
(0.0062) 
Hispanic -0.0635*** (0.0015) 
0.2456*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0474*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.5764*** 
(0.0049)  
-0.3743*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.2982*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.5862*** 
(0.0060) 
0.6217*** 
(0.0088) 
Mid Income -0.0477*** (0.0009) 
0.1144*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0935*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1395*** 
(0.0024)  
0.0645*** 
(0.0015) 
0.1215*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0348*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1797*** 
(0.0041) 
Low Income -0.1495*** (0.0015) 
0.0773*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0035 
(0.0036) 
-0.1397*** 
(0.0043)   
-0.0189*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0068** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0941*** 
(0.0067) 
0.4407*** 
(0.0074) 
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Table 14A.  (Continued) 
Asthma 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 Pr. Expbraonly|Exp>0 Pr. Expboth|Exp>0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
Ln(Expgenonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Near Poor -0.0439*** (0.0027) 
0.3646*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.3268*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.2180*** 
(0.0085)  
0.4925*** 
(0.0047) 
0.7223*** 
(0.0047) 
-1.2236*** 
(0.0155) 
0.5313*** 
(0.0158) 
Poor -0.1665*** (0.0019) 
-0.3192*** 
(0.0038) 
0.2498*** 
(0.0040) 
0.1793*** 
(0.0048)  
0.1249*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0478*** 
(0.0037) 
0.3397*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.4881*** 
(0.0084) 
Married 0.0472*** (0.0011) 
-0.2890*** 
(0.0024) 
0.1640*** 
(0.0027) 
0.3146*** 
(0.0032)  
0.0885*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0170*** 
(0.0022) 
0.3243*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.1126*** 
(0.0054) 
Divorced 0.0096*** (0.0014) 
-0.3466*** 
(0.0029) 
0.1496*** 
(0.0033) 
0.4128*** 
(0.0037)  
0.2864*** 
(0.0024) 
0.1949*** 
(0.0029) 
0.5602*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.4441*** 
(0.0065) 
Household -0.0162*** (0.0003) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0186*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0739*** 
(0.0009)  
0.0024*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0567*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.1240*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0102*** 
(0.0018) 
Education          
High School -0.0421*** (0.0010) 
-0.1471*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0548*** 
(0.0021) 
0.1462*** 
(0.0025)  
0.0627*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0102*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0258*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0589*** 
(0.0041) 
BA -0.0805*** (0.0012) 
0.0819*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0024 
(0.0026) 
-0.2402*** 
(0.0033)  
-0.1107*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0230*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.7070*** 
(0.0050) 
0.2915*** 
(0.0059) 
MA -0.1718*** (0.0017) 
-0.3382*** 
(0.0034) 
0.2968*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1599*** 
(0.0044)  
0.0536*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0281*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.1833*** 
(0.0062) 
0.3564*** 
(0.0073) 
Empolyment          
Employed -0.1380*** (0.0015) 
-0.0157*** 
(0.0031) 
0.1250*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.1815*** 
(0.0040)  
0.2345*** 
(0.0025) 
0.3113*** 
(0.0025) 
0.2180*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0332*** 
(0.0072) 
Unemployed -0.0429*** (0.0018) 
-0.2501*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1569*** 
(0.0040) 
0.2306*** 
(0.0045)  
0.0885*** 
(0.0029) 
0.1677*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.4918*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.1825*** 
(0.0084) 
Selfemployed 0.0494*** (0.0016) 
-0.1494*** 
(0.0032) 
0.1067*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1161*** 
(0.0042)  
0.0071*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0869*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0792*** 
(0.0065) 
0.2434*** 
(0.0079) 
Union 0.0933*** (0.0013) 
-0.4668*** 
(0.0024) 
0.3151*** 
(0.0026) 
0.4418*** 
(0.0031)  
0.0674*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1577*** 
(0.0027) 
0.2299*** 
(0.0047) 
0.2125*** 
(0.0048) 
Sicpay 0.0326*** (0.0013) 
0.1010*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0347*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.1673*** 
(0.0035)   
-0.1416*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.1647*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0775*** 
(0.0057) 
0.0916*** 
(0.0065) 
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Table 14A.  (Continued) 
Asthma 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. Expboth|Exp>0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
Ln(Expgenonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Payvac 0.0346*** (0.0014) 
-0.1726*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0018 
(0.0032) 
0.3070*** 
(0.0038)   
0.0019 
(0.0024) 
-0.0361*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.1727*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.5018*** 
(0.0075) 
Regions          
Midwest -0.0656*** (0.0012) 
0.3608*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.4440*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0171*** 
(0.0030)  
0.1876*** 
(0.0019) 
0.2988*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.5178*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.0013 
(0.0051) 
South -0.1758*** (0.0011) 
0.0326*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1436*** 
(0.0024) 
0.1785*** 
(0.0029)  
0.0799*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0210*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.1818*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0278*** 
(0.0047) 
West -0.1252*** (0.0012) 
0.3394*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.5052*** 
(0.0027) 
0.1096*** 
(0.0032)  
-0.0189*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0714*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.4800*** 
(0.0050) 
0.1110*** 
(0.0053) 
Urban -0.0406*** (0.0012) 
-0.0643*** 
(0.0023) 
0.1493*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0724*** 
(0.0028)  
-0.0833*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0478*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.3566*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0296*** 
(0.0048) 
Health Characteristics 
Very Good Health 0.2476*** (0.0012) 
-0.2930*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0717*** 
(0.0028) 
0.9183*** 
(0.0052)  
0.1176*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0187*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0647*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.2535*** 
(0.0124) 
Good Health 0.3570*** (0.0012) 
-0.2502*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.1071*** 
(0.0028) 
0.8487*** 
(0.0052)  
0.1031*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0843*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.2469*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0593*** 
(0.0122) 
Fair Health 0.4662*** (0.0015) 
-0.3619*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0408*** 
(0.0033) 
0.9694*** 
(0.0056)  
0.1261*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0075** 
(0.0030) 
0.0004 
(0.0060) 
-0.3152*** 
(0.0132) 
Poor Health 0.5620*** (0.0024) 
-0.5535*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0477*** 
(0.0046) 
1.2577*** 
(0.0065)  
0.5522*** 
(0.0041) 
0.4293*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0260*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.1282*** 
(0.0148) 
Limit -0.0709*** (0.0025) 
0.1778*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0678*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.2366*** 
(0.0060)  
0.1649*** 
(0.0039) 
0.4198*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.6848*** 
(0.0090) 
1.0393*** 
(0.0107) 
Coglim -0.0675*** (0.0021) 
0.1590*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.1147*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0460*** 
(0.0051)  
-0.1100*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0791*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0755*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.3554*** 
(0.0090) 
Emphdx 0.0563*** (0.0027) 
-0.4965*** 
(0.0046) 
0.3465*** 
(0.0046) 
0.4824*** 
(0.0051)   
0.3945*** 
(0.0039) 
0.2333*** 
(0.0056) 
1.2073*** 
(0.0081) 
-0.3294*** 
(0.0076) 
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Table 14A.  (Continued) 
Asthma 
  Prob. of Expenditure > 0   Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
   Conditional on Exp > 0    Conditional on Exp > 0 
  Pr. Exp>0 Pr. Expgenonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expbraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Expboth|Exp>0 
  Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 Ln(Expgenonly)   |Exp>0 
Ln(Expbraonly)   
|Exp>0 
Ln(Expboth)   
|Exp>0 
Depression -0.1170*** (0.0012) 
-0.0707*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0408*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0373*** 
(0.0027)      
Conditions      
0.0049*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0254*** 
(0.0017) 
0.1944*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.3408*** 
(0.0038) 
Risk Preference          
Aspkfl 0.7617*** (0.001) 
-0.1521*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0496*** 
(0.0019) 
0.3569*** 
(0.0021)  
0.065*** 
(0.0032) 
0.3606*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1702*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.4751*** 
(0.004) 
Adrisk -0.0586*** (0.001) 
-0.0187*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0193*** 
(0.0024) 
0.025*** 
(0.0028)  
-0.1376*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1798*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.2436*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0386*** 
(0.005) 
Adsmok -0.0549*** (0.0011) 
-0.0375*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0391*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0181*** 
(0.0029)  
0.0782*** 
(0.0018) 
0.1362*** 
(0.002) 
-0.2099*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0495*** 
(0.005) 
Year Dummy          
2004 -0.1253*** (0.0013) 
0.2831*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.3027*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0794*** 
(0.0035)  
0.0028 
(0.0022) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0267*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.2547*** 
(0.006) 
2005 -0.0283*** (0.0013) 
0.4525*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.5346*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0631*** 
(0.0033)  
-0.0933*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0309*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.3553*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.662*** 
(0.0053) 
2006 0.1031*** (0.0013) 
0.6136*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.6963*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.125*** 
(0.0033)  
-0.0992*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0058** 
(0.003) 
-0.1518*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.1635*** 
(0.0056) 
2007 0.1299*** (0.0012) 
0.4137*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.6711*** 
(0.0026) 
0.1834*** 
(0.0031)  
0.1873*** 
(0.002) 
0.4567*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.4655*** 
(0.005) 
-1.0126*** 
(0.0056) 
Intercept -1.1587*** (0.0031) 
0.7155*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.6253*** 
(0.0072) 
-2.228*** 
(0.0096)  
4.3718*** 
(0.009966) 
3.1032*** 
(0.006336) 
3.9988*** 
(0.014134) 
8.4976*** 
(0.025147) 
Sigma      
1.1351*** 
(0.0015) 
0.9770*** 
(0.0008) 
1.4416*** 
(0.0033) 
1.2456*** 
(0.0049) 
Rho           -0.3834*** (0.0041) 
-0.1983*** 
(0.0065) 
0.8766*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.9128*** 
(0.0016) 
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Table 14B.   Regression Results from Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates for the Asthma Sample) 
Asthma 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Exp>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Insurance and Utilization 
HINDC 0.1111*** (0.0024) 
0.5824*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.4271*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0416*** 
(0.0067)  
0.5757*** 
(0.0140) 
0.2141*** 
(0.0164) 
-0.2239*** 
(0.0346) 
-0.9854*** 
(0.0625) 
HIWDC 0.1740*** (0.0014) 
-0.2418*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0866*** 
(0.0038) 
0.2062*** 
(0.0043)  
0.3235*** 
(0.0090) 
0.2874*** 
(0.0100) 
1.3828*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0503 
(0.0390) 
HMODC 0.2823*** (0.0015) 
0.0296*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.2307*** 
(0.0041) 
0.2566*** 
(0.0045)  
0.7601*** 
(0.0096) 
0.6755*** 
(0.0103) 
0.7712*** 
(0.0240) 
-0.0810** 
(0.0398) 
HINDC*Obnum 0.2759*** (0.0016) 
-0.2744*** 
(0.0028) 
0.1020*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0407*** 
(0.0013)  
-0.1424*** 
(0.0033) 
0.1392*** 
(0.0119) 
0.3823*** 
(0.0042) 
0.9059*** 
(0.0156) 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.1860*** (0.0004) 
0.0183*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0255*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0191*** 
(0.0005)  
0.0415*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0233*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0361*** 
(0.0018) 
0.2756*** 
(0.0040) 
HMODC*Obnum 0.1508*** (0.0004) 
-0.0284*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0148*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0436*** 
(0.0004)  
0.1562*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1115*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0301*** 
(0.0039) 
0.2848*** 
(0.0037) 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.3098*** (0.0009) 
0.0471*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0375*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0046** 
(0.0019)  
0.2599*** 
(0.0042) 
0.1881*** 
(0.0040) 
0.8203*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.9645*** 
(0.0182) 
Demographic 
Age 0.0001*** (0.0000) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0026*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0068*** 
(0.0001)  
0.0039*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0231*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0370*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0133*** 
(0.0009) 
Female 0.0136*** (0.0009) 
-0.1059*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0620*** 
(0.0020) 
0.1415*** 
(0.0023)  
-1.1143*** 
(0.0049) 
-1.1589*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.9064*** 
(0.0107) 
-2.7909*** 
(0.0227) 
Black -0.1071*** (0.0014) 
-0.0224*** 
(0.0028) 
0.2685*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0912*** 
(0.0036)  
0.5089*** 
(0.0080) 
0.6050*** 
(0.0090) 
1.8218*** 
(0.0181) 
-0.9991*** 
(0.0300) 
Hispanic -0.0520*** (0.0015) 
0.2051*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0355*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.5740*** 
(0.0048)  
-0.9953*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.7723*** 
(0.0089) 
-1.0605*** 
(0.0164) 
0.3501*** 
(0.0589) 
Mid Income -0.0456*** (0.0009) 
0.0942*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0871*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.1123*** 
(0.0024)  
0.5669*** 
(0.0053) 
0.6846*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0646*** 
(0.0118) 
2.3596*** 
(0.0213) 
Low Income -0.1553*** (0.0015) 
0.0668*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.2489*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.1349*** 
(0.0042)   
-0.2075*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0971*** 
(0.0099) 
-1.2360*** 
(0.0197) 
1.8715*** 
(0.0384) 
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Table 14B.  (Continued) 
Asthma 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Exp>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Near Poor -0.0576*** (0.0027) 
0.3547*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0992*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.1366*** 
(0.0083)  
2.3976*** 
(0.0164) 
2.9500*** 
(0.0169) 
-0.4489*** 
(0.0639) 
-2.9939*** 
(0.0835) 
Poor -0.1706*** (0.0019) 
-0.3326*** 
(0.0037) 
0.1600*** 
(0.0043) 
0.1900*** 
(0.0048)  
-0.2301*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0160 
(0.0130) 
-0.4066*** 
(0.0212) 
0.9609*** 
(0.0452) 
Married 0.0498*** (0.0011) 
-0.2818*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0117*** 
(0.0029) 
0.3200*** 
(0.0032)  
-0.0115* 
(0.0067) 
-0.2068*** 
(0.0076) 
0.3121*** 
(0.0165) 
1.5474*** 
(0.0322) 
Divorced 0.0154*** (0.0014) 
-0.3407*** 
(0.0029) 
0.2357*** 
(0.0033) 
0.4069*** 
(0.0037)  
0.7908*** 
(0.0083) 
0.3373*** 
(0.0097) 
1.8660*** 
(0.0197) 
1.6174*** 
(0.0400) 
Household -0.0140*** (0.0003) 
0.0502*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0014 
(0.0008) 
-0.0727*** 
(0.0009)  
0.0287*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0956*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1429*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0091 
(0.0094) 
Education          
High School -0.0394*** (0.0010) 
-0.1468*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0283*** 
(0.0023) 
0.1538*** 
(0.0025)  
-0.1700*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.4239*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0606*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0729*** 
(0.0226) 
BA -0.0761*** (0.0012) 
0.0604*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.1830*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.2158*** 
(0.0033)  
-0.3530*** 
(0.0069) 
-0.2260*** 
(0.0076) 
-1.1316*** 
(0.0163) 
-0.0411 
(0.0323) 
MA -0.1761*** (0.0017) 
-0.3507*** 
(0.0034) 
0.2168*** 
(0.0040) 
0.1842*** 
(0.0044)  
0.0829*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.2317*** 
(0.0122) 
-0.0622*** 
(0.0189) 
5.3938*** 
(0.0374) 
Empolyment          
Employed -0.1381*** (0.0015) 
-0.0175*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0984*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.1647*** 
(0.0039)  
0.5245*** 
(0.0085) 
0.8716*** 
(0.0091) 
0.2912*** 
(0.0235) 
-3.1197*** 
(0.0393) 
Unemployed -0.0397*** (0.0018) 
-0.2843*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1243*** 
(0.0044) 
0.2191*** 
(0.0045)  
1.4482*** 
(0.0100) 
1.3036*** 
(0.0112) 
0.2870*** 
(0.0256) 
1.5681*** 
(0.0453) 
Selfemployed 0.0534*** (0.0016) 
-0.1559*** 
(0.0032) 
0.2204*** 
(0.0037) 
0.1217*** 
(0.0042)  
-0.5604*** 
(0.0090) 
-1.0008*** 
(0.0099) 
0.8170*** 
(0.0197) 
1.2941*** 
(0.0416) 
Union 0.0765*** (0.0013) 
-0.4657*** 
(0.0024) 
0.3162*** 
(0.0029) 
0.3979*** 
(0.0030)  
0.2730*** 
(0.0070) 
-0.2691*** 
(0.0086) 
0.6608*** 
(0.0161) 
2.3135*** 
(0.0343) 
Sicpay 0.0381*** (0.0013) 
0.0871*** 
(0.0028) 
0.1489*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.1677*** 
(0.0035)   
0.0192** 
(0.0079) 
-0.1552*** 
(0.0089) 
1.6838*** 
(0.0184) 
-0.2136*** 
(0.0355) 
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Table 14B.  (Continued) 
Asthma 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Exp>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Payvac 0.0366*** (0.0014) 
-0.1737*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0394*** 
(0.0034) 
0.3266*** 
(0.0038)   
-0.2914*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.3550*** 
(0.0090) 
-1.3692*** 
(0.0197) 
-0.4717*** 
(0.0433) 
Regions          
Midwest -0.0483*** (0.0012) 
0.3368*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.5354*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0012 
(0.0030)  
0.3503*** 
(0.0065) 
0.4319*** 
(0.0075) 
-2.2338*** 
(0.0161) 
-0.6546*** 
(0.0251) 
South -0.1717*** (0.0011) 
0.0101*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0932*** 
(0.0027) 
0.1655*** 
(0.0029)  
0.2903*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0676*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.8852*** 
(0.0142) 
1.5471*** 
(0.0257) 
West -0.1197*** (0.0012) 
0.3262*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.3475*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0980*** 
(0.0032)  
0.0369*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.4437*** 
(0.0077) 
-1.0583*** 
(0.0161) 
0.4074*** 
(0.0269) 
Urban -0.0416*** (0.0012) 
-0.0787*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0400*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.1122*** 
(0.0028)  
-0.4391*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0805*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.6870*** 
(0.0148) 
-0.8629*** 
(0.0222) 
Health 
Characteristics          
Very Good Health 0.2469*** (0.0012) 
-0.2983*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0531*** 
(0.0031) 
1.0526*** 
(0.0056)  
0.8266*** 
(0.0077) 
0.3531*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0128 
(0.0159) 
1.9912*** 
(0.0948) 
Good Health 0.3545*** (0.0012) 
-0.2340*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0929*** 
(0.0030) 
0.9804*** 
(0.0056)  
1.2074*** 
(0.0080) 
0.8398*** 
(0.0082) 
0.1158*** 
(0.0163) 
1.9029*** 
(0.0909) 
Fair Health 0.4756*** (0.0015) 
-0.3494*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0384*** 
(0.0037) 
1.1023*** 
(0.0059)  
1.1489*** 
(0.0097) 
0.7023*** 
(0.0101) 
0.1272*** 
(0.0186) 
2.5423*** 
(0.0990) 
Poor Health 0.5555*** (0.0024) 
-0.5488*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0092* 
(0.0054) 
1.4081*** 
(0.0068)  
2.6825*** 
(0.0133) 
1.6908*** 
(0.0151) 
0.0201 
(0.0295) 
4.9596*** 
(0.1161) 
Limit -0.0737*** (0.0025) 
0.1578*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.1184*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.2146*** 
(0.0059)  
1.0564*** 
(0.0137) 
1.9812*** 
(0.0156) 
-1.9388*** 
(0.0327) 
7.8706*** 
(0.0544) 
Coglim -0.0758*** (0.0020) 
0.1633*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.2218*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0188*** 
(0.0050)  
-1.0543*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.8518*** 
(0.0127) 
-0.9293*** 
(0.0299) 
-7.0591*** 
(0.0458) 
Emphdx 0.0889*** (0.0027) 
-0.4672*** 
(0.0045) 
0.4367*** 
(0.0055) 
0.3024*** 
(0.0050)   
1.7936*** 
(0.0134) 
1.5170*** 
(0.0188) 
4.2457*** 
(0.0274) 
0.1810*** 
(0.0402) 
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Table 14B.  (Continued) 
Asthma 
  Prob. of Use > 0   Use|Use>0 
   Conditional on Use > 0    Conditional on Use > 0 
  Pr. Use>0 Pr. Usegenonly|Use>0 
Pr. 
Usebraonly|Exp>0 
Pr. 
Useboth|Exp>0 
  Use|Use>0 Usegenonly|Use>0 Usebraonly|Use>0 Useboth|Use>0 
Depression -0.1252*** (0.0012) 
-0.0773*** 
(0.0024) 
0.1703*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0004 
(0.0030)      
Conditions      
-0.2834*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.2622*** 
(0.0063) 
0.9164*** 
(0.0106) 
-2.5620*** 
(0.0203) 
Risk Preference          
Aspkfl 0.7727*** (0.0010) 
-0.1532*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.1427*** 
(0.0021) 
0.3334*** 
(0.0021)  
0.4631*** 
(0.0078) 
0.9224*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.5482*** 
(0.0109) 
-1.6875*** 
(0.0281) 
Adrisk -0.0442*** (0.0010) 
0.0008 
(0.0021) 
-0.1802*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0751*** 
(0.0027)  
-0.7181*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.9545*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.5481*** 
(0.0142) 
-1.6397*** 
(0.0256) 
Adsmok -0.0402*** (0.0011) 
-0.0531*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0392*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0279*** 
(0.0028)  
0.4727*** 
(0.0064) 
0.7605*** 
(0.0073) 
-0.4211*** 
(0.0154) 
-0.0780*** 
(0.0245) 
Year Dummy          
2004 -0.1474*** (0.0013) 
0.2925*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0686*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0371*** 
(0.0035)  
-0.1965*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.3184*** 
(0.0090) 
0.2409*** 
(0.0144) 
-1.1115*** 
(0.0298) 
2005 -0.0391*** (0.0013) 
0.4424*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.3693*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0414*** 
(0.0033)  
0.0870*** 
(0.0072) 
0.4652*** 
(0.0088) 
-1.0493*** 
(0.0155) 
-3.8804*** 
(0.0256) 
2006 0.0933*** (0.0013) 
0.6264*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.4289*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.1166*** 
(0.0033)  
0.2479*** 
(0.0069) 
0.4703*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.6881*** 
(0.0142) 
-2.4380*** 
(0.0290) 
2007 0.1172*** (0.0012) 
0.4143*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.5283*** 
(0.0030) 
0.2512*** 
(0.0031)  
-0.1696*** 
(0.0069) 
0.1950*** 
(0.0083) 
-1.6711*** 
(0.0163) 
-4.2578*** 
(0.0300) 
Intercept -1.1629*** (0.0031) 
0.7886*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.4244*** 
(0.0079) 
-2.4773*** 
(0.0098)  
2.9819*** 
(0.0259) 
1.4269*** 
(0.0206) 
-0.0131 
(0.0429) 
11.5209*** 
(0.2464) 
Sigma      
3.8682*** 
(0.0019) 
3.5370*** 
(0.0018) 
4.3167 
(0.0098) 
4.2785*** 
(0.0051) 
Rho           -0.1299*** (0.0029) 
-0.0872 
(0.0026) 
0.0921 
(0.3252) 
-0.0072 
(0.0190) 
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Table 15A.  Marginal Percentage Impacts of Selected Explanatory Variables on 
Insurance Choices among Non-elderly Adults with Hypertension 
Results from the First Equation in the Hypertension Sample 
Variable Name Uninsured HINDC HIWDC HMODC 
Female -17.964 12.432 -7.119 -0.932 
Black 27.135 -5.805 -27.570 16.149 
Hispanic 68.194 -4.301 -44.295 0.708 
Mid Income 32.349 6.423 -10.764 -11.572 
Low Income 86.248 1.814 -34.623 -32.456 
Near Poor 96.955 -13.688 -41.115 -29.111 
Poor 101.276 11.327 -48.683 -67.798 
Married -35.769 -21.144 38.851 7.910 
Divorced -4.930 8.144 0.319 -8.127 
Household 3.716 6.324 -5.862 -1.664 
High School -23.948 -6.561 4.446 12.600 
BA -38.471 18.639 2.193 -11.564 
MA -70.886 -5.599 12.752 14.663 
Employed -9.747 4.495 -12.130 10.157 
Unemployed -22.618 3.984 7.241 -3.055 
Selfemployed 3.755 23.842 -9.487 -25.387 
Union -39.956 -2.450 1.509 14.096 
Sicpay -71.612 -9.155 20.605 22.246 
Payvac -70.634 -19.183 27.316 29.629 
Urban -24.074 -9.993 1.538 16.143 
Very Good Health -11.691 -5.393 -1.404 11.374 
Good Health 7.345 -11.430 -3.352 12.611 
Fair Health 34.661 -13.266 -4.835 3.264 
Poor Health 45.107 -18.620 -2.504 -0.304 
Limit -33.287 2.960 -9.293 14.465 
Coglim 18.859 30.173 -12.379 -44.517 
Chddx -27.364 16.972 -12.013 -1.427 
Midx -14.626 -22.496 11.715 16.163 
Angidx 16.012 10.467 -17.320 -5.092 
Ohrtdx -11.179 -12.455 13.230 5.048 
Strkdx -36.700 14.624 11.238 -17.545 
Conditions -0.121 -1.551 -3.120 4.479 
Adrisk 3.898 13.249 -10.182 -8.785 
Adsmok 34.909 -7.996 -6.378 -0.920 
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Table 15B.  Marginal Percentage Impacts of Selected Explanatory Variables on 
Insurance Choices among Non-elderly Adults with Diabetes 
Results from the First Equation in the Diabetes Sample 
Variable Name Uninsured HINDC HIWDC HMODC 
Female -15.725 -12.870 -3.827 11.300 
Black 2.342 37.426 -54.393 -24.346 
Hispanic 73.781 -19.556 -44.198 10.721 
Mid Income 30.885 11.272 -2.456 -10.825 
Low Income 98.564 -13.613 -13.036 -3.914 
Near Poor 99.656 15.572 -56.101 -22.708 
Poor 128.975 2.484 -21.730 -31.238 
Married -32.410 -48.672 28.653 39.523 
Divorced 18.672 -50.656 4.806 25.615 
Household -2.132 7.894 -8.457 -2.382 
High School -26.652 14.254 2.688 -8.287 
BA -17.557 29.403 7.943 -25.719 
MA 36.043 -61.058 30.492 21.310 
Employed -16.241 49.869 -25.005 -24.257 
Unemployed -43.815 53.481 -18.385 -44.177 
Selfemployed -2.581 26.738 -9.155 -21.023 
Union -67.011 2.358 -9.804 4.987 
Sicpay -92.308 11.515 14.939 -1.933 
Payvac -71.274 -41.962 8.051 36.676 
Urban -64.252 -31.233 -15.310 38.936 
Very Good Health 26.331 -6.603 8.969 0.245 
Good Health 54.506 -21.468 18.883 5.948 
Fair Health 66.013 -2.759 23.698 -10.839 
Poor Health 85.519 -20.606 31.408 -6.238 
Limit -28.758 3.321 -18.962 3.251 
Coglim -16.840 47.543 -29.796 -42.922 
Chddx 11.091 -30.664 12.755 14.676 
Midx -61.994 -51.637 -14.527 31.902 
Angidx -28.553 56.050 -59.668 -52.901 
Ohrtdx -22.978 -17.168 -11.946 14.574 
Strkdx -35.951 -17.481 -0.806 13.553 
Dskidn -23.135 12.505 -22.770 -3.559 
Dseypr 1.196 23.073 -4.573 -18.362 
Conditions -18.539 -11.450 -7.069 11.336 
Adrisk 6.302 -2.216 -16.896 4.033 
Adsmok 40.754 -31.708 6.930 14.248 
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Table 15C.  Marginal Percentage Impacts of Selected Explanatory Variables on 
Insurance Choices among Non-elderly Adults with Depression 
Results from the First Equation in the Depression Sample 
Variable Name Uninsured HINDC HIWDC HMODC 
Female -43.775 -20.454 6.203 9.118 
Black 14.525 15.639 -58.902 12.724 
Hispanic 68.037 41.614 -53.543 -6.707 
Mid Income 54.575 -2.386 -17.224 -4.776 
Low Income 100.851 -7.228 -31.253 -23.966 
Near Poor 123.719 -36.714 -33.856 -53.223 
Poor 137.121 -42.356 -51.053 -61.528 
Married -55.435 -70.881 24.870 10.159 
Divorced 17.903 -63.578 15.152 -3.529 
Household 5.040 -6.406 -5.727 2.651 
High School -13.953 25.996 12.089 -5.195 
BA -8.585 34.773 14.932 -9.303 
MA -78.623 25.397 15.831 1.404 
Employed 6.689 -17.136 -2.858 1.942 
Unemployed 9.613 6.678 15.877 -9.453 
Selfemployed 20.054 55.802 -13.319 -7.665 
Union -48.965 14.325 18.090 -1.650 
Sicpay -43.992 -49.606 -10.583 17.939 
Payvac -103.683 -23.258 33.556 12.410 
Urban -22.542 -28.689 4.402 6.670 
Very Good Health -37.068 -2.631 6.327 4.328 
Good Health 8.927 -4.186 10.842 -5.576 
Fair Health -4.424 10.046 -3.185 0.845 
Poor Health 4.794 14.122 -0.755 -2.365 
Limit -19.324 44.955 -19.908 3.945 
Coglim -0.479 -1.409 9.504 -3.639 
Conditions -13.193 -6.270 -0.182 3.148 
Adrisk 24.848 8.991 -4.513 -4.433 
Adsmok 49.747 0.623 -7.454 -8.153 
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Table 15D.  Marginal Percentage Impacts of Selected Explanatory Variables on 
Insurance Choices among Non-elderly Adults with Asthma  
Results from the First Equation in the Asthma Sample 
Variable Name Uninsured HINDC HIWDC HMODC 
Female -32.450 -12.542 2.441 7.677 
Black 18.785 18.329 -61.431 -1.510 
Hispanic 44.320 -2.322 -60.490 2.758 
Mid Income 48.064 -16.729 -22.650 3.712 
Low Income 86.220 24.240 -59.815 -17.486 
Near Poor 138.333 -15.472 -41.137 -39.295 
Poor 139.215 34.849 -70.966 -58.475 
Married -22.094 -31.037 5.104 12.834 
Divorced 35.367 -19.049 -11.634 3.903 
Household -5.754 4.923 -1.796 -0.626 
High School -18.811 -7.573 -3.347 5.112 
BA -40.385 -7.434 20.372 3.012 
MA -48.536 -4.184 20.177 2.205 
Employed -1.730 27.632 -2.860 -8.465 
Unemployed -5.884 18.571 6.372 -7.821 
Selfemployed -7.840 15.674 -31.695 -0.944 
Union -68.493 10.853 2.834 1.094 
Sicpay -73.767 -55.574 27.951 25.751 
Payvac -68.926 -17.016 -6.975 14.736 
Urban -23.792 -18.215 -0.926 10.156 
Very Good Health -3.504 29.694 -19.938 -8.140 
Good Health 12.017 35.453 -16.223 -13.020 
Fair Health 42.418 -12.004 -27.778 2.741 
Poor Health 73.829 -45.787 21.968 -1.713 
Limit 11.358 -35.713 29.239 4.510 
Coglim -18.756 35.227 -4.401 -13.441 
Aspkfl -23.637 1.172 7.388 0.652 
Emphdx -15.929 22.897 9.770 -9.745 
Conditions -42.049 -39.096 -1.106 15.652 
Adrisk 13.274 17.836 -6.914 -7.273 
Adsmok 64.174 -43.976 -5.675 6.362 
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Table 16A-1.  Marginal Effects of Selected Variables in the Hypertension Sample 
Results from the Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Expenditure > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Pr.(*) |Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Ln(Exp*)|Exp>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Exp Pr.Expgenonly Pr.Expbraonly Pr.Expboth Ln(Exp) Ln(Expgenonly)    Ln(Expbraonly)    Ln(Expboth)    
Base Probability 0.810 0.448 0.332 0.221 - - - - 
HINDC 0.074 -0.080 0.011 0.068 0.176 -0.036 -0.097 0.474 
HIWDC 0.111 -0.113 0.075 0.043 -0.329 -0.584 -0.483 -0.202 
HMODC 0.097 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.460 -0.500 -0.502 -0.261 
HINDC*Obnum 0.037 -0.019 0.018 0.002 0.064 0.119 0.042 -0.055 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.013 -0.005 -0.013 0.013 0.032 0.016 0.044 0.000 
HMODC*Obnum 0.014 -0.018 -0.002 0.019 0.042 0.010 0.033 0.004 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.029 -0.033 0.017 0.015 0.114 0.089 0.067 0.080 
Female 0.046 0.015 -0.042 0.027 -0.032 -0.048 0.000 -0.063 
Black -0.002 -0.054 0.046 0.009 0.132 0.029 0.098 0.124 
Hispanic -0.029 -0.023 0.064 -0.045 0.014 -0.013 0.023 0.039 
Mid Income -0.001 0.019 -0.014 -0.007 0.024 0.058 0.004 0.068 
Low Income -0.026 0.077 -0.086 0.008 -0.024 0.064 0.077 -0.031 
Near Poor -0.059 0.099 -0.093 -0.011 -0.059 -0.003 0.174 0.071 
Poor -0.041 0.041 -0.051 0.014 0.014 0.104 -0.015 -0.005 
Married 0.021 -0.001 0.015 -0.013 0.027 0.087 0.015 -0.097 
Divorced -0.031 -0.010 0.041 -0.029 0.027 0.046 -0.010 0.021 
Household -0.013 0.007 0.006 -0.013 -0.010 -0.029 0.036 0.019 
High School -0.005 -0.023 -0.010 0.034 0.106 0.076 0.046 0.092 
BA 0.008 -0.039 0.014 0.025 0.076 -0.055 0.053 0.101 
MA -0.010 0.010 -0.034 0.026 -0.059 -0.093 -0.049 -0.027 
Employed -0.004 -0.008 0.021 -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.044 0.088 
Unemployed 0.011 -0.045 0.021 0.025 0.033 -0.078 0.167 -0.049 
Selfemployed 0.017 -0.028 0.010 0.017 0.215 0.155 0.292 0.062 
Union 0.001 -0.017 -0.003 0.018 -0.116 -0.132 -0.088 -0.205 
Sicpay 0.031 -0.019 0.019 0.002 0.027 0.011 0.114 -0.144 
Payvac -0.007 -0.024 -0.015 0.039 0.046 -0.082 0.120 0.021 
Urban -0.011 0.013 -0.010 -0.006 -0.058 -0.082 -0.044 0.027 
Very Good Health 0.039 -0.020 -0.029 0.053 0.130 0.164 -0.021 0.064 
Good Health 0.040 -0.035 -0.012 0.055 0.222 0.247 0.078 0.080 
Fair Health 0.036 0.016 -0.074 0.064 0.215 0.298 0.083 0.130 
Poor Health 0.023 -0.049 -0.066 0.118 0.320 0.237 0.163 0.131 
Limit 0.011 -0.040 0.040 -0.006 -0.038 -0.199 0.070 0.050 
Coglim -0.022 0.102 -0.065 -0.035 -0.036 0.195 -0.085 -0.018 
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Table 16A-1.  (Continued) 
Results from the Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Expenditure > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Pr.(*) |Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Ln(Exp*)|Exp>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Exp Pr.Expgenonly Pr.Expbraonly Pr.Expboth Ln(Exp) Ln(Expgenonly)    Ln(Expbraonly)    Ln(Expboth)    
Chddx 0.055 -0.033 -0.084 0.086 0.064 -0.137 -0.031 0.095 
Midx 0.039 -0.087 0.027 0.047 0.172 0.058 0.129 0.030 
Angidx 0.013 -0.057 0.006 0.035 0.186 0.108 0.099 0.116 
Ohrtdx 0.042 -0.084 -0.013 0.081 0.064 -0.135 0.027 0.010 
Strkdx -0.018 -0.066 -0.072 0.099 0.299 0.188 0.110 0.244 
Conditions - - - - 0.054 0.010 -0.002 0.076 
Diabetes 0.019 -0.049 -0.001 0.039 - - - - 
Hyerlidpedemia 0.011 -0.018 0.019 -0.002 - - - - 
Adrisk -0.034 0.019 -0.010 -0.008 -0.052 -0.040 -0.089 0.038 
Adsmok -0.013 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.055 0.011 0.057 0.100 
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Table 16A-2.  Marginal Effects of Selected Variables in the Hypertension Sample 
Results from the Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Use > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Use|Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Pr.(*) |Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Use*|Use>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Use Pr.Usegenonly Pr.Usebraonly Pr.Useboth Use Usegenonly    Usebraonly    Useboth    
Base Probability 0.822 0.433 0.327 0.223 - - - - 
HINDC 0.062 0.003 -0.017 0.060 1.737 0.089 -0.318 4.982 
HIWDC 0.105 -0.058 0.044 0.037 1.320 -1.591 1.434 4.092 
HMODC 0.088 0.027 -0.029 -0.007 0.801 0.752 -0.664 4.482 
HINDC*Obnum 0.034 -0.005 0.010 0.002 -0.001 -0.093 0.317 -0.536 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.013 -0.001 -0.005 0.013 0.171 -0.010 -0.104 -0.255 
HMODC*Obnum 0.016 -0.016 0.008 0.018 0.356 -0.415 0.259 0.080 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.034 -0.015 0.010 0.014 0.313 -0.406 0.402 0.463 
Female 0.037 0.018 -0.052 0.028 0.146 0.481 -1.524 -0.379 
Black -0.001 -0.009 0.037 0.010 1.028 -0.272 1.074 2.718 
Hispanic -0.032 -0.031 0.016 -0.045 -0.761 -0.849 0.476 0.462 
Mid Income -0.001 0.003 -0.014 -0.008 0.157 0.074 -0.458 0.286 
Low Income -0.028 0.032 -0.069 0.008 0.162 0.847 -2.006 -0.573 
Near Poor -0.043 0.004 -0.017 -0.027 -0.256 -0.042 -0.334 -0.511 
Poor -0.033 0.013 -0.012 0.015 0.115 0.287 -0.259 -1.181 
Married 0.018 0.002 -0.009 -0.010 -0.096 0.034 -0.214 -0.204 
Divorced -0.030 -0.011 0.019 -0.025 0.024 -0.310 0.579 0.596 
Household -0.012 0.005 0.001 -0.013 -0.074 0.128 0.032 0.100 
High School -0.001 -0.024 -0.013 0.033 0.282 -0.675 -0.339 0.309 
BA 0.009 -0.054 -0.001 0.031 0.046 -1.477 -0.009 0.184 
MA -0.010 -0.029 -0.006 0.029 0.020 -0.836 -0.107 -0.212 
Employed -0.003 0.007 -0.037 -0.007 0.416 0.209 -1.153 1.459 
Unemployed 0.013 -0.014 -0.014 0.030 0.383 -0.374 -0.376 0.071 
Selfemployed 0.014 -0.020 0.026 0.024 0.476 -0.523 0.812 0.323 
Union -0.003 -0.011 -0.010 0.017 -0.358 -0.281 -0.240 -1.441 
Sicpay 0.033 -0.024 0.012 0.004 -0.426 -0.647 0.406 -1.285 
Payvac -0.010 -0.022 0.011 0.039 0.447 -0.621 0.363 -0.176 
Urban -0.014 -0.015 -0.030 -0.007 -0.210 -0.432 -0.872 0.075 
Very Good Health 0.041 -0.003 -0.016 0.049 0.353 -0.070 -0.393 -0.394 
Good Health 0.040 0.011 0.023 0.052 1.066 0.308 0.755 -0.463 
Fair Health 0.045 0.052 -0.034 0.062 1.326 1.432 -0.951 0.097 
Poor Health 0.033 0.054 0.014 0.114 2.447 1.531 0.445 0.056 
Limit 0.013 -0.028 0.054 -0.002 0.685 -0.768 1.711 1.999 
Coglim -0.026 0.056 -0.029 -0.037 1.070 1.544 -0.618 1.844 
155 
 
 
 
Table 16A-2.  (Continued) 
Results from the Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Use > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Use|Use>0 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
Pr.(*) |Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Use*|Use>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Use Pr.Usegenonly Pr.Usebraonly Pr.Useboth Use Usegenonly    Usebraonly    Useboth    
Chddx 0.065 -0.009 -0.055 0.087 1.470 -0.224 -1.185 1.821 
Midx 0.035 0.056 0.075 0.052 1.605 1.562 2.200 -1.219 
Angidx 0.004 0.001 -0.012 0.031 1.152 0.150 -0.295 1.903 
Ohrtdx 0.040 -0.055 0.003 0.089 1.453 -1.535 0.169 1.729 
Strkdx -0.006 0.082 -0.015 0.091 3.161 2.475 -0.889 3.153 
Conditions - - - - 0.770 -0.017 -0.094 1.805 
Diabetes 0.023 0.000 -0.004 0.046 - - - - 
Hyerlidpedemia 0.014 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 - - - - 
Adrisk -0.037 -0.009 -0.041 -0.007 -0.169 -0.235 -1.279 0.870 
Adsmok -0.008 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 0.124 -0.123 -0.222 0.826 
156 
 
 
 
Table 16B-1.  Marginal Effects of Selected Variables in the Diabetes Sample 
Results from the Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Expenditure > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
  Conditional on Exp > 0 
Pr.(*) |Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Ln(Exp*)|Exp>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Exp Pr.Expgenonly Pr.Expbraonly Pr.Expboth Ln(Exp) Ln(Expgenonly)    Ln(Expbraonly)    Ln(Expboth)    
Base Probability 0.656 0.373 0.360 0.271 - - - - 
HINDC 0.011 -0.007 -0.044 0.023 -0.010 -0.008 0.007 0.164 
HIWDC 0.097 0.011 -0.049 0.027 -1.065 -0.985 -1.001 -0.675 
HMODC 0.067 0.052 -0.033 -0.045 -1.136 -1.039 -0.982 -0.570 
HINDC*Obnum 0.037 -0.008 0.003 0.002 -0.034 -0.001 -0.058 0.094 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.028 -0.018 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.069 0.016 -0.012 
HMODC*Obnum 0.023 -0.007 0.004 0.003 0.019 0.027 0.038 0.029 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.031 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.007 0.066 -0.004 0.028 
Female -0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.006 0.010 -0.006 -0.057 0.073 
Black -0.008 0.011 -0.024 0.018 0.042 0.149 -0.042 0.061 
Hispanic 0.018 0.106 -0.079 -0.035 -0.212 -0.410 0.062 0.161 
Mid Income 0.003 0.010 -0.033 0.028 0.064 0.057 0.075 -0.021 
Low Income 0.038 0.067 -0.057 -0.018 -0.084 -0.039 0.114 -0.214 
Near Poor -0.062 0.085 -0.078 -0.019 0.015 0.016 -0.072 -0.018 
Poor -0.002 0.048 -0.063 0.033 -0.104 -0.047 0.043 -0.408 
Married -0.023 -0.008 -0.058 0.082 0.041 0.135 -0.078 -0.394 
Divorced -0.050 0.043 -0.068 0.034 0.025 -0.092 0.001 -0.221 
Household -0.003 0.001 0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.018 -0.014 -0.002 
High School -0.012 -0.022 0.002 0.018 -0.057 -0.041 -0.160 -0.179 
BA -0.049 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.136 0.036 -0.509 -0.062 
MA -0.052 -0.169 0.100 0.050 0.194 0.468 0.001 -0.313 
Employed 0.027 0.086 -0.060 -0.018 -0.147 -0.480 0.125 0.082 
Unemployed 0.014 0.069 -0.025 -0.040 -0.212 -0.579 0.170 -0.126 
Selfemployed 0.011 0.000 0.030 -0.029 -0.033 -0.100 0.050 0.009 
Union -0.028 0.004 -0.008 0.002 -0.186 -0.285 -0.147 -0.291 
Sicpay 0.023 0.006 0.030 -0.028 0.059 -0.115 0.294 0.158 
Payvac 0.046 -0.019 -0.044 0.056 -0.156 0.122 -0.262 -0.300 
Urban -0.010 0.079 -0.007 -0.065 -0.127 -0.139 -0.107 0.066 
Very Good Health 0.002 -0.003 0.016 -0.016 0.113 0.275 0.059 0.305 
Good Health 0.061 -0.022 -0.006 0.012 0.056 0.309 0.100 0.094 
Fair Health 0.057 -0.027 -0.006 0.025 0.088 0.382 0.029 0.155 
Poor Health -0.030 -0.061 -0.007 0.053 0.447 0.588 0.119 0.300 
Limit -0.045 0.050 0.061 -0.109 -0.048 -0.347 0.177 0.266 
Coglim -0.017 0.022 -0.045 0.033 0.039 0.047 0.090 -0.282 
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Table 16B-1.  (Continued) 
Results from the Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Expenditure > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
  Conditional on Exp > 0 
Pr.(*) |Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Ln(Exp*)|Exp>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Exp Pr.Expgenonly Pr.Expbraonly Pr.Expboth Ln(Exp) Ln(Expgenonly)    Ln(Expbraonly)    Ln(Expboth)    
Chddx 0.125 -0.020 0.027 -0.029 -0.297 -0.291 -0.011 -0.161 
Midx -0.041 -0.081 0.019 0.041 0.268 0.211 0.353 -0.071 
Angidx -0.069 0.116 0.026 -0.111 0.005 -0.156 -0.230 0.702 
Ohrtdx -0.038 -0.037 0.034 0.011 0.049 -0.101 0.108 -0.011 
Strkdx 0.017 -0.049 -0.006 0.051 0.113 0.210 -0.116 0.141 
Dskidn 0.122 -0.075 -0.023 0.081 -0.001 0.257 -0.248 0.171 
Dseypr 0.064 -0.134 0.038 0.079 0.028 0.323 0.011 -0.241 
Conditions - - - - -0.036 0.083 0.034 -0.027 
Hypertension 0.037 -0.001 0.009 -0.009 - - - - 
Hyerlidpedemia 0.066 -0.014 -0.039 0.041 - - - - 
Adrisk -0.011 0.044 -0.043 0.005 0.031 -0.215 0.077 0.117 
Adsmok -0.027 0.057 -0.025 -0.036 0.007 -0.136 0.078 0.126 
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Table 16B-2.  Marginal Effects of Selected Variables in the Diabetes Sample 
Results from the Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Use > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Use|Use>0 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
Pr.(*) |Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Use*|Use>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Use Pr.Usegenonly Pr.Usebraonly Pr.Useboth Use Usegenonly    Usebraonly    Useboth    
Base Probability 0.681 0.365 0.280 0.357 - - - - 
HINDC -0.001 -0.034 0.037 -0.007 4.212 2.592 2.386 7.224 
HIWDC 0.090 -0.053 0.060 0.001 0.637 0.195 0.019 1.788 
HMODC 0.077 -0.021 -0.011 0.030 -0.115 -0.128 0.098 0.726 
HINDC*Obnum 0.034 0.003 0.004 -0.007 -0.288 -0.218 -0.405 0.141 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.041 0.004 0.007 -0.018 0.126 0.037 0.128 0.112 
HMODC*Obnum 0.029 0.005 0.002 -0.009 0.259 0.163 0.264 0.600 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.028 -0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.227 0.275 0.240 0.202 
Female -0.010 0.006 0.008 -0.011 -0.105 -0.599 -0.213 0.475 
Black -0.010 -0.025 0.025 -0.004 1.301 1.283 0.098 3.118 
Hispanic 0.011 -0.080 -0.039 0.112 -1.368 -1.197 -0.858 -0.864 
Mid Income 0.003 -0.031 0.033 0.001 0.638 1.002 0.691 -0.628 
Low Income 0.040 -0.059 -0.009 0.067 -0.256 1.356 0.391 -2.583 
Near Poor 0.007 -0.089 -0.038 0.122 -1.497 -0.154 -0.439 -2.547 
Poor 0.013 -0.067 0.025 0.051 0.026 0.727 0.959 -1.601 
Married -0.023 -0.055 0.078 -0.014 0.605 -0.453 0.869 0.456 
Divorced -0.038 -0.063 0.045 0.023 0.475 -0.708 0.559 1.464 
Household -0.002 0.009 -0.010 0.002 -0.202 0.030 -0.312 -0.199 
High School -0.015 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.152 -0.345 -0.600 -0.659 
BA -0.039 0.009 -0.019 0.011 -1.007 0.247 -2.926 -0.217 
MA -0.050 0.108 0.015 -0.157 -0.058 -1.677 -0.111 -2.529 
Employed 0.042 -0.061 -0.012 0.087 -0.020 -0.038 1.714 0.222 
Unemployed 0.015 -0.029 -0.063 0.101 -0.173 -1.057 2.629 -0.896 
Selfemployed 0.006 0.021 -0.019 0.002 -0.010 -0.225 0.144 -0.789 
Union -0.027 -0.018 0.006 0.019 -0.858 -0.336 0.167 -3.101 
Sicpay 0.034 0.028 -0.033 0.011 0.331 -1.069 1.510 1.489 
Payvac 0.029 -0.041 0.038 -0.001 0.439 0.559 -0.274 -0.015 
Urban 0.003 -0.002 -0.057 0.066 -0.823 0.873 -1.296 -0.009 
Very Good Health 0.021 0.018 -0.013 -0.006 1.362 -0.244 2.624 3.183 
Good Health 0.087 0.005 0.025 -0.032 1.199 -0.207 2.474 2.044 
Fair Health 0.087 0.005 0.024 -0.029 1.306 -0.390 2.156 3.101 
Poor Health 0.015 0.006 0.048 -0.057 1.851 -0.050 2.311 1.970 
Limit -0.078 0.066 -0.066 0.002 0.370 -0.922 2.284 0.184 
Coglim -0.007 -0.063 0.018 0.050 -0.153 0.873 -0.449 -0.713 
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Table 16B-2.  (Continued) 
Results from the Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Use > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Use|Use>0 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
Pr.(*) |Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Use*|Use>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Use Pr.Usegenonly Pr.Usebraonly Pr.Useboth Use Usegenonly    Usebraonly    Useboth    
Chddx 0.102 0.020 -0.024 0.001 -0.256 -1.773 2.303 -1.844 
Midx -0.042 0.023 0.033 -0.071 0.579 0.635 1.748 -1.664 
Angidx -0.064 0.036 -0.123 0.107 0.290 0.083 -0.668 6.373 
Ohrtdx -0.033 0.035 0.012 -0.054 0.167 0.076 -0.125 0.083 
Strkdx 0.010 -0.005 0.034 -0.020 1.150 0.828 -0.959 2.828 
Dskidn 0.096 -0.033 0.074 -0.055 0.759 -0.467 -0.872 2.833 
Dseypr 0.067 0.043 0.079 -0.144 0.448 -0.179 0.267 -0.754 
Conditions - - - - 0.301 0.930 0.712 -0.591 
Hypertension 0.051 0.011 -0.011 -0.002 - - - - 
Hyerlidpedemia 0.073 -0.048 0.048 0.001 - - - - 
Adrisk -0.005 -0.047 0.016 0.033 0.506 -0.479 1.026 0.765 
Adsmok -0.008 -0.028 -0.022 0.051 -0.387 -0.548 -0.151 0.598 
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Table 16C-1.  Marginal Effects of Selected Variables in the Depression Sample 
Results from the Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Expenditure > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
  Conditional on Exp > 0 
Pr.(*) |Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Ln(Exp*)|Exp>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Exp Pr.Expgenonly Pr.Expbraonly Pr.Expboth Ln(Exp) Ln(Expgenonly)    Ln(Expbraonly)    Ln(Expboth)    
Base Probability 0.542 0.235 0.619 0.147 - - - - 
HINDC 0.156 -0.018 -0.057 0.096 0.112 0.090 0.315 0.453 
HIWDC 0.211 -0.052 -0.004 0.067 -0.850 -0.613 -0.430 -0.878 
HMODC 0.183 -0.017 -0.044 0.073 -0.883 -0.715 -0.460 -0.822 
HINDC*Obnum 0.011 -0.011 -0.004 0.007 0.004 0.063 0.031 -0.019 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.008 
HMODC*Obnum 0.010 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.009 0.016 0.011 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.022 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.007 0.027 0.016 0.033 
Female 0.085 0.032 -0.073 0.040 -0.058 0.108 0.121 0.162 
Black -0.234 -0.024 0.013 0.009 -0.058 -0.296 -0.743 -0.480 
Hispanic -0.089 0.015 -0.001 -0.018 -0.142 -0.387 -0.333 -0.120 
Mid Income -0.005 0.010 -0.015 0.005 -0.021 -0.027 -0.034 -0.089 
Low Income -0.043 0.018 -0.013 -0.005 0.214 0.221 0.196 -0.287 
Near Poor -0.040 -0.017 0.032 -0.011 0.338 0.795 0.054 0.156 
Poor -0.053 0.012 0.022 -0.032 0.323 0.097 0.269 0.153 
Married 0.041 -0.002 -0.042 0.046 -0.044 -0.128 0.097 -0.124 
Divorced -0.025 0.002 -0.012 0.013 0.036 -0.109 0.003 0.025 
Household 0.003 -0.015 0.026 -0.011 0.009 0.069 -0.003 -0.021 
High School 0.037 0.001 0.013 -0.018 -0.138 -0.008 -0.058 -0.086 
BA 0.041 0.004 0.001 -0.009 -0.071 0.302 -0.069 -0.025 
MA 0.045 -0.039 0.021 0.019 0.053 0.294 0.084 0.107 
Employed -0.001 0.020 0.047 -0.065 -0.110 -0.015 -0.087 -0.174 
Unemployed -0.004 0.029 -0.005 -0.019 -0.193 -0.107 -0.185 -0.201 
Selfemployed 0.013 -0.011 0.004 0.012 0.083 -0.122 0.232 0.150 
Union 0.010 -0.051 0.034 0.019 -0.145 0.047 -0.334 0.192 
Sicpay 0.037 0.004 -0.018 0.015 -0.146 -0.056 -0.071 -0.036 
Payvac -0.021 0.028 -0.021 -0.003 0.084 0.124 0.110 -0.092 
Urban -0.056 -0.027 0.014 0.012 0.193 0.027 0.106 -0.098 
Very Good Health 0.015 -0.015 -0.038 0.067 0.222 -0.052 0.323 0.023 
Good Health 0.029 -0.013 -0.039 0.068 0.200 -0.025 0.285 0.076 
Fair Health 0.057 -0.005 -0.078 0.095 0.150 -0.047 0.334 0.127 
Poor Health 0.071 -0.021 -0.035 0.073 0.101 -0.270 0.426 -0.223 
Limit 0.096 -0.011 -0.035 0.038 -0.047 0.250 0.109 -0.056 
Coglim 0.005 0.018 -0.039 0.014 0.062 0.262 -0.041 0.218 
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Table 16C-1.  (Continued) 
Results from the Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Expenditure > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
  Conditional on Exp > 0 
Pr.(*) |Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Ln(Exp*)|Exp>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Exp Pr.Expgenonly Pr.Expbraonly Pr.Expboth Ln(Exp) Ln(Expgenonly)    Ln(Expbraonly)    Ln(Expboth)    
MCS -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 
Conditions - - - - 0.013 0.074 0.031 0.158 
Adrisk -0.075 -0.004 0.032 -0.024 0.109 -0.007 -0.028 0.026 
Adsmok -0.020 -0.037 -0.021 0.054 0.063 -0.126 0.013 0.038 
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Table 16C-2.  Marginal Effects of Selected Variables in the Depression Sample 
Results from the Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Use > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Use|Use>0 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
Pr.(*) |Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Use*|Use>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Use Pr.Usegenonly Pr.Usebraonly Pr.Useboth Use Usegenonly    Usebraonly    Useboth    
Base Probability 0.555 0.238 0.610 0.152 - - - - 
HINDC 0.154 -0.022 -0.043 0.093 -0.322 -2.135 0.187 1.083 
HIWDC 0.202 -0.072 0.010 0.077 0.718 0.325 1.072 0.783 
HMODC 0.178 -0.037 -0.027 0.080 0.880 -0.387 1.493 0.266 
HINDC*Obnum 0.010 -0.014 -0.003 0.007 0.206 -0.063 0.115 0.092 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.006 -0.004 0.000 0.002 0.105 0.012 0.116 0.068 
HMODC*Obnum 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.037 0.046 0.013 0.050 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.024 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.095 0.149 0.116 0.036 
Female 0.080 0.015 -0.056 0.040 1.111 1.261 0.842 1.370 
Black -0.221 0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -1.747 -1.367 -2.575 -0.665 
Hispanic -0.099 0.001 0.017 -0.023 -1.110 -1.926 -0.946 -1.702 
Mid Income -0.013 0.002 -0.008 0.007 0.073 -0.027 0.118 0.081 
Low Income -0.055 0.012 -0.002 -0.010 0.623 0.907 0.299 1.796 
Near Poor -0.020 0.027 -0.009 -0.013 0.522 0.900 -0.063 3.316 
Poor -0.054 0.013 0.032 -0.044 0.275 0.165 0.297 3.090 
Married 0.048 0.006 -0.042 0.038 0.410 0.197 0.370 0.435 
Divorced -0.021 0.015 -0.016 0.004 0.363 -0.287 0.137 1.401 
Household 0.002 -0.018 0.025 -0.008 0.031 0.126 0.105 -0.197 
High School 0.039 -0.010 0.021 -0.016 -0.173 0.185 -0.112 -0.249 
BA 0.038 -0.010 0.006 -0.002 -0.279 0.405 -0.483 0.030 
MA 0.050 -0.049 0.015 0.033 0.761 1.159 -0.311 3.587 
Employed 0.013 0.028 0.038 -0.064 -0.435 0.922 0.065 -0.968 
Unemployed 0.010 0.036 -0.022 -0.010 -0.400 0.762 -0.208 -1.180 
Selfemployed 0.010 -0.025 0.007 0.021 -0.090 -0.959 0.104 -0.400 
Union 0.008 -0.045 0.037 0.010 0.411 0.664 -0.058 2.085 
Sicpay 0.038 0.000 -0.025 0.027 -0.120 0.089 -0.614 1.969 
Payvac -0.017 0.030 -0.019 -0.008 0.415 0.967 0.378 -0.640 
Urban -0.061 -0.021 0.011 0.010 0.336 0.033 0.432 0.078 
Very Good Health 0.018 -0.017 -0.040 0.071 0.660 0.095 0.664 -1.217 
Good Health 0.038 -0.015 -0.044 0.077 0.442 -0.281 0.476 -1.565 
Fair Health 0.063 -0.009 -0.074 0.097 1.055 -0.028 1.148 -0.372 
Poor Health 0.100 -0.010 -0.046 0.075 0.503 0.283 0.619 -2.096 
Limit 0.106 -0.010 -0.042 0.045 0.617 0.883 0.213 0.615 
Coglim 0.008 0.014 -0.040 0.016 0.830 0.527 0.006 3.436 
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Table 16C-2.  (Continued) 
Results from the Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Use > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Use|Use>0 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
Pr.(*) |Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Use*|Use>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Use Pr.Usegenonly Pr.Usebraonly Pr.Useboth Use Usegenonly    Usebraonly    Useboth    
MCS -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.012 0.021 0.013 0.002 
Conditions     0.359 0.466 0.468 0.983 
Adrisk -0.073 -0.007 0.024 -0.016 0.130 0.115 -0.041 0.037 
Adsmok -0.017 -0.028 -0.029 0.054 -0.008 -0.755 -0.089 -0.030 
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Table 16D-1.  Marginal Effects of Selected Variables in the Asthma Sample 
Results from the Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Expenditure > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
  Conditional on Exp > 0 
Pr.(*) |Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Ln(Exp*)|Exp>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Exp Pr.Expgenonly Pr.Expbraonly Pr.Expboth Ln(Exp) Ln(Expgenonly)    Ln(Expbraonly)    Ln(Expboth)    
Base Probability 0.208 0.694 0.196 0.113 - - - - 
HINDC 0.032 0.188 -0.161 -0.011 -0.317 -0.386 -0.180 -0.001 
HIWDC 0.046 -0.071 0.045 0.023 -0.693 -0.586 -0.536 -1.047 
HMODC 0.073 0.012 -0.050 0.031 -0.672 -0.522 -0.773 -0.787 
HINDC*Obnum 0.071 -0.088 0.040 0.008 -0.033 0.238 0.094 0.019 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.046 0.005 -0.009 0.002 -0.024 -0.010 0.051 0.031 
HMODC*Obnum 0.037 -0.009 0.000 0.007 0.013 0.016 0.025 -0.002 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.073 0.022 -0.023 -0.001 -0.021 0.066 0.021 -0.013 
Female 0.004 -0.034 0.016 0.022 -0.231 -0.292 -0.257 -0.318 
Black -0.032 0.008 0.030 -0.027 0.100 0.016 0.355 -0.078 
Hispanic -0.016 0.077 0.012 -0.098 -0.374 -0.298 -0.586 0.622 
Mid Income -0.012 0.036 -0.024 -0.024 0.064 0.122 0.035 0.180 
Low Income -0.037 0.024 0.001 -0.024 -0.019 -0.007 -0.094 0.441 
Near Poor -0.011 0.115 -0.082 -0.037 0.492 0.722 -1.224 0.531 
Poor -0.042 -0.100 0.063 0.030 0.125 0.048 0.340 -0.488 
Married 0.012 -0.091 0.041 0.053 0.088 -0.017 0.324 -0.113 
Divorced 0.002 -0.109 0.038 0.070 0.286 0.195 0.560 -0.444 
Household -0.004 0.017 -0.005 -0.013 0.002 0.057 -0.124 0.010 
High School -0.011 -0.046 0.014 0.025 0.063 0.010 -0.026 -0.059 
BA -0.020 0.026 0.001 -0.041 -0.111 0.023 -0.707 0.291 
MA -0.043 -0.106 0.075 0.027 0.054 0.028 -0.183 0.356 
Employed -0.034 -0.005 0.031 -0.031 0.234 0.311 0.218 -0.033 
Unemployed -0.011 -0.079 0.040 0.039 0.089 0.168 -0.492 -0.183 
Selfemployed 0.012 -0.047 0.027 0.020 0.007 -0.087 -0.079 0.243 
Union 0.023 -0.147 0.079 0.075 0.067 -0.158 0.230 0.212 
Sicpay 0.008 0.032 -0.009 -0.028 -0.142 -0.165 0.078 0.092 
Payvac 0.009 -0.054 0.000 0.052 0.002 -0.036 -0.173 -0.502 
Urban -0.010 -0.020 0.038 -0.012 -0.083 -0.048 -0.357 -0.030 
Very Good Health 0.062 -0.092 -0.018 0.156 0.118 0.019 0.065 -0.254 
Good Health 0.089 -0.079 -0.027 0.144 0.103 0.084 -0.247 -0.059 
Fair Health 0.117 -0.114 -0.010 0.164 0.126 0.008 0.000 -0.315 
Poor Health 0.140 -0.174 -0.012 0.213 0.552 0.429 -0.026 -0.128 
Limit -0.018 0.056 -0.017 -0.040 0.165 0.420 -0.685 1.039 
Coglim -0.017 0.050 -0.029 -0.008 -0.110 -0.079 -0.075 -0.355 
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Table 16D-1.  (Continued) 
Results from the Expenditure Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Expenditure > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Ln(Exp)|Exp>0 
  Conditional on Exp > 0 
Pr.(*) |Exp>0 
 Conditional on Exp > 0 
Ln(Exp*)|Exp>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Exp Pr.Expgenonly Pr.Expbraonly Pr.Expboth Ln(Exp) Ln(Expgenonly)    Ln(Expbraonly)    Ln(Expboth)    
Emphdx 0.014 -0.156 0.087 0.082 0.395 0.233 1.207 -0.329 
Conditions - - - - 0.005 -0.025 0.194 -0.341 
Aspkfl 0.190 -0.048 -0.013 0.061 0.065 0.361 -0.170 -0.475 
Adrisk -0.015 -0.006 -0.005 0.004 -0.138 -0.180 -0.244 -0.039 
Adsmok -0.014 -0.012 0.010 -0.003 0.078 0.136 -0.210 -0.050 
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Table 16D-2.  Marginal Effects of Selected Variables in the Asthma Sample 
Results from the Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Use > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Use|Use>0 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
Pr.(*) |Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Use*|Use>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Use Pr.Usegenonly Pr.Usebraonly Pr.Useboth Use Usegenonly    Usebraonly    Useboth    
Base Probability 0.211 0.690 0.204 0.112 - - - - 
HINDC 0.028 0.184 -0.111 0.007 0.576 0.214 -0.224 -0.985 
HIWDC 0.044 -0.077 0.022 0.035 0.324 0.287 1.383 -0.050 
HMODC 0.071 0.009 -0.060 0.043 0.760 0.675 0.771 -0.081 
HINDC*Obnum 0.069 -0.087 0.026 0.007 -0.142 0.139 0.382 0.906 
HIWDC*Obnum 0.047 0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.041 0.023 -0.036 0.276 
HMODC*Obnum 0.038 -0.009 -0.004 0.007 0.156 0.111 -0.030 0.285 
Uninsured*Obnum 0.078 0.015 0.010 0.001 0.260 0.188 0.820 -0.964 
Female 0.003 -0.034 -0.016 -0.001 -1.114 -1.159 -0.906 -2.791 
Black -0.027 -0.007 0.070 -0.015 0.509 0.605 1.822 -0.999 
Hispanic -0.013 0.065 -0.009 -0.097 -0.995 -0.772 -1.061 0.350 
Mid Income -0.011 0.030 -0.023 -0.019 0.567 0.685 -0.065 2.360 
Low Income -0.039 0.021 -0.064 -0.023 -0.208 0.097 -1.236 1.871 
Near Poor -0.015 0.112 -0.026 -0.023 2.398 2.950 -0.449 -2.994 
Poor -0.043 -0.105 0.041 0.032 -0.230 -0.016 -0.407 0.961 
Married 0.013 -0.089 -0.003 0.054 -0.012 -0.207 0.312 1.547 
Divorced 0.004 -0.108 0.061 0.069 0.791 0.337 1.866 1.617 
Household -0.004 0.016 0.000 -0.012 0.029 0.096 -0.143 -0.009 
High School -0.010 -0.046 0.007 0.026 -0.170 -0.424 -0.061 -0.073 
BA -0.019 0.019 -0.047 -0.036 -0.353 -0.226 -1.132 -0.041 
MA -0.044 -0.111 0.056 0.031 0.083 -0.232 -0.062 5.394 
Employed -0.035 -0.006 0.025 -0.028 0.525 0.872 0.291 -3.120 
Unemployed -0.010 -0.090 0.032 0.037 1.448 1.304 0.287 1.568 
Selfemployed 0.013 -0.049 0.057 0.021 -0.560 -1.001 0.817 1.294 
Union 0.019 -0.147 0.082 0.067 0.273 -0.269 0.661 2.314 
Sicpay 0.010 0.028 0.039 -0.028 0.019 -0.155 1.684 -0.214 
Payvac 0.009 -0.055 -0.010 0.055 -0.291 -0.355 -1.369 -0.472 
Urban -0.010 -0.025 -0.010 -0.019 -0.439 -0.081 -0.687 -0.863 
Very Good Health 0.062 -0.094 -0.014 0.178 0.827 0.353 0.013 1.991 
Good Health 0.089 -0.074 -0.024 0.166 1.207 0.840 0.116 1.903 
Fair Health 0.120 -0.111 0.010 0.186 1.149 0.702 0.127 2.542 
Poor Health 0.140 -0.174 0.002 0.238 2.682 1.691 0.020 4.960 
Limit -0.019 0.050 -0.031 -0.036 1.056 1.981 -1.939 7.871 
Coglim -0.019 0.052 -0.057 -0.003 -1.054 -0.852 -0.929 -7.059 
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Table 16D-2.  (Continued) 
Results from the Utilization Equations (Joint Estimates) 
 Meff_P2_Covariate 
Prob. of Use > 0 
Meff_Covariate 
Use|Use>0 
  Conditional on Use > 0 
Pr.(*) |Use>0 
 Conditional on Use > 0 
Use*|Use>0 
Variable 
Name 
Pr.Use Pr.Usegenonly Pr.Usebraonly Pr.Useboth Use Usegenonly    Usebraonly    Useboth    
Emphdx 0.022 -0.148 0.113 0.051 1.794 1.517 4.246 0.181 
Conditions - - - - -0.283 -0.262 0.916 -2.562 
Aspkfl 0.194 -0.049 -0.037 0.056 0.463 0.922 -0.548 -1.688 
Adrisk -0.011 0.000 -0.047 0.013 -0.718 -0.954 -0.548 -1.640 
Adsmok -0.010 -0.017 -0.010 0.005 0.473 0.761 -0.421 -0.078 
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This study explores insurance choice of the chronically ill non-elderly adults and 
their utilization and expenditures on prescription drugs. Discrete factor model is used 
to estimate an individual’s probability of any drug use and the conditional level of 
utilization and associated out-of-pocket expenditures. Analyses on four subpopulation 
groups, i.e. hypertension, diabetes, asthma and depression, provide detailed insights 
into individuals’ health insurance decision making and subsequent prescription drug 
filling behavior, given their health insurance status. The results indicate that only a 
few health risk factors are statistically significant in determining an individual’s 
health insurance status, and that the direction of the effects are mixed, implying no 
definite pattern of self-selection. Meanwhile, most health characteristic variables are 
strongly related to overall use of prescription drugs. The association between health 
insurance and prescription drug utilization and expenditures differs by condition. The 
greatest one is evident among individuals with depression or hypertension, while the 
weakest is among individuals with asthma. These findings have important implication 
for policy makers and plan designers in evaluating the affordability of the 
combination of drugs, assessing individuals’ financial burden of drug treatment and 
rationalizing drug formulary decisions, to ultimately improve population health 
outcomes.   
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wage differentials in petroleum industry. The findings provided practical implications in 
increasing firm productivity through employee involvement and financial incentives. 
   Analyzed applied economic policies on petroleum and petrochemical industry and     
recommended changes in policies.  
 
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS 
   Mendelson Levin Award for best thesis work in the field of Economics, Wayne State 
University, Summer 2013 
   Dissertation Fellowship, Wayne State University, Winter 2011 
   Graduate Professional Scholarship, Wayne State University, Fall 2007 to Winter 2010 
   Thomas C. Rumble University Graduate Fellowship, one-year, merit based fellowship, 
Wayne State University, Fall 2006 to Winter 2007 
   Excellent Academic Scholarship, University of Petroleum of China, Beijing, Fall 1999 to 
Winter 2002 
 
PUBLICATION 
   2008: Made in China (Eds. with Qi Shen, Tian Xia, Hui Ding and Yuqing Yang), Hubei: 
Hubei Cishu Press, 2005. 
 
